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FOREWORD
This monograph is intended to contribute to a more
comprehensive debate on the Wider Europe and how
the United States and the European Union (EU) can
more effectively shape a successful Eastern Dimension.
The Central-East European (CEE) capitals contend that
without a realistic prospect for the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and EU accession, Ukraine,
Belarus, Moldova, and Georgia will increasingly
become sources of domestic and regional instability
and objects of Russia’s neo-imperialist ambitions. Such
developments will negatively impact on U.S. strategic
interests and have serious security implications for
America’s new European allies. Washington needs to
be closely engaged alongside the EU to prevent the
most destabilizing scenarios from materializing and to
consolidate trans-Atlantic security.
Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia face serious
obstacles to their Euro-Atlantic integration, including
internal political divisions, Moscow’s resistance to
further NATO and EU expansion, and the hesitation
of EU and Allied capitals in offering clear membership
prospects. In this inauspicious environment, the new
members of both NATO and the EU have sought to
develop credible policies for consolidating democratic
reforms among their eastern neighbors, enhancing
their prospects for trans-Atlantic inclusion, and
contributing to containing a resurgent and assertive
Russia. The CEE governments have also endeavored
to more closely involve the United States in the process
of Euro-Atlantic enlargement, as this will expand the
zone of democratic security.
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There are several reasons why the Black Sea and
trans-Caucasian region are important for the security
of the European continent and the Atlantic Alliance.
First, weak, divided states, or authoritarian states are a
threat to their own security and to the security of their
neighbors. Moldova, Georgia, and potentially Ukraine
are politically polarized and divided states where the
absence of territorial integrity and elite consensus
corrupts state institutions, undermines economic
development, and prevents regional cooperation.
These states are also susceptible to Russian government
manipulation, economic blackmail, and political
pressure precisely because they remain weak and
divided.
Second, a variety of military and submilitary
threats challenge the region, including a spillover of
armed conflict from the Moscow-sponsored separatist
entities in Moldova and Georgia; and Russian military
involvement among neighbors in preventing state
integration. A potential escalation of armed conflict
between Georgia and the two separatist regimes in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia may also precipitate a
wider conflict by drawing in neighboring powers and
even the United States and the EU into the conflict.
Third, major energy supplies to Europe from the
Caspian Basin will increasingly traverse the Caucasus
and Black Sea regions, and their transit needs to be
secured from potential disruption, whether as a result of
blockages by suppliers or transit countries or sabotage
by substate actors and international terrorists. Reliable
supplies are best guaranteed by diversifying suppliers
and routes and bringing the entire region under a more
secure NATO umbrella.
And fourth, the East European-Black Sea region
connects the EU and NATO with the Middle East, the
vi

Caspian zone, and Central Asia—three areas that will be
critical for U.S., NATO, and EU security interests over
the coming decade. As a result, the region will remain
a battleground between Atlanticism and Eurasianism,
in essence between the West and Russia, as both sides
will seek to project and defend their influences.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
This monograph provides a set of recommendations
to the United States, NATO allies, and EU institutions
in promoting a more consequential Eastern Dimension.
Above all, the U.S. administration needs to clearly
make the argument that progress toward stable states
and secure democracies in a widening Europe and an
expanding trans-Atlantic community that encompasses
the Black Sea zone is in America’s national interests and
serves its strategic goals. The eventual inclusion of all
East European states that are currently situated outside
NATO and the creation of a wider Alliance would help
expand and consolidate democratic systems, open up
new markets, stabilize Washington’s new allies, and
increase the number of potential U.S. partners.
Russia is not a reliable partner for Washington as it
has its own ambitions to restore its regional dominance
and to undercut the U.S. policy of democratic
expansion. Contingencies for a potentially unstable
post-Putin era also need to be drawn up as we cannot
assume that Putinism has created a stable authoritarian
system. Russia confronts several looming crises:
demographic ethnic, religious, economic, social, and
political, especially if power struggles become manifest
between the new Kremlin oligarchs and security chiefs
who have gained control over large sectors of the
economy. Although the United States has few tools to
influence Russia’s internal development, it can deploy
its economic, diplomatic, and military capabilities to
contain any instabilities emanating from Russia that
could challenge the security of neighboring countries.
NATO Allies must be prepared for a long and
arduous struggle if they want to ensure that Moscow’s
ix

neighbors become America’s and Europe’s partners
with closer political, economic, and security ties.
In particular, a sustained package of incentives
and assistance must be provided for Ukraine to
consolidate the advantages of democratic reform.
Targeted assistance is necessary for the Belarusian
opposition and elements of the establishment that
may seek an alternative to the Lukashenka regime.
A more activist policy can be pursued to reintegrate
the divided Moldovan and Georgian states, promote
democratization, combat criminal networks, and give
both countries the prospect of a U.S. alliance.
NATO itself should devise a more coherent,
consensual, and long-range approach toward the
aspirant states in Eastern Europe in terms of future
Alliance membership. As NATO takes on a global
role in such areas as peace enforcement, humanitarian
support, and state stabilization countries that fulfill
the general criteria for inclusion, including democratic
rule and security sector reform, need to obtain a
membership track.
NATO must be prepared to provide peacekeeping
forces and other units in the “frozen conflicts” in
Moldova (Transnistria) and Georgia (Abkhazia
and South Ossetia), while Chisinau and Tbilisi
need to formulate concrete proposals for Alliance
participation in peacekeeping operations. They can
also engage in democratization programs, civil society
building, security sector reform, demilitarization,
demobilization, and antiproliferation in former
conflict zones. NATO can also plan for the creation
of a joint peacekeeping contingent under the auspices
of the GUAM organization (comprised of Georgia,
Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) that would help
raise its visibility and practical value. The contingent
x

could serve alongside NATO and U.S. units in various
conflict or reconstruction zones.
The EU can be instrumental in establishing a fund
to support democratic movements in the authoritarian
states of the post-communist world, including
Belarus and Russia. Before he was elected Estonia’s
President in October 2006, the vice chairman of the
European Parliament Toomas Hendrik Ilves made
such a recommendation together with British, Polish,
Hungarian, and Czech Europarliamentarians. The idea
would be to bypass current EU regulations that only
allow funds to be donated to movements approved by
each country’s government. Because the fund cannot
be created within the framework of the EU due to the
opposition of the older members, the new EU entrants
need to take the initiative. The European Liberty Fund
has been proposed as the name of the new initiative,
which would work through alternative mechanisms to
support the democratic opposition.
The EU should adopt a more prominent role in
resolving the separatist standoffs in Moldova and
Georgia. This would include the application of sanctions
and incentives where necessary to advance solutions.
The EU can also enhance its European Neighborhood
Policy (ENP) Action Plan with Moldova and Georgia
to include the issue of state reintegration. The South
Caucasus and Moldovan conflicts need to be raised
in senior discussions by EU representatives with
neighboring powers, particularly during EU-Russia
Summits and other high-level meetings.
A more coherent EU policy needs to be devised
toward Russia, working together with the United States
and NATO. Specifically, this would need to include
diplomatic pressure on Moscow to cease supporting the
Lukashenka dictatorship in Belarus; requirements to
xi

withdraw military contingents and weaponry from the
Transnistrian region of Moldova in line with Moscow’s
commitments at the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe Istanbul Summit in November
1999; and placing the Kaliningrad region on the Baltic
coast, which borders Poland and Lithuania, on the EU’s
neighborhood agenda to prevent it from becoming a
source of instability, criminality, and environmental
catastrophe for the Baltic region.
It is important for the United States and the EU to
coordinate their energy policies as a common strategic
security interest. Russian control over energy routes
from the Caspian region will undermine American
interests throughout the Middle East, Central Asia,
and Eastern Europe by giving Moscow strong
political leverage over these states. A trans-Atlantic
energy security strategy can direct more substantial
investment toward alternative routes from the Caspian
basin while NATO and EU members can pool their
resources during a crisis. This will lessen dependence,
instability, and potential future conflicts with Russia.
It is also important for the Central-East European
capitals to better coordinate and support each other in
EU and NATO institutions in devising and pursuing
policies of engagement with Eastern neighbors and
policies of realism toward Russia. This would engender
a more effective Eastern Dimension to trans-Atlantic
security.
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THE EASTERN DIMENSION OF AMERICA’S
NEW EUROPEAN ALLIES
I. INTRODUCTION
The post-Soviet countries of Belarus, Moldova,
Ukraine, and Georgia face serious obstacles to their EuroAtlantic integration. Among the notable challenges and
obstructions they will need to overcome are internal
political divisions and potential public opposition, the
resistance of the Russian administration to further North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European
Union (EU) expansion eastward, and the hesitation of
EU and Allied capitals in offering clear membership
prospects. In this inauspicious environment, the
Central-East European (CEE) countries, especially
the new members of both NATO and the EU, have
sought to develop credible policies for consolidating
democratic reforms among their eastern neighbors,
enhancing their prospects for inclusion in NATO and
the EU and thereby contribute to containing a resurgent
and assertive Russia. The CEE governments have also
endeavored to more closely involve the United States
in the process of Euro-Atlantic enlargement.
The CEE capitals contend that without a realistic
prospect for NATO and EU accession, Ukraine,
Belarus, Moldova, and Georgia will increasingly
become sources of domestic and regional instability
and objects of Russia’s neo-imperialist ambitions.
Such developments will also have negative security
implications for America’s new allies in CEE. Hence,
Washington needs to be closely involved alongside
Brussels to prevent the most destabilizing scenarios
from materializing.
1

There are several reasons why the former Sovietoccupied territories, including the Black Sea and
trans-Caucasian region, are important for the security
of the European continent and the Atlantic Alliance.
First, regarding questions of state stability, weak
states, divided states, and authoritarian states are a
threat to their own security and to the security of their
neighbors. Moldova, Georgia, and potentially Ukraine
are politically polarized and divided states where the
absence of territorial integrity and elite consensus
corrupts state institutions, fosters organized crime,
undermines economic development, discourages
foreign investment, and prevents regional cooperation.
These states are also susceptible to Russian government
manipulation, economic blackmail, and political
pressure precisely because they remain weak and
divided.
Russia and Belarus are authoritarian states seeking
to limit Euro-Atlantic expansion in their neighborhood.
Belarus is an isolationist dictatorship that may prove a
security threat to its western neighbors if it succumbs
completely to Russian domination, represses its
national minorities, and serves as an outpost of antiWesternism and anti-Americanism in Central Europe.
Russia itself is intent on constructing a sphere of
dominance throughout Eastern Europe and a separate
“Eurasian pole” to challenge American preeminence
and to split the United States from its European allies.
Moscow prefers to have either authoritarian,
divided, or weak states along its borders rather than proWestern democracies or strategically neutral regimes.
Ongoing Kremlin support for the Belarusian regime of
President Alyaksandr Lukashenka, especially through
energy subsidization, as well as for the Transnistrian
separatists in Moldova and the Abkhaz and Ossetian
2

secessionist movements in Georgia, demonstrates
Moscow’s strategy of promoting vulnerable and
dependent neighbors.
Second, in the sphere of military security, a variety
of military and submilitary threats challenge the
region, including a spillover of armed conflict from
the Moscow-sponsored separatist entities in Moldova
and Georgia; Russian military involvement among
neighbors in preventing state integration; and Russian
military, nuclear, and anti-missile shield build-up
to project its growing assertiveness. A potential
escalation of armed conflict between Georgia and the
two separatist regimes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia
may also precipitate a wider conflict by drawing in
neighboring powers and even the United States and
the EU into the conflict.
Third, with regard to economic security, major
energy supplies to Europe from the Caspian Basin
will increasingly traverse the Caucasus and Black Sea
regions, and their transit needs to be secured from
potential disruption whether as a result of deliberate
blockages by suppliers or transit countries, or sabotage
by substate actors and international terrorist networks.
Supply transit needs to be assured to all consumers,
and such guarantees are best served by diversifying
suppliers and routes in case of blackmail or sabotage
and bringing the entire region under a more secure
NATO umbrella.
Fourth, in terms of international security, the East
European-Black Sea region connects the EU with the
Middle East, the Caspian zone, and Central Asia, three
areas that will be critical for U.S. and EU security
interests over the coming decade. The region will remain
a battleground between Atlanticism and Eurasianism,
in essence between the West and Russia, as both sides
will seek to project and defend their influences.
3

A multitude of other security threats challenge
the region, including international jihadist terrorism;
weapons proliferation; international organized crime;
and potential natural disasters such as epidemics,
climatic changes, and environmental disasters. As
a result, a coherent strategy for durable stability
and sustainable security needs to be devised and
implemented by the EU and United States working
in tandem with the countries of the region, especially
with those capitals that seek inclusion in both the EU
and NATO.
Unfortunately, the EU has treated the “post-Soviet”
countries or “newly independent states” differently
from the western Balkan states, which have been offered
the prospect of EU accession through stabilization and
association agreements provided that they fulfill the
required membership criteria. By contrast, the EU’s
European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) has not offered
the prospect of EU membership to the remaining East
European states; instead, they were given ENP action
plans that would steadily engage them in EU networks
and programs. Without more effective incentives for
Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Belarus, especially
the realistic prospect of eventual EU membership,
the ENP is in danger of lacking sufficient momentum
and incentive to promote structural reforms, generate
more substantial foreign investments, and reinforce
commitments to Western integration.
Meanwhile, NATO may be willing to enlarge
eastward, but two factors will need to be considered
before decisions regarding including any of the
remaining East European countries are finalized. First,
the commitment of the candidate states, their political
elites and citizens, both to NATO standards and Atlantic
Alliance membership, needs to be assured. Second, a
commitment by the Alliance that such inclusion is in
4

the strategic and national interests of all NATO and
EU allies needs to be accepted. In this geo-strategic
context, the Eastern Dimension of the new EU and
NATO member states has involved various campaigns
and initiatives to bring their neighbors into the ambit
of both multinational organizations.
Three specific issues are explored in some depth in
this monograph:
1. Central-East European Policies. An assessment of
the motives, goals, and strategies of the CEE capitals in
their policies toward the remaining Eastern European
states and their approach toward Russia. Each of the new
EU-NATO members has focused on specific partners
along its eastern border or in nearby states outside the
EU and NATO and has developed concrete political,
security, and economic linkages with these countries
while campaigning on their behalf within the major
international institutions of which they are members.
The monograph examines the objectives and strategies
that drive CEE policies and their effectiveness in
fostering democratic reform, promoting pro-Western
elites, and moving these countries toward the major
European and trans-Atlantic institutions.
2. European Union and NATO Strategies. An
examination of the support and resistance that the
CEE capitals have encountered among older EU and
NATO member states, including the United States,
in pushing for the further expansion eastward of
both international institutions. Certain Western
capitals have been resolutely opposed to further
enlargement, whether on the grounds of economic
cost, public opposition, or potential political and
diplomatic conflict with Moscow. Their arguments
and perspectives are discussed, and the emergence of
divergent multinational interest groups within the EU
5

and NATO concerning the enlargement question and
policy toward Russia is assessed.
3. Impact of EU and NATO Policies. An exploration
of the short- and long-term impact of EU and NATO
policies on the wider European region. Long-term
delay or the termination of further enlargement will
not only impact on the internal politics of excluded
states, but it will also affect relations between the
current EU and NATO member states. Additionally,
nonenlargement will have implications for Russia’s
regional role and Moscow’s policies toward the EU
and NATO. This monograph assesses the potential
outcomes of restricted EU and NATO enlargement,
and how such a policy will impact on the stability and
development of the EU’s neighbors. In this context,
Russia’s perspectives on EU and NATO policy will also
be examined as Moscow acts to secure its expansive
strategic interests.
This monograph is intended to contribute to a
more comprehensive debate on the Wider Europe
and what this signifies for long-term trans-Atlantic
relations. It concludes with a set of suggestions and
policy recommendations for the U.S. administration
and for the governments of NATO and EU member
states. The recommendations are intended to specify
how Washington can help shape the process of security
expansion by working closely with its new European
allies in forging a more consequential Eastern
Dimension.
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II. WIDENING EUROPE AND ENLARGING
NATO: PERSPECTIVES FROM CENTRALEASTERN EUROPE
This section outlines the policies of the CEE states
with regard to promoting the process of EU and NATO
enlargement eastward. The approach of the CEE
capitals is significant for the evolution of the Alliance
and the Union, for the policies of specific NATO and
EU member states, and for the national and strategic
interests of the United States.
Central-East European Eastern Policy.
The CEE countries have sought to prevent any
lasting divisions between themselves and the rest of
Eastern Europe. In their calculations, barriers to their
neighbor’s political, economic, and security integration
would damage interstate relations, encourage Russian
revanchism, and potentially destabilize a wider region.
Each CEE country has supported the further eastern
enlargement of both NATO and the EU in order to
promote the reform process, to expand liberal and
democratic values, to build productive free market
economies, and to ensure security in countries that still
remain prone to instability and conflict.
The CEE capitals also contend that it is in U.S.
national security interests to intensify engagement
with the European states that are currently located
outside the EU and NATO. Their inclusion in both
organizations and the creation of an institutional
“Wider Europe” would help expand and consolidate
nascent democratic systems, open up markets,
stabilize Washington’s new allies, increase the number
of America’s potential future partners, and strengthen
7

both NATO and the EU as the two most important
multinational institutions.
The promotion of NATO enlargement has proved
to be a less contentious issue than EU expansion and it
has elicited greater consensus among member states.
For instance, at a meeting of Visegrád states (Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia) in January
2006, all four CEE defense ministers confirmed their
support for Ukraine’s membership in NATO.1 Helping
Ukraine join NATO and other alliances was seen as one
of the most urgent issues at the session in Budapest.
The Visegrád Four also planned to form a committee
of experts to foster Ukraine’s military reforms. Most
of the CEE capitals have also pledged to increase their
financial commitments and development funds for
their eastern neighbors.
By contrast with the NATO question, the new EU
member states from CEE face a persistent dilemma in
their eastern policy. On the one hand, EU integration
requires each candidate and member to better secure
its non-EU borders and redirect its economy and social
policies toward the Union. On the other hand, the CEE
governments are seeking to expand direct contacts
with their eastern neighbors to help promote political
and economic reform and to bring them into the EU.
The new members have also understood that there
is little or no consensus within the Union on foreign
policy questions and their entry has added to the
diversity of approach. Each capital will need to learn
how to navigate through EU institutions and work
with potential partners within the Union in pursuit of
its national priorities.
Most of the CEE administrations view Russia
as a priority in the EU’s security policy but not in
its enlargement and integration policies. They have
8

watched with increasing trepidation as President
Vladimir Putin has concentrated power in the Kremlin
and pursued a more assertive and domineering
approach toward neighboring countries. They see
themselves as frontier states facing growing security
challenges to their east, with the biggest challenge
being Russia itself. CEE capitals do not support
Russia’s membership in the EU and NATO because
they fear Russia could turn both the Union and the
Alliance into mere political organizations devoid of
meaningful defense capabilities and severely weaken
their resistance to Russia’s strategic expansion.
While the CEE capitals have endeavored to construct
a common EU eastern policy based on expanding
the zone of democracy and security, the Russian
government of President Vladimir Putin charges that the
CEE states have infected the EU with “Russophobia,”
with the intent to undermine Moscow’s attempts to
influence Brussels to its strategic advantage. According
to Russian officials, European parliamentarians from
CEE capitals have injected a “spirit of confrontation
and intolerance toward our country” into this panEuropean body.2 The Kremlin, claiming that Baltic and
Polish representatives in particular have purposely
“complicated” Russia’s dialogue with the EU, has
singled them out for particular criticism. At the same
time, Russian officials are seeking to promote fractures
in the EU by appealing to traditional partners in Paris,
Berlin, Rome, and elsewhere and complaining about
the alleged dangers posed to the EU-Russia relationship
by the CEE states.
In reality, the new EU members, especially those
that remain most prone to negative Russian influences,
have contributed a much needed dose of realism about
Russia’s expansionist and restorationist ambitions in
9

Eastern Europe.3 These countries have been pushing
for the EU to respond appropriately, in unison, and
with strict conditionality to a concerted Kremlindirected threat to redivide Europe, but their approach
is resisted by several of the larger western European
members. For Germany and France in particular,
commercial pragmatism has generally prevailed over
geostrategic calculation and long-term political impact.
CEE capitals, wary of any compromises with the
Kremlin that will weaken the U.S. role and endanger
their own security interests, have a more distrustful
view of Moscow’s intentions and are determined to
keep contentious issues with the Russian regime on
the EU radar screen. Moreover, for the CEE countries,
Washington is the only credible guarantee against
Russia’s aspirations toward Europe.
The majority of CEE states have been firm supporters
of both NATO and EU expansion eastward, not only to
encompass Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova, but also all
the Black Sea states, including all three south Caucasus
countries, and a greater openness to the Central Asian
region. The United Kingdom (UK) and the Nordic
states generally support this strategy although they
are usually less assertive than the CEE capitals. By
contrast, the French and German authorities believe
that the EU has reached its maximum practical extent,
and some even contend that it may have expanded too
far and too fast. Some of the older EU members point
out that the EU has only limited resources available
to pursue a wider Europe strategy and offer entry to
countries such as Ukraine or Moldova. Moreover, the
Eastern states have thus far been unable to meet the
basic standards necessary for closer association with
the Union or for achieving candidate status.

10

The European Security Strategy (ESS), issued by the
EU in December 2003, asserted that “the integration of
acceding states increases our security but also brings
the EU closer to troubled areas.”4 Moreover, the Union
was called upon to “promote well governed countries
to the east of the EU with whom we can enjoy close and
cooperative relations.” If it is vigorously pursued, such
a strategy can bring the EU into collision with Russia
especially over its Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) neighbors. According to the ESS, the EU
should “tackle political problems” to its east because
“the best protection for our security is a world of wellgoverned democratic states.” In addition to promoting
democracy along its eastern borders, some EU officials
have pressed Russia to agree to crisis management rules
for possible future EU-led missions in the Caucasus
and Moldova and to end Moscow’s border disputes
with Estonia and Latvia in order to help stabilize the
region.
In its policy toward Russia, the EU exhibits divisions
between “pragmatists” and “realists.” Pragmatists,
led primarily by France, Germany, and Italy, have
evidently been willing to overlook negative trends
in domestic Russian politics, as well as the Kremlin’s
attempts to rebuild its sphere of dominance in the
CIS and a zone of influence throughout Central and
Eastern Europe. Pragmatists view Russia strategically
as a growing economic partner and even as a useful
counterbalance to the United States. Moscow for its
part has traditionally used its close bilateral ties with
Paris, Berlin, and Rome to bypass central European
capitals, avoid censure by a united EU, and attempt to
divide the Atlantic Alliance.
Warm relations among the French, German,
Italian, and Russian presidents evident in recent years
11

have raised concerns in several CEE capitals over the
reliability and solidarity of some EU member states.
For example, in 2005 Polish President Aleksander
Kwaśniewski expressed apprehension over the
proposed construction of the North European Gas
Pipeline (NEGP) beneath the Baltic Sea from Russia
to Germany designed to bypass CEE. Russian
government–owned Gazprom, the world’s largest gas
exporter, planned to commence construction of the
pipeline (renamed “North Stream”) by the end of 2006.
Kwaśniewski criticized the lack of involvement of all
EU member states in preparations for the pipeline and
the lack of consideration by Berlin and other West
European capitals regarding the economic and political
implications of the new transit route. The governments
of Poland, Belarus, Ukraine, and the three Baltic states
stood to lose millions of dollars in transit fees after the
pipeline was scheduled to be completed in 2010 and
Russian gas would be able to bypass their countries en
route to Western Europe.
Although CEE leaders support diversifying energy
supplies and transit routes in the region, they fear that
the North Stream project may provide opportunities
for political blackmail by Moscow as the CEE states
remain highly dependent on Russian energy supplies.
Moscow could in the future limit or sever its supplies
to individual CEE countries without disrupting its
energy exports to West European consumers, thereby
avoiding EU criticism and potential censure.
Russian officials are intent on deflating EU
capabilities in their neighborhood, as well as the more
assertive approach of several CEE governments. They
were buoyed by the failure of the EU’s Constitutional
Treaty in 2005. Russian commentators claimed that
the EU’s enlargement strategy was the cause of the
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constitutional rejection because Brussels supposedly
overestimated the Union’s absorption capacity during
the accession of the CEE countries.5 Moscow felt
uneasy about the EU’s eastward growth for several
reasons: Russia was excluded from the process of a
united Europe, the EU brought into the union allegedly
“Russophobic” states, and the EU encouraged Russia’s
“near abroad” to canvass for EU membership. Kremlin
officials have used the EU’s constitutional failure to
encourage a halt to further enlargement, demand
the EU’s acknowledgement of Russia’s primary
responsibility in the post-Soviet states, and push for
a closer link between two unions—the EU and the
Russian Federation.
Strategic “pragmatists” in Western Europe have
criticized the new CEE members for their alleged
“Russophobia” and for seeking to shift EU foreign
policy toward Russia in a more aggressive direction.
CEE “realists” often perceive several Western European
EU members as appeasers of Russia, while some West
European officials view CEE members as unnecessarily
hostile toward Moscow.6 A number of CEE capitals are
increasingly challenging their West European partners
to take a tougher stance in defense of their interests visà-vis Moscow rather than pursuing narrow national
agendas and short-term economic gains at the expense
of the EU as a whole. On the other hand, persistent
perceptions in the EU of alleged CEE “Russophobia”
could isolate several CEE capitals from the older EU
members and this may become an additional obstacle
in constructing a common EU foreign and security
policy.
The new members and other “realists” remain
concerned that the EU has no common or effective
foreign policy toward Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova,
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Georgia, or Russia’s other neighbors, and that this
disunity and lack of clarity can be manipulated by
Moscow to its advantage. Germany, France, and Italy
in particular seek to maintain strong bilateral ties with
Russia. If more serious confrontations materialize, they
may not wish to jeopardize these relations for the sake of
Ukrainian interests or any other regional issue. Indeed,
several CEE capitals complain that the EU as a whole
has failed to condemn persistent Russian pressures
against the three Baltic states, as evident in frequent
Russian military overflights over their territories and
Moscow’s refusal to sign bilateral treaties with Tallinn
and Riga, despite the fact that they are now part of the
EU. Moscow seemingly refuses to accept the Baltic
countries as fully sovereign, and the EU acts as if they
are unimportant peripheries, thus fuelling Russian
ambitions in the region.
In March 2003, the European Commission issued
its communication on a “Wider Europe” that laid the
foundations for the EU’s ENP toward nearby countries.7
The EU has treated the CIS countries differently from
the Western Balkan states, which were given the
prospect of joining the EU through Stabilization and
Association Agreements (SAA) provided that they
fulfilled the membership criteria stipulated by the
Copenhagen European Council in 1993. The ENP did
not offer the prospect of EU membership to the East
European states; instead, they were offered ENP Action
Plans.8 Each capital was required to make commitments
that could be monitored. If reforms were successfully
completed, the EU would engage them in its networks
and programs and negotiate closer agreements. The
ENP also lacked a strong regional or multilateral
component that could strengthen regional security.9
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CEE governments argue that the EU’s ENP has been
inadequate in providing the struggling democracies of
Eastern Europe with a sufficient incentive to reform.
They argue that the EU must differentiate between
countries who want to enter the Union and those who
want to remain as partners. It must also distinguish
between European countries that have a prospect
of entry according to article 49 of the Treaty of the
European Union, and non-European states that have
been included in the ENP process but without any
likelihood for Union accession. A sharp distinction
should therefore be drawn between “European
neighbors” and “Europe’s neighbors.”
According to several CEE officials, the genuine
candidates who want to enter the EU should be
provided with “accession agreements” or “integration
agreements” much like the countries of the Western
Balkans who have been given SAA with the EU en
route to future membership. In such arrangements, the
ENP Action Plans need to become more focused with a
clear set of priorities for each government in its reform
agenda. This integration process should concentrate on
achievable targets such as free trade, visa facilitation,
and the interconnection of transportation and energy
systems. A time frame of implementation could also
be established, with annual reviews on the progress
achieved conducted by the European Commission. This
would help structure and intensify the harmonization
process between candidate states and the EU.10 The
eastern neighbors can also become more closely
engaged in the ongoing dialogue over Common
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), European Security
and Defense Policy (ESDP), justice and home affairs,
and economic cooperation.
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The CEE governments assert that without more
effective incentives, such as the prospect of eventual
EU membership, the untested ENP initiative was
in danger of losing its momentum as a mechanism
for promoting economic and structural reforms.
According to the conclusions of the Vilnius Conference
in May 2006, entitled “Common Vision for a Common
Neighborhood,” an initiative co-sponsored by the
Lithuanian and Polish presidents, the ENP “has not
lived up to expectations for a truly common foreign
policy effort.” The organizers asserted that “Europe’s
power of attraction may not be sufficient to offset
Russia’s power of compulsion.”11
CEE capitals underscore that the EU needs to
provide Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Georgia
with a clear and hopeful message that the EU will
remain open to new members. If the EU avoids such
an approach, the domestic political commitment to
reform could dissipate, and they will either remain in
an unstable gray area or succumb to overwhelming
Russian influence and reenter Moscow’s orbit. CEE
countries point out that, in contrast, NATO membership
has remained open to these capitals provided that they
fulfill various criteria for reform through which they
could graduate from the Partnership for Peace (PfP)
programs to Membership Action Plans (MAPs) over
a number of years. Some analysts have suggested
creating a new EU Commissioner for Enlargement and
the New Neighborhood who could handle accession
negotiations together with the ENP policy and would
serve to better integrate these states over the long
term.12
To CEE leaders it often appears that close personal
relations between several EU heads of state and
President Putin drive EU policy toward Russia. The
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persistence of close bilateral links between a number of
West European capitals and Moscow at the expense of
the CEE countries could raise the level of Euroskepticism
among the new members and generate rifts in other
areas of EU policy. CEE officials seek to discourage EU
neglect of the democratic aspirations of residents in the
East European countries. In stark contrast, the larger EU
capitals seem hesitant to offer any realistic prospect of
EU membership, thereby feeding the assumption that
they consider the rest of Eastern Europe to be located
within the zone of Russian strategic interests. Indeed,
some West European capitals fear that a broader policy
of inclusion would lead to a marked deterioration of
relations with Moscow.
In sum, Russian authorities have sought to weaken
any common EU front with regard to the Eastern
Dimension by exploiting their bilateral links with
individual EU capitals. Division among EU members
in their policies toward Moscow has been evident
for many years. While several older members have
called for a “strategic partnership” with Russia, many
of the new entrants view this as a strategic error that
would gain the Kremlin unwarranted influence in EU
policymaking, especially in the foreign and security
dimension, and diminish their own national interests.
Divergent Central-East European Approaches.
Although there are basic commonalities between the
CEE states in their foreign policy priorities, especially
in terms of the future of NATO, the EU, and the transAtlantic relationship, differences have also emerged
in their approaches toward their eastern neighbors.
Divisions have become evident between the Baltic
littoral countries, including Poland, on the one hand,
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and the smaller Central European states on the other.
Poland, the largest country to join the EU in 2004,
has tried to pursue its own distinct foreign policy
agenda in Brussels, especially its goal of achieving
a special status in the EU for Ukraine, Belarus, and
Moldova, with the prospect of future membership.13
In particular, the Polish government considers itself
a spokesperson for Ukraine’s integration into the EU
and NATO because it believes that only such a policy
can bring stability to Europe’s eastern flank and curtail
Russia’s re-expansion.
For both Warsaw and Moscow, the historic struggle
for influence over the lands between the Polish and
Russian borders has been revived since the collapse of
communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
Poland seeks to increase its leverage within the EU and
NATO and to utilize its close relations with the United
States to pull Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Georgia
into the Western orbit. Conversely, the Kremlin is
intent on maintaining primary influence over these
countries and preventing their merger into Western
organizations, and it has leveled its attacks against
Polish policy as being allegedly “anti-Russian.”
Poland does not seek to politically dominate the
region but its foreign policy agenda is focused on
achieving special status for its eastern neighbors visà-vis Western institutions. The Polish government
has declared itself the main standard-bearer for
Ukraine’s integration into the EU and NATO. It is
convinced that only such a prospect can bring stability
to Europe’s eastern flank. For Warsaw, the political
and national upheaval in Ukraine at the close of 2004,
culminating in the Orange Revolution, highlighted
the inadequacies of the EU’s good-neighbor policy
toward the nearby eastern European states. Brussels
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was simply unprepared for the dramatic events in
Ukrainian politics.
A Polish member of the European Parliament,
Jerzy Buzek, and other CEE delegates, led calls in the
parliament for the EU to dispatch a high-level delegation
to Ukraine during the election crisis in November–
December 2004. The European Parliament’s resolution
against the manipulation of elections by the regime
of Leonid Kuchma in November 2004 was initiated
and pushed through by the new member states.
Poland’s Foreign Minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz
in late 2004 acknowledged that the EU’s relatively fast
decisionmaking helped to defuse the election standoff,
but attributed this effectiveness specifically to the role
of the new CEE members.14
The Polish first deputy foreign minister, Jan
Truszczynski, also stated that Warsaw would use its
influence in the EU to push Brussels toward deeper
engagement with Moldova on the Transnistria standoff
and to resolve the dispute over the separatist area under
the auspices of the Action Plan signed by Brussels and
Chisinau in April 2005. Truszczynski also asserted that
deploying international monitors on the Transnistrian
part of the Moldova-Ukraine border could pave the
way toward a lasting settlement of the conflict in the
breakaway region.15
Polish analysts continue to express anxiety that,
while Russia intensifies its efforts at reimperialization,
Warsaw’s EU partners have tried to convince Warsaw
and other capitals that there is nothing to worry about.16
Brussels has placed Ukraine on a par with neighboring
states in the eastern Mediterranean and North Africa
in its ENP program and has thereby frustrated Warsaw
and several East European capitals. Poland believes
that if Ukraine and other states were convinced of the
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prospect of EU inclusion, the domestic reform process
would be significantly stimulated. Without such a
prospect, the pursuit of structural reform could be
jeopardized. Indeed, the enduring commitment to EU
accession of the new government in Kyiv, led by Prime
Minister Viktor Yanukovych, could be a litmus test for
the effectiveness of Union strategy.
Poland sees Ukrainian independence and
democracy as a critical counterbalance to Russian neoimperialism and authoritarianism. The Polish view is
not shared wholeheartedly by Berlin or Paris, which
want to see the EU’s eastern border more tightly sealed
and do not envisage an early prospect of Ukrainian
membership.17 In October 2004, Poland’s campaigns
on the Ukrainian predicament resulted in Warsaw and
Berlin finally issuing a joint declaration confirming
“Ukraine’s European aspirations” and the “huge role
it plays in European security,” while calling upon
the EU as a whole to recognize the country as a “key
neighbor” with a market economy and to establish a
free trade zone with Kyiv.18
With its persistent assertiveness on the “eastern
question,” Warsaw will need to be mindful lest it is
perceived as neglecting the foreign policy priorities of
its major partners in Western Europe. A certain degree
of reciprocation and compromises will be necessary.
For instance, Warsaw will need to offer support to the
older EU members in several policy arenas, whether
regarding internal EU policy or in security and external
affairs, in return for their backing for Poland’s Eastern
Dimension.
Similarly to Poland, the three Baltic states have
also adopted an assertive and constructive role
toward their eastern neighbors. For example, Latvian
Foreign Minister Artis Pabriks has repeatedly called
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for a common CEE approach that could pressure
the EU to take a more active eastern role. Lithuania
took a prominent stance toward Ukraine during the
election crisis in November–December 2004. President
Valdas Adamkus of Lithuania in particular involved
himself directly in mediation efforts in Kyiv. The
Lithuanian authorities have called for a clearer EU
strategy for Eastern Europe by revising the ENP and
signing integration treaties with potential candidates
for membership.19 Baltic capitals have also pushed to
mobilize support among the Nordic countries for a
more effective EU Eastern Dimension.
In contrast to Poland and the Baltic states, several
of the Central European countries have adopted a
more circumspect position in their eastern policy.
For example, the official position of the Czech and
Hungarian governments toward the Ukrainian crisis in
2004 was more muted, and they refrained from strongly
criticizing President Putin’s policy in the region even
though they indicated their support for further EU and
NATO enlargement eastwards.
Slovakia has pursued a more forthright eastern
agenda than Prague or Budapest and under the
Mikulas Dzurinda government (1998-2006), Bratislava
became active in promoting democratic developments
among its eastern and southern neighbors. The Slovak
Foreign Ministry strongly supported the country’s
nongovernment organizations (NGOs) in their grassroots work on behalf of civil society and human rights
in neighboring countries. After the election of the more
nationalist Smer coalition government in June 2006,
NGO leaders expressed fears that Bratislava would
reduce or even abandon its activist approach in Belarus,
Ukraine, and elsewhere, while withdrawing support
for further EU and NATO expansion. The general
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“programmatic statement” of the Slovak government
released in July 2006 also expressed a desire to “activate
relations with the Russian Federation,” thus raising
fears that Bratislava may adopt a softer approach
toward Russia’s policies in the broader region.
When Romania and Bulgaria entered the EU
in January 2007, they fortified the CEE’s Eastern
Dimension. Bucharest in particular is positioning
itself as the fulcrum of Black Sea initiatives targeted
on bringing Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia under
the NATO umbrella and into the EU structure.
The Romanian authorities will seek to focus all
international organizations on stabilizing and securing
the Black Sea region. In addition to NATO and the EU,
Romania has also sought to invigorate the Black Sea
Economic Cooperation (BSEC) initiative, launched in
June 1992 and focusing on stimulating cooperation in
areas ranging from energy to transport, trade, tourism,
and counterterrrorism.20 However, BSEC has limited
political value and does not deal with vital security
issues such as the separatist conflicts in Moldova and
Georgia. Russia’s membership in the organization
will ensure that its expansionist interests wlll not be
seriously challenged by BSEC.
Bucharest has also supported various regional
initiatives among the former Soviet satellites that
exclude the Russian Federation. In particular, it
has focused attention on the GUAM grouping,
which includes Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and
Moldova. In May 2006, GUAM transformed itself
into the Organization for Democracy and Economic
Development (ODED)-GUAM, and discussions were
initiated to enlarge GUAM with the possible inclusion
of Romania. The Romanian government has contended
that by working together the post-Soviet states would
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become more stable and prosperous and help secure
the wider Black Sea region as part of the Euro-Atlantic
structure. With this goal in view, Romania is seeking
to prove its value as an important regional player and
regional stabilizer both for NATO and for the EU.
Bucharest views the Black Sea-Caspian Sea region
as Europe’s vital eastern frontier that needs to be
brought into the Euro-Atlantic fold to prevent potential
insecurities and violent spillovers from the broader
Middle East. It is also a corridor for energy resources
to Europe so that its long-term stability is essential for
the energy security of all EU and NATO members. The
region should not merely be seen as an operational
region for NATO-led missions further afield but as an
integral part of the Euro-Atlantic sphere of security.
As a result, the Romanian authorities support more
prominent EU and U.S. roles in the region. In practical
terms, in December 2005 a basing agreement was
signed between Washington and Bucharest enabling
American forces to construct training facilities and
forward operating sites along the Black Sea coast.21
A similar agreement was signed between the United
States and Bulgaria in April 2006.
Despite several joint declarations on the Eastern
Dimension by the Visegrád Group, some analysts
have criticized the CEE countries for not developing
and implementing a common strategy toward all the
neighbors to the east. Instead, each capital is often
seen to be pursuing essentially separate and discreet
national strategies. Evidently, each country is more
focused on supporting its closest neighbors on the path
of Euro-Atlantic integration rather than dealing with
the region as an integral whole.22
Critics also argue that the EU newcomers have been
most active in pushing an Eastern Dimension in the
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European Parliament, a body with limited influence
on EU foreign and security policy, as compared to
working within the European Commission and the
Council of Ministers. Undoubtedly, the CEE countries,
through various EU institutions and initiatives, will
have further opportunities to become more intensively
involved with their eastern neighbors. For example, the
prospect of an EU foreign service raises the possibility of
diplomatic posts in Moscow, Kyiv, Minsk, and Tbilisi,
in which the CEE countries will be keenly interested.
Leveraging the United States.
In most CEE capitals, the United States continues to
be recognized as the leader of the western “democratic
community” that has invested more than any other
Allied capital in the region’s stability and development
and whose engagement remains essential for generating
security and democratic progress throughout the
eastern part of Europe. The United States is widely
viewed as the key factor for moving the boundaries of
NATO and even the EU further eastward. The EU as an
institution, and its member states, is not considered to
have sufficient military power, international prestige,
or political will to ensure the further enlargement
eastward of the two key Western structures.
As a result of America’s preeminent role, each
CEE government has focused on developing a
“special relationship” or “strategic partnership” with
the United States by maintaining a close political
and security bond in an uncertain international
environment. Although the CEE countries are not
economically or militarily powerful, many have made
it a national priority to contribute to NATO and U.S.
military operations so as to demonstrate that they have
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graduated from consumers to producers of security
and have a role to play alongside their larger allies. In
addition to participation in NATO missions in BosniaHercegovina and Kosova over the past decade, several
CEE states have made military contributions to the
U.S.-led coalition operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
elsewhere.
All the CEE countries view the United States as
their predominant ally and most important security
partner in the process of further NATO enlargement.
However, each country is also developing more
distinctive national priorities and foreign and security
policies. This will become evident in the extent to
which they will seek to blend into the EU mainstream
as small states without major regional ambitions. These
distinctions may also become increasingly reflected in
the intensity of commitments to active Atlanticism and
the degree of support for the EU’s emerging foreign
and security policy.
In terms of the CEE’s Eastern Dimension, among
the “front line” states in particular, the United States
is considered to have a more consistent and influential
policy toward Russia than either the EU or any of
its member states. The United States is the primary
Western power that Moscow evidently respects,
and CEE capitals calculate that a close alliance with
Washington will help protect them against Russian
pressures and other sources of insecurity along their
eastern borders.
By contrast, EU policy is often dismissed among
CEE officials as inconsistent and inadequate while
the EU as a whole is not acknowledged to be a major
global security player by the Kremlin. Moreover,
Moscow has been able to exploit its bilateral relations
with individual countries such as France, Germany,
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and Italy to try and divide the Union, promote intraEU rivalry for lucrative Russian contracts, sideline the
CEE states from EU decisionmaking, and undermine
the trans-Atlantic link.
In the broader Alliance context, where the
relationship between the United States and the EU
has been marked by disputes and disagreements
during much of the George W. Bush presidency, the
CEE countries have aimed to uphold a viable U.S.European partnership by maintaining the American
presence in Europe. An important reason for the active
involvement of most CEE capitals in America’s postSeptember 11, 2001 (9/11), military missions has been
their intention to display enduring political solidarity
with Washington. The new democracies have avoided
adopting positions contrary to that of the White House
and want to be viewed as reliable long-term allies.
However, insufficient U.S. reciprocity and lack of
focus on the strategic interests and national priorities
of the CEE capitals could gradually weaken this transAtlantic link in the years ahead.23
The United States should continue to be supportive
of its new allies in CEE and their foreign policy
concerns for several reasons. The political liberation of
Eastern Europe was an important legacy of the Cold
War and America’s investment in European security.
The successful construction of democratic polities
and market economies is a major achievement of U.S.
foreign policy and a culmination of decades of intensive
diplomatic engagement and material investment.
The CEE countries have also become valuable role
models for political and economic transition whose
experiences could be applied to other post-communist
and post-authoritarian systems. With the declared
commitment of the Bush administration to promote
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democratic rule in other regions, the prominence of the
CEE states has been heightened as a pertinent example
of success whose lessons could be applied and adapted
in the rest of Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central
Asia.
For the U.S. administration, the CEE region was
initially a bastion of resistance to communist rule and
Soviet expansionism, and subsequently an invaluable
laboratory for democratic transformation. However,
Washington’s improved relations with Russia during
both the Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin administrations
and its definition of Russia as a developing democracy
may have placed some limitations on U.S. support for
the thrust of CEE Eastern policy.
Some American policymakers have studiously
avoided aggravating relations with Russia and thereby
undercutting Moscow’s willingness to cooperate with
Washington in the latter’s expansive global agenda
against international terrorists and the proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Such an approach
may have constrained clear and consistent messages
concerning Russia’s regression toward autocracy and
Moscow’s destabilizing foreign policy and support for
despotic regimes, which have countered the U.S. goal
of democratic expansion. Such evident acquiescence to
Kremlin objectives, especially during the first term of
the Bush presidency, generated concern among several
of America’s new CEE allies over the thrust and goals
of U.S. policy.
U.S. decisionmakers must also remain mindful that
national memories of American assistance in helping
to eradicate communism and building democratic
systems are gradually receding in the CEE region.
Future relations are more likely to be based on starker
pragmatic choices and state interests rather than on
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historical sentiments. Moral debts to the United States
will be overshadowed by practical requirements,
such as gaining sufficient EU funding, meeting the
expectations of the majority of citizens, and maintaining
good relations with the larger and more prosperous
Western European neighbors.
A number of pressing regional questions of direct
concern to the CEE capitals will necessitate greater
American engagement if the link with the new allies
is to be maintained. In particular, developments in the
region between CEE and Russia remain uncertain and
potentially destabilizing. America’s CEE partners seek
greater clarity, consistency, and assertiveness in U.S.
policy toward Russia and the wider European region
and more resolute opposition to Moscow’s strategic
ambitions. CEE governments contend that a long-term
commitment to reform and security in the “post-Soviet”
states would give more substance to President Bush’s
global initiative to expand the frontiers of freedom and
democracy.
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III. IMPACT OF NATO AND EUROPEAN UNION
POLICIES
This section examines current EU, NATO, and
U.S. policy toward the states of Eastern Europe that
have not acceded to the two key Western institutions.
It also explores how the prospect of either inclusion
or exclusion from the EU and NATO may affect the
progress of domestic reforms, the development of
regional relations, and the growing role of Russia.
NATO’s Eastern Policy.
NATO membership has proved to be more easily
achievable for candidate countries than EU accession for
several reasons. The criteria for Alliance entry are more
specific and achievable, as compared to the protracted
transformations demanded of candidates for the EU.
The NATO Alliance is based on the sovereignty of
its members rather than the “pooling of sovereignty”
required by the EU, which necessitates uniformity
rather than diversity.24 In addition, NATO has upheld
an open door policy for potential candidates, and its
expansion is not contingent on public approval among
current member states but on governmental and
parliamentary support.
Over the past decade, NATO has shifted its mission
increasingly toward security promotion, including
crisis management and peacekeeping, both within and
outside of Europe. As a result, the Black Sea region
has become an integral part of its security domain,
and the Prague Summit in November 2002 adopted
the principle of NATO’s out-of-area operations and its
cooperation with all the post-Soviet states. Moreover,
the accession of new members from CEE has brought
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NATO into the Black Sea and Caucasian regions as
these areas neighbor the new Alliance entrants and are
of immediate security concern for them.
NATO involvement in the post-Soviet region has
involved various mechanisms and formats. The EuroAtlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), which replaced
the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), is a
forum for dialogue and consultation between NATO
and all the partner countries, including Ukraine,
Belarus, Moldova, and Georgia. Its focus has been on
arenas such as crisis management and crisis response,
peace support operations, regional issues, arms control,
counterterrorism, civil emergency planning, nuclear
security, anticrime initiatives, arms control, and
antiproliferation. The format has included ministers of
defense and foreign affairs in annual meetings, periodic
summits, and more focused working groups.
NATO states have sought to promote defense
sector reform in states aspiring to membership, to
enhance military interoperability, and to help stabilize
the wider region through various “soft security” tools.
NATO has various mechanisms at its disposal for
accelerating cooperation and interoperability.25 The
Partnership for Peace (PfP) program was developed
as a form of practical cooperation between NATO
and individual partner states to enable them to meet
Alliance standards in such areas as the democratic
control of the armed forces, joint exercises that enhance
interoperability, transparency in defense planning and
budgeting, and participation in NATO’s peacekeeping
and humanitarian missions. The basic form of
participation in PfP consists of implementing 2-year
Individual Partnership Programs (IPP) tailored to the
needs and capabilities of specific states developed
on the basis of the Partnership Work Program
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(PWP) and geared toward transforming the defense
systems of partner states.
Partnership Action Plans (PAPs) are a mechanism
for bringing together NATO members with nonmembers in the pursuit of specific regional objectives.
A number of concrete plans have been launched in
recent years, including the Partnership Action Plan
against Terrorism (PAP-T), which involves most of
the EAPC countries, and the Partnership Action Plan
on Defense Institution Building (PAP-DIB), designed
for multilateral cooperation in support of democratic
defense reform. Most of the NATO members, partners,
and candidates have been involved in both initiatives.
Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAPs) are
methods for expanding NATO’s bilateral relations
with individual countries. IPAP was developed to
enable candidate states to prepare for MAPs. The MAPs
were designed to prepare countries for full NATO
membership and have been based on comprehensive
technical and advisory support with individual
capitals.
In addition to these long-range initiatives, measures
have been taken to consolidate links with potential
candidate countries. At NATO’s Istanbul Summit in
June 2004, a Special Representative for the Caucasus
and Central Asia was appointed, together with two
NATO liaison officers—one for each region. Several
NATO members and aspirants, including Romania,
Bulgaria, Ukraine, and Georgia, have also supported
NATO’s proposal to extend the Alliance’s maritime
security operation, ACTIVE ENDEAVOR, from the
Eastern Mediterranean into the Black Sea region.
However, Moscow and Ankara have resisted the
initiative. Instead, Moscow has pushed for turning the
Black Sea Force (BLACKSEAFOR) naval cooperation
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agreement into a regional naval security grouping as
an alternative to NATO and in which Russia can play
a pivotal role.
Ukraine. Ukraine became a partner country in
NATO’s PfP program in 1994, the first state in the CIS
to achieve this status.26 In 1997 Ukraine was upgraded
when a NATO-Ukraine Charter was initialed in
Madrid and a NATO-Ukraine Action Plan (NUAP)
was developed, with its Annual Target Plans (ATPs)
that focused primarily in the military field. The Charter
on a Distinctive Partnership established the NATOUkrainian Commission as a permanent mechanism
to assist with reform projects and to deepen relations
with the Alliance.27 Kyiv has also participated in several
NATO peace-enforcement missions, including in postconflict Kosova after the summer of 1999. However,
the Ukrainian government was unable to implement
a full array of military reforms under the presidency
of Leonid Kuchma and did not explain the benefits of
NATO membership to large sectors of the Ukrainian
public.
Ukraine has benefited from several Alliance
mechanisms for closer cooperation since 2002,
including the NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC), the
NATO-Ukraine Action Plan, annual NATO-Ukraine
Target Plans, the Military Committee Work Plan, and
the Joint Working Group on Defense Reform. Kyiv
was also invited in April 2005 to begin an Intensified
Dialogue on Membership, a precursor to enter the
MAP process. The NUC was established in 1997 as a
means for consultation and cooperation and to assess
progress in the Action Plan and other initiatives.
Ukraine has also participated in several NATO
peacekeeping operations, including the Implementation
Force (IFOR)/Stabilization Force (SFOR) operation in
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Bosnia-Hercegovina between 1995 and 1999 and the
Kosovo Force (KFOR) mission in Kosova since 1999.
Kyiv has also made its air space and territory available
to U.S. and NATO forces and actively participated in
NATO’s Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) programs.
Ukraine has remained a prospective candidate
for NATO membership. In May 2002, Kyiv adopted
its Strategy on NATO approved by a presidential
decree, which asserted that Alliance integration
constituted a long-term goal for Ukraine. The objective
of NATO integration was also included in the law on
the Foundations of the National Security of Ukraine
in June 2002. The new version of Ukraine’s Military
Doctrine, revised in July 2004, underscored EuroAtlantic integration as a foreign policy priority but did
not explicitly spell out the goal of NATO membership.
Such ambiguity was evidently an indication of limited
support for Alliance accession among the citizenry and
sectors of the political elite.
After the election of President Viktor Yushchenko
in November 2004, Ukraine pushed for acquiring
a NATO MAP. This would be critical in propelling
the country toward eventual Alliance membership.
Indeed, several analysts contended that Ukraine was
eligible for MAP status because of the defense reforms
already conducted, its participation in NATO missions
in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the commitments
made by Kyiv to raise the defense budget to 2
percent of annual gross domestic product (GDP), as
recommended by NATO officials. In qualifying for a
MAP, Ukraine also needed to conduct further security
sector reforms. In October 2004, Ukraine’s Defense
Minister Anatoly Hrytsenko asserted that Kyiv would
complete its reform of the armed forces by 2008, and
in November 2005 Chief of the General Staff Serhiy
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Kirichenko presented a plan for reforming Ukraine’s
military by 2011.28
However, the prospect of Ukraine receiving a MAP
program at NATO’s Riga Summit in November 2006
rapidly evaporated after the election of the Yanukovych
government in the summer of 2006. This was a
consequence of serious doubts about the commitment
of the new administration to Alliance goals and the
lack of consensus among Ukraine’s political elite on
key strategic issues. In addition, anti-NATO forces in
Ukraine, including the major pro-Russian parties in
Crimea, supported by Moscow, became more active
during 2006 in seeking to thwart Kyiv’s bid for Alliance
membership.
For example, in May 2006, protests and pickets were
organized in Crimea to prevent preparations for U.S.Ukrainian naval exercises that had taken place each
summer since 1997.29 On June 6, 2006, the parliament
of the Crimean Autonomous Republic adopted a
proposal to the Ukrainian parliament asking that the
entire peninsula be proclaimed as a “NATO-free zone”
and called on President Yushchenko to cancel this
year’s military exercises.
Shortly after assuming office in December 2004,
President Viktor Yushchenko had announced the
end of “multivectorism” in Ukraine’s foreign policy,
signaling a commitment to Western integration. But this
pro-Western position was again called into question
after the government of Prime Minister Yanukovich
was installed in August 2006, and hopes collapsed that
Ukraine would receive any encouragement to canvass
for NATO membership for the planned enlargement
summit in 2008.
An important indicator of readiness to join NATO
is the extent of public support for membership. In
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Ukraine this figure has remained low because of the
Soviet hangover and lack of credible information
regarding the Alliance. Results of a survey released in
June 2006 by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation in
Kyiv, indicated that only 12.4 percent of respondents
approve of Ukraine joining NATO, while 64.4 percent
were against.30 The pro-NATO vote has fluctuated
between 15 percent and 30 percent over the past several
years, which is exceptionally low by CEE standards.
The Russian media broadcasting to Ukraine has
continued to stress the restricted nature of public
support for NATO accession, asserting that several major
Ukrainian political parties are actively campaigning
against the Alliance.31 One common reason given by
Ukrainian respondents opposed to NATO entry is
that this would allegedly worsen Ukrainian-Russian
relations. Moscow continues to give credence to such
an outcome in order to help maintain opposition to
NATO accession within Ukraine.
If public opinion is to be transformed, Kyiv will
need to steadily build up a positive national consensus
on NATO entry through a more effective and extensive
public information campaign. In addition, in October
2005, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer
underscored that Ukraine’s future membership in
the Alliance hinged on its performance in meeting
rigorous NATO standards in civil and military
reform. This would include deeper cuts in the size of
the armed forces and a prolonged process of military
modernization and professionalization.
In September 2006, Prime Minister Yanukovych
asserted at NATO headquarters in Brussels that Kyiv
was putting on hold its aspirations to join NATO’s MAP
because of public opposition to Alliance membership.32
His statements, which were subsequently contradicted
by President Yushchenko, demonstrated that Ukraine’s
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political leadership remained deeply divided and
ultimately unprepared for the process of NATO
inclusion. Defense Minister Anatoliy Hrytsenko and
Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk vigorously countered
the Prime Minister’s statements. Both these ministers,
who were appointed by President Yushchenko,
claimed that NATO membership was a centerpiece
of Ukrainian foreign policy. Evidently, the Defense
Ministry will continue to pursue an action plan geared
toward acquiring membership in the Alliance. The
Foreign Ministry also supported the process of NATO
accession, but the dismissal by parliament of Foreign
Minister Tarasyuk and Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko
in early December 2006 raised serious doubts about
the government’s commitments to meeting NATO
standards.
The conflict over policy in the Ukrainian
administration will clearly retard Kyiv’s prospect
of obtaining a MAP from the Alliance and postpone
NATO membership indefinitely. The Yanukovych
leadership has also pledged to hold a public referendum
on NATO accession. Critics contend that this will be
calculated to reinforce their non-NATO stance and
silence the pro-Alliance politicians, while government
officials maintain that they are seeking to better prepare
Ukraine for possible NATO entry by promoting a
public debate.
At the NATO Summit in Riga in November 2006,
Alliance leaders provided support to Ukraine’s proNATO forces by issuing a declaration reaffirming their
intention to pursue the process of Intensified Dialogue
with Ukraine. Although this does not guarantee
eventual membership, it does place Kyiv on track for
obtaining a MAP when it is ready, both politically and
technically.33
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Belarus. Under the rule of President Alyaksandr
Lukashenka since the mid-1990s, Belarus has not been
interested in NATO membership or even a close security
relationship with the Alliance. The country has engaged
in limited bilateral cooperation and participated in some
PfP activities with Alliance members after joining the
initiative in 1994. However, the presidency has limited
the extent of military cooperation with the NATO states
despite some interest expressed within the Ministry of
Defense. Although Belarusian legislation allows for
participation in peacekeeping missions abroad, no
presidential decisions have been taken on dispatching
troops on any NATO-led operations. At the same
time, NATO states remain highly critical of Minsk
for the country’s authoritarian system, the absence of
civil-military reform, and for the regime’s frequent
propaganda attacks and disinformation campaigns
against the Alliance.
Moldova. Moldova joined the PfP program in 1994,
received IPPs, and adopted the PAP-DIB to support its
defense reform. However, the government in Chisinau
has only engaged in a handful of joint activities with
NATO. It has participated on a small scale in some
NATO operations but has extremely limited financial
means and a largely unreformed bureaucratic structure.
Moldova is also a member of the Southeast European
Cooperative Initiative (SECI) and thereby involved in
various NATO cooperation formats with the Balkan
states.
In June 2005, President Vladimir Voronin visited
NATO headquarters in Brussels and asked for the
initiation of a special partnership with the Alliance in
the form of an IPAP. However, the existing Moldovan
constitution stresses the country’s neutrality and
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prohibits membership in any military alliance,
including NATO. Thus far, Chisinau has not voiced
any direct membership aspirations. However, the
Voronin government has stressed the importance of
Moldova’s integration into “European and transatlantic
structures” in order to reduce threats and insecurities.
Chisinau’s deteriorating relations with Russia and
its fear of losing the Transnistrian region has pushed
the government closer to NATO even though its
membership prospects remain slim at present.
Georgia. NATO has developed several forms of
partnership with the south Caucasian states, especially
in assisting their armed forces to develop democratic
standards. Georgia has emerged as the most active
NATO partner in the Southern Caucasus and aspires
to NATO membership. It views strong ties with the
Alliance as protection against Russia’s pressure and
as a potential form of assistance in reintegrating
the territories detached by separatist movements
supported by Moscow. NATO is also important
for obtaining practical assistance in the country’s
defense transformation. The Rose Revolution and the
election of President Mikhail Saakashvili in January
2004 enhanced Tbilisi’s cooperation with NATO and
enabled it to launch an intensive program of defense
reform.
Georgia has been involved in the PfP program since
March 1994 and has been engaged in IPAPs. The IPAP
is designed to intensify PfP cooperation by specifying
programs for reform spanning a broad range of issues
including military, judicial, and economic reform;
budgeting; civil emergency planning; equipment
standardization; and improving interoperability with
NATO members. Tbilisi also participates in the PAPDIP designed to improve the operational capabilities
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of the military while subordinating the military to
civilian control.34 Military officers from several CEE
states have been involved in advising their Georgian
counterparts in applying these various projects as
Tbilisi has sought assistance in security sector reform
and enhanced interoperability with NATO.
The Georgian authorities have been very cooperative
in assisting in U.S. and NATO missions. In March 2005,
Georgia and NATO signed an Agreement on Provision
of Host Nation Support to and Transit of NATO
Forces and NATO Personnel. The agreement provided
an insurance of NATO transit through Georgian
territory.35 Tbilisi has also proposed transforming the
Batumi Base into a common NATO-Russia training
center for the Black Sea region. Georgian military units
have participated in NATO’s Kosova KFOR mission
and in the International Security Assistance Forces
(ISAF) operation in Afghanistan. In 2001, Georgia
became the first South Caucasian country to host PfP
military exercises. Georgia was also the first country
where a NATO liaison officer appointed for the South
Caucasus region began work in early 2005.
NATO’s Intensified Dialogue with Georgia
was reconfirmed at the Alliance Summit in Riga in
November 2006, and Tbilisi was commended for its
contribution to peacekeeping operations in Kosova
and Iraq.36 The Georgian authorities remain hopeful
of obtaining a full MAP from NATO following the
implementation of its IPAP goals approved in October
2004. After the Rose Revolution and the election of
President Mikhail Sakaashvilli, the new government
displayed its commitment to internal democratic
reform, and its foreign policy priorities included
membership in both NATO and the EU. Tbilisi has
cultivated a closer relationship with the Alliance and
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with its member states, especially the United States, in
the hope of obtaining NATO membership.
Tbilisi has displayed its commitment to the Alliance
by offering its airspace and airfields for the U.S.-led
campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, by dispatching a
military unit to Afghanistan to participate in NATO’s
ISAF, and by sending a peacekeeping contingent to Iraq.
In turn, the United States has provided support to the
“Georgia Train and Equip Program” designed to assist
Tbilisi in countering terrorist infiltration. With U.S.
backing, the Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE) also conducted a border monitoring
operation along part of the Russian-Georgian frontier
between 1999 and 2004. The Russian government
refused to support the renewal of this OSCE mandate,
evidently fearful of creating an effective border that
would set an example for other areas. Moscow prefers
to have ambiguous and even contested borders with
smaller and vulnerable neighbors in order to keep
them off balance and to gain political advantages for
its expansive state interests.
An indefinite delay or the abrupt termination of
further NATO enlargement eastwards would impact
negatively on the internal politics of several excluded
states. It could halt the nascent reform programs and
encourage anti-Western or isolationist elements among
the political elites while weakening the staunchly proAmerican and pro-European political forces. Exclusion
from western institutions may disenchant large sectors
of the public and favor populist, xenophobic, and
authoritarian trends in national politics. It could curtail
regional cooperation and limit national contributions
to Allied peacekeeping and state reconstruction
operations in various regional trouble spots. And this
would send ripple effects throughout state institutions
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to the detriment of security sector and judicial
reform and other arenas necessary for acquiring EU
membership.
Nonenlargement of the Alliance would also
adversely affect relations between current NATO
member states. If the newest NATO countries from
CEE are unable to persuade their partners that eastern
enlargement is essential for Allied security, then this
could breed resentment and even unwillingness to
participate in some NATO operations. It could lead
to more damaging political rifts within the Alliance.
Meanwhile, apprehensions may grow across the
region that some NATO allies were appeasing Russia
and willing to come to agreements with Moscow at
the expense of the security and national interests of
the CEE countries. Paradoxically, restricted expansion
rather than an open-ended Alliance may contribute
more to fracturing NATO as a political alliance and
undermining its expanded military roles outside the
European continent.
NATO’s nonenlargement will also have serious
implications for Russia’s position in the East European
region and Moscow’s policies toward the North
Atlantic Alliance. By interpreting Kremlin opposition
to NATO enlargement as Russia’s diplomatic and
regional success, a freeze on expansion could further
embolden the Russian administration. NATO would
be increasingly perceived as a weakened organization
with limited interests in regions where Russia seeks
to reestablish its zone of dominance. Paradoxically, a
spatially restricted NATO is more likely to embolden
Russia to provoke disputes with NATO’s newer
members and precipitate potential confrontations with
the Alliance as a whole.
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U.S. Eastern Policy.
At a regional level, Washington has been supportive
of democratizing and securing the remaining East
European countries in the trans-Atlantic zone. However,
it has often lacked a coherent strategy, sufficient support
and cohesion among its traditional European allies, and
fully credible partners in all the East European states.
In terms of grand strategy, the “Newly Independent
States” or the “Black Sea Region” have proved to be
elusive concepts containing widely diverging countries
that have mirrored bureaucratic divisions in regional
responsibility within the U.S. foreign policy apparatus.
Some governments, as in Belarus and Russia, have been
opposed to more extensive U.S. engagement, some
as in Kuchma’s Ukraine and throughout the 1990s in
Moldova were neutral, while other governments, as in
post-Rose Revolution Georgia, post-Orange Revolution
Ukraine, and post-2005 Moldova, have welcomed more
pronounced U.S. involvement.
In terms of regional organizations in the postSoviet domain, there has been an absence of a single
all-encompassing institution for Washington to
engage with. Instead, it has focused on working with
a variety of multinational organizations, including
GUAM, BSEC (where the United States has observer
status), the Black Sea Trust (established by the German
Marshal Fund), and the Black Sea Forum, which held its
inaugural meeting in Bucharest in June 2006. The U.S.
administration has also supported specific multinational
projects such as the Black Sea border security initiative,
focused on antiproliferation measures, and the Black
Sea Civil-Military Preparedness Program, involving
joint exercises in the event of natural disasters and
other emergencies.
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Ukraine. During the second half of the 1990s,
Ukraine became the largest recipient of U.S. economic
aid. Nevertheless, political relations between Kyiv and
Washington stagnated because of President Leonid
Kuchma’s backtracking from democratic practice
and his acts of repression against independent critics.
Relations visibly improved and deepened following
the Orange Revolution in November-December 2004.
The United States restored the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP) in trade, accorded Ukraine market
economy status, signed a bilateral World Trade
Organization (WTO) market access agreement, and
permanently lifted the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to
encourage Ukrainian exports to the United States.
President Yushchenko received a positive signal
from the White House concerning Ukraine’s bid for
NATO membership during his visit to Washington
in April 2005. Kyiv was invited to join NATO’s
Intensified Dialogue on Membership, and a Strategic
Partnership Agreement was signed by the two capitals,
although it brought few immediate benefits for Kyiv.
Washington also supported Ukraine’s membership in
various regional structures, including the Community
for Democratic Choice (CDC) and the South Eastern
Europe Defense Ministerial Group (SEDM). The
Ukrainian authorities have supplied troops to various
peacekeeping missions including the U.S.-led coalition
operation in Iraq.
However, the further development of bilateral
relations came into question following the March
2006 election victory of the Party of Regions led by
the new Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych and the
confusion surrounding Ukraine’s strategic direction
and its commitment to Western integration. While
Washington will continue to support reform and
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economic development in Ukraine, it will also carefully
monitor the stability and performance of the new
government as well as the impact of Russia’s influence
on Kyiv’s security and foreign policy.
Belarus. Washington has applied various measures
to promote democratization and even regime change in
Belarus. This has included the Belarus Democracy Act
2004, an initiative designed to financially support the
implementation of programs for building democratic
institutions.37 The Act also empowered Washington
to impose sanctions on Minsk in case of continuing
human rights violations and several high-ranking
Belarusian officials have been banned from entry into
the United States. In December 2006, the U.S. House
of Representatives passed the Belarus Democracy
Reauthorization Act, which extended the original
Belarus Democracy Act until 2008. The bill authorized
over $27 million in funding for democracy-building
activities and banned the U.S. Government from
providing financial assistance to Minsk, except for
humanitarian aid, until the regime conducts a thorough
inquiry into the 1999-2000 disappearances of President
Lukashenka’s opponents, releases political prisoners,
drops charges against opposition figures, and ends the
prosecution of independent media and pro-democracy
organizations.38
The U.S. Congress and the administration have
generally worked together in condemning the antidemocratic policies of the Lukashenka regime and
criticizing a series of fraudulent elections in Belarus.
However, Washington’s strident tones have not
translated into any fundamental changes in the country.
Indeed, repression has been intensified, especially
since the 2004 upheaval in neighboring Ukraine, as the
Belarusian regime launched preemptive repressions
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supposedly to prevent a “colored revolution.” The
majority of Belarusian citizens have either remained
passive or unwilling to openly oppose the government,
and organized opposition has remained restricted.
Moldova. The United States developed closer
relations with Moldova when Chisinau made a firmer
commitment to Western integration after the March
2005 general elections. U.S. assistance programs to
Moldova aim to promote democratic and market
reform and have focused on local governance, civic
participation, anticorruption, law enforcement reform,
and antitrafficking in persons.39 Washington has made
it clear that it supports Moldova’s territorial integrity
and has condemned moves toward separation and
independence by the Transnistrian regime. Assistance
programs also support Moldova’s membership in
various regional structures. For instance, the United
States has backed Moldova’s active participation in
the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe and in the
GUAM initiative.
Other bilateral arrangements have included a
trade agreement providing reciprocal most-favorednation tariff status and the granting of GSP status in
August 1995. U.S. training and technical assistance
has promoted administrative reform with the goal of
increasing the autonomy and effectiveness of local
government, encouraging fiscal decentralization,
generating greater transparency and citizen
participation in decisionmaking, supporting NGOs in
fostering civil society, promoting private enterprise
development, and expanding an independent and
professional media.
U.S. assistance programs have also focused on
enabling Moldova’s participation in NATO’s PfP
program, developing its peacekeeping capacities, and
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strengthening border security, especially in Transnistria.
Foreign Military Finance (FMF) and International
Military Education and Training (IMET) funding has
helped to develop and reform Moldova’s armed forces,
while allowing its peacekeeping battalion to operate
alongside NATO forces. This directly promotes the
eventual integration of Moldova into the Alliance. The
Anti-Crime Training and Technical Assistance (ACTTA)
program has supported cooperative efforts between
U.S. law enforcement agencies and Moldovan officials
to combat organized crime, corruption, narcotics, and
trafficking in persons. To demonstrate its aspirations
for closer relations with the United States, Chisinau
dispatched a small military contingent to Iraq in the
second half of 2003, which was supplemented in 2004.
Georgia. Since Georgia’s Rose Revolution in
November 2003, relations between Tbilisi and
Washington have significantly improved, and the
United States has provided political, diplomatic,
military, and economic support to the reformist
government.40 Extensive U.S. assistance is targeted
to support Georgia’s democratic, judicial, economic,
and security reform programs, with an emphasis on
institution-building and implementing democratic
reforms. Efforts have been made to strengthen
independent political parties, develop professional
media, and build a strong and effective civil society.
The Georgian parliament has also received substantial
support to buttress its capacity and forge a legislative
body that exercises effective oversight.
The United States has also worked closely with Tbilisi
in its counterterrorism efforts. It has provided Georgia
with bilateral security assistance, including military
professionalism training through the IMET program
and help in law enforcement reform, nonproliferation,
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and combating organized crime and transborder
smuggling. The multiyear Georgia Train and Equip
Program (GTEP) ended in 2004, and was widely
hailed as a success in enhancing Georgia’s military
capabilities and stimulating military reform. Military
restructuring initiatives have continued through the
Sustainment and Stability Operations Program (SSOP)
and other education and training projects. The Georgia
Border Security and Law Enforcement (GBSLE)
program has improved the effectiveness of the Border
Guard, the Coast Guard, and the Customs Service. In
its turn, Georgia has contributed troops to the U.S.-led
operation in Iraq, and its 850 soldiers formed the largest
national contingent proportionate to the population of
all countries engaged in the stabilization operation.
European Union Eastern Policy.
In theory, all the European states, geographically
and politically defined, are EU candidates. According
to Article 49 of the Treaty on the European Union, each
European country can apply for membership in the EU
provided that it meets certain specified standards. The
EU’s Copenhagen Criteria for admitting new states
rest on three principles: stable democratic institutions,
the rule of law and ensuring human rights, and the
protection of minorities.41 All European capitals, with
the exception of Moscow and Minsk, view EU accession
as a strategic objective and priority. However, the EU
has not included the post-Soviet states on an entry
path through association agreements as it has with the
West Balkan countries. Warsaw and several other CEE
capitals have pushed to have their status upgraded
from Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA)
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with the Union to SAA as a stepping-stone to eventual
EU admission.
Poland and its neighbors initially supported a
New Neighborhood Initiative (NNI) toward Ukraine,
Belarus, and Moldova.42 However, the notion of focusing
on these states with future membership prospects
was altered by the EU in its ENP, devised in 2003 as a
“Wider Europe” concept, laying the groundwork for
closer cooperation with the EU’s eastern and southern
neighbors.43 The initiative was formally announced
at the EU’s June 2003 Thessaloniki Summit and was
intended to create a circle of stable states adjacent to the
Union’s borders without explicitly offering membership
prospects to any specific country. The stated objective
was to help promote democratic standards, the rule of
law, an independent judiciary, and other reforms that
complied with EU standards and norms.
The ENP initially included Ukraine and Moldova
and was extended to encompass Georgia, Armenia,
and Azerbaijan in June 2004. Parallel to this initiative,
the ESS was prepared by the office of the EU’s High
Representative for CFSP in 2003 to help shape the
Union’s interactions with the outside world.44 It
specified that there should be no more dividing lines
within Europe, and that the benefits of political and
economic cooperation should be extended to the EU’s
eastern neighbors.
Within the ENP framework, EU leaders have
focused on “benchmarks” of progress in neighboring
states that can be rewarded with financial support
and technical assistance. They have underscored the
importance of 3- to 5-year Action Plans (AP) tailored
to each country in promoting democratic reform, the
rule of law, institution building, trade liberalization,
and transport connections.45 EU officials contend that
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in the economic arena the ENP helps to deepen trade
relations, enhances financial and technical assistance,
promotes participation in EU programs, and gives
each country a link with the Union’s internal market.
The Action Plans are not legally binding agreements
but political documents outlining a set of objectives for
the Neighborhood countries with specific road maps
for reform.46
Several CEE capitals have criticized the ENP for
the significant disproportions between the number of
commitments made by the neighborhood states and
the extent of benefits promised by the EU.47 They argue
that the ENP initiative needs to be enhanced with
greater access to EU markets, work and immigration
opportunities, technical assistance, and increased
freedom of movement in recognition of stronger
border controls and domestic law enforcement in the
ENP states. Some analysts have proposed that the
East European countries be offered the prospect of a
place in the EU’s internal market through preferential
trading relations and market openings leading to a
free trade agreement in people, goods, services, and
capital. To this effect, assistance needs to be provided
to improve infrastructure interconnecting these
countries with the Union, especially in transportation,
energy, telecommunications, and efficient border
management.48 It is important that the EU’s new
external border does not become a barrier to trade,
social interchange, and regional cooperation.
The European Neighborhood and Partnership
Instrument (ENPI) has been developed as the core
financial program that will replace existing assistance
packages and become the main channel of EU aid to all
neighboring countries from 2007 onwards. A projected
14.9 billion euros is due to be earmarked for the
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ENPI region between 2007 and 2013. This constitutes
a 60 percent growth in average annual spending as
compared to the funds allocated between 2004 and
2006. The bulk of financing will be earmarked for
the development of border regions and cross-border
cooperation in environmental protection, public
security, countercrime, and conflict prevention.
The EU has displayed its reluctance to further
enlargement eastwards, especially since the failure to
approve the EU’s Constitutional Treaty in 2005 and
its preoccupation with the Western Balkans. With the
inclusion of Bulgaria and Romania as EU members in
January 2007, some analysts have concluded that further
Union enlargement will be halted indefinitely.49 In
September 2006, European Commission President José
Manuel Barroso indicated that the current expansion
of the Union might be the last until an “institutional
settlement” is reached within the EU following the
Treaty’s failure. Additionally, the slowdown in EU
economic growth has avowedly weakened political and
public support for further enlargement and integration.
For instance, the French authorities announced that any
future member beyond Bulgaria and Romania would
need to be approved by a French referendum. This
could delay or derail the accession of various states in
the West Balkans and Eastern Europe.
The debate in several EU capitals has focused
on the limits of EU expansion and a search for an
acceptable definition of Europe’s ultimate borders that
would determine who can qualify for membership.
While the CEE and several Western European
capitals have supported enlargement eastward,
other voices have proposed alternative arrangements
and “special relationships” between the EU and
the excluded East European countries, including a
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European Commonwealth with a Euro-Mediterranean
Parliament.50 Others have proposed a greater emphasis
on regionalism in overlapping zones such as the Black
Sea region and in other parts of the “Eastern dimension”
involving the former Soviet republics.51 While such
initiatives may enhance the performance of particular
countries and promote regional cooperation, they are
likely to be perceived in the affected capitals as an
attempted substitute for full EU membership.
The German authorities may be considering making
a clearer EU distinction between continental countries
that have membership hopes and those that will never
be admitted. German officials have asserted that the
ENP has not been successful because it links together
too many diverse countries, while not providing
sufficient incentives to East European states that border
the EU. If adopted, such a policy could downgrade
the North African and Middle Eastern partners while
upgrading all the East European countries within the
ENP.52 Undoubtedly, such an approach would be
supported by the majority of CEE capitals but is likely
to be resisted by several West European governments
who do not relish making “Europe’s neighbors” into
“European neighbors” with a realistic prospect of EU
inclusion.
While the EU’s European Council enhanced
its own foreign policy role by appointing a High
Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, the
European Parliament has steadily developed its own
distinct voice in foreign policy issues. It has been more
outspoken in pressing for the inclusion of the remaining
East European states within the EU. The EP has used
its budgetary powers to help establish the European
Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR).
In March 2006, the EP endorsed a report recommending
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that all countries bidding for membership should be
given a “European perspective” that would include a
“privileged partnership” until entry is secured.53 Such
an arrangement, with various trade concessions and
involvement in the EU’s internal market, would make
the long and arduous transition to membership more
palatable.
However, several East European leaders and
analysts see EU policies as delaying tactics to prevent
further Union expansion. Rather than a mechanism of
convergence that would enable the participating state
to qualify for EU entry, the ENP is widely viewed as
an attempt by Brussels to delay decisions on further
enlargement. Critics contend that the Western
orientations of new governments in Georgia, Ukraine,
and Moldova has increased opportunities for EU
leverage in these countries. They remain unconvinced
that the ENP or various trade arrangements provide
sufficient incentives for pursuing vigorous reforms
and complain about the wide disparity between
funds allocated by the EU to the South Mediterranean
countries and to Eastern Europe.
Warsaw and other capitals have sought to
replace the current PCAs between the EU and
Ukraine and other Eastern states with an “Enhanced
Agreement on Association.” However, the European
Parliament, despite its declarations, has been unable
to find governmental allies in most member states in
recognizing Ukraine and other East European states as
potential EU members. It has also struggled in reaching
any consensus in condemning Russia’s attempts to
obstruct its neighbors from joining the pan-European
project.
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Some analysts propose that the ENP include a
significant component for strengthening civil society in
its policy of democracy promotion.54 This could entail
creating new mechanisms for democracy assistance
through an EU foundation established specifically for
this purpose and modeled on the operations of U.S. and
German foundations which have provided considerable
support. Until now, the EU has earmarked fewer
funds for civil society than several other major donors.
Civil society should be viewed as a valuable method
for broadening domestic support for democracy, a
market economy, and EU integration. At a practical
level, NGOs could also participate in monitoring the
implementation of ENP Action Plans in each of the
Neighborhood states.
On the security front, cooperation needs to be
intensified to prevent and combat threats to Europe’s
security, including international terrorist networks,
criminal organizations, nuclear and environmental
hazards, and communicable diseases. This would
include closer interstate police, border control,
intelligence, and judicial cooperation. Proposals have
also been made to provide East European countries
with the prospect of aligning themselves with CFSP
statements and decisions in order to familiarize them
with EU foreign and security policy mechanisms and
procedures.55
An additional format for involving the East
European countries with their EU neighbors in joint
cross-border programs has been the Euro-Region
initiative. Several Euro-Regions have been established
over the past decade, spanning border countries in
multilateral cooperation frameworks and focusing on
such issues as environment, agriculture, land planning,
transport, telecommunications, tourism, civil society,
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media, education, culture, and border security. They
have included the Lower Danube Euro-Region and the
Upper Prut Euro-Region, spanning several counties
in Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine. However, their
progress has been hamstrung by an absence of action
plans with clearly defined goals, lack of experience
among local administrations, and limited financial
resources.56
Belarus. Belarus is the only European country that
is not a member of the Council of Europe. In practice,
the OSCE was the only pan-European body that had
a presence in Minsk for much of the 1990s. Following
Belarusian independence in 1991, relations with the
EU markedly improved. Initial progress was made in
negotiating a PCA in 1995, together with an interim
trade agreement. However, both of these arrangements
were suspended as a result of deteriorating internal
developments in Belarus from 1996 onwards after the
election of President Alyaksandr Lukashenka.57 Since
that time, EU policy toward Belarus has included regular
condemnations of the concentration of presidential
powers and consistent human rights abuses, such
as harassment and imprisonment of opposition
politicians. EU institutions have warned repeatedly
about the self-isolation of Belarus and called for a
genuine partnership with Minsk. However, Belarus
has failed to meet the basic democratic requirements
needed to qualify for inclusion in the ENP.
Belarus has benefited from various EU assistance
programs, especially in funds allocated in the early
years of independence. These have included support
for private sector development, transportation, nuclear
safety, and environmental protection. Much of the aid
was suspended after 1996 when the EU did not recognize
the legitimacy of the 1996 referendum, which amended
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the 1994 Belarusian Constitution despite a ruling by the
Constitutional Court of Belarus that the amendments
were unconstitutional. Several planned EU allocations
were frozen and the ratification of the Interim Trade
Agreement was suspended as the democratically
elected parliament was replaced by a pliant legislative
body beholden to President Lukashenka. The EU’s
General Affairs Council concluded in 1997 that relations
should remain restricted until Belarus begins to move
away from a dictatorial system of government. Since
that time, the EU has focused on support for democracy
development and civil society, including training for
independent journalists, NGO development, youth
support, and human rights monitoring.
The EU, with urging from the CEE neighbors, sought
to involve Minsk in various cross-border programs,
including the training of Belarusian border officials,
the management of border controls, migration and
asylum, and support for counterterrorism initiatives
and the combating of cross-border criminal networks.
In addition, most EU member states have been
providing direct aid to Belarus, mostly focused on
developing civil society, NGOs, the independent media,
cultural activities, educational pursuits, and youth and
women’s programs. Such activities are of limited scale
and restricted impact because of the resistance of the
Belarusian authorities to what is officially depicted as
Western interference in the country’s internal affairs.
During 2002, the EU adopted a “benchmark”
approach in order to encourage gradual step-bystep reforms in Belarus with specific rewards, but
this yielded little result. Punitive measures have also
been imposed to encourage Minsk to adopt basic
democratic standards and human rights principles.
In November 2002, 14 EU member states imposed a
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visa ban on several Belarusian officials. In April 2006,
the EU Council of Ministers confirmed a visa ban on
six leading Belarusian officials, including President
Lukashenka. The EU planned to expand this ban to
other government officials. The Union also imposed
economic sanctions by denying financial assistance and
suspending participation in a number of institutions,
including the Council of Europe. Various EU bodies
also asserted that the 2004 parliamentary elections and
the 2006 presidential ballot did not meet democratic
norms.
In retaliation for EU criticism and exclusion, Minsk
has periodically refused to issue visas to the OSCE
Advisory and Monitoring Group (AMG) and expelled
several Western organizations and programs and
closed down their operations, including the British
Council, the cultural arm of the British government.58
At a time of escalating disputes, the CEE capitals
have been pushing for greater EU engagement with
Minsk through diplomatic, economic, cultural, and
NGO channels and have proposed the opening of an
EU Commission office in the country that would help
develop contacts with moderate officials and potential
reformers.
The EU also excluded Belarus from its ENP and
its Neighborhood Programs adopted in 2003, which
involved trade and assistance to countries that embarked
on political and economic reforms. Nevertheless, it
offered the prospect of inclusion if Minsk made moves
to meet basic democratic standards. The new ENPI
mechanism will enable the EU to implement projects
in Belarus with national or local governments and civic
society organizations, even if Minsk has not signed an
ENP Action Plan.
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However, the EU has little concrete to offer Minsk
in comparison to Russia on which Belarus is dependent
for cheap and essential energy supplies and most of its
export trade. By contrast, the EU’s neighborhood policy
would not ensure access to the single European market
for Belarusian products. Despite various incentives,
sanctions, and pressures, EU policy in transforming
Belarus into a democratic state has proved ineffective,
as President Lukashenka has consolidated his
authoritarian regime during the last decade.
Some policy splits have also emerged among EU
member states, with Poland, Lithuania, Sweden, and
Germany favoring greater engagement with Minsk at
the governmental level. Meanwhile the UK, Holland,
and other countries have sought to keep official
relations to a minimum, arguing that contacts will
simply benefit the Lukashenka regime to acquire
international legitimacy without moving forward the
democratization agenda. The EU resolved to provide
better information to the Belarusian public on the EU
and the ENP, to make Minsk eligible for some forms of
cross-border cooperation under the new Neighborhood
Programs with Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine,
to enable Belarus to benefit from the ENPI, as of 2007,
and to provide some budgetary assistance for civil
society and local governments.
In September 2005, the EU launched a program
in support of independent media broadcasting to
Belarus.59 The initiative was pursued largely as a result of
pressure from the new EU members bordering Belarus.
In November 2006, the European Commission offered
Minsk significant economic incentives in exchange
for fulfilling 12 conditions for democratization.60
Brussels pledged to open its markets for Belarusian
commodities, to give financial support to Belarusian
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companies, to provide more scholarships for Belarusian
students, to streamline visa formalities for Belarusian
citizens, and to assist in implementing economic and
self-government reforms. Minsk, in turn, would have
to release political prisoners, halt its persecution of the
opposition, investigate the disappearances of political
opponents, ensure fair court trials, respect minority
rights, and hold free elections. In effect, Brussels was
inviting the Belarusian regime to conclude a new
partnership agreement to replace the one frozen in
1996.
Ukraine. The EU and Ukraine signed a PCA in
June 1994 and ratified the accord in March 1998 for 10
years. In June 1998, Kyiv announced its intention to
become an EU associate member.61 In December 1999,
the EU adopted a Common Strategy for Ukraine for 4
years, underscoring support for Ukraine’s democratic
and economic reforms and providing for technical
and financial assistance principally through the Tacis
assistance program. This has involved supporting
the economic transition, ensuring environmental
protection, energy security, and nuclear safety, and
assisting Ukraine’s integration into the European and
world economy. Between 1999 and 2005, the EU’s
financial aid amounted to more than 1 billion euro,
thus making the EU the largest donor in Ukraine.
The EU also established a political mechanism with
Kyiv, enabling bilateral summits between the EU and
Ukrainian presidents and periodic ministerial meetings.
However, during the Kuchma presidency, Kyiv’s
commitment to meeting EU governance and legal
standards remained lukewarm as the ruling stratum
feared a loss of power through the implementation of a
more transparent and democratic process. Ukraine also
took a step backwards in terms of its economic reforms
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and Western integration by signing an agreement to
create a CIS free trade zone within a Common Economic
Space (CES) with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan in
September 2003. At the same time, Kyiv’s prospects
for a free trade agreement with the EU had made little
progress, especially given the ongoing political turmoil
in Ukraine.
In May 2004, the European Commission launched
the ENP, providing for a greater degree of integration
including access to the EU’s internal market
and increased financial assistance to implement
important reforms. After the election of President
Viktor Yushchenko, relations with the EU markedly
improved as the new administration pledged
Ukraine’s commitment to EU norms, the irreversibility
of democratic reforms, and Kyiv’s chief foreign
policy priority as Union membership. The European
Parliament led by CEE delegates called for a clearer
signal to Ukraine regarding its EU perspective and in
assisting the country’s democratic transition.62
An EU-Ukraine Action Plan was adopted in
February 2005 within the ENP framework, setting
several priority areas for Ukraine. These included
strengthening democratic institutions, conducting
economic reform, adopting tax reform, improving
the investment climate, and enhancing cooperation in
regional security. Kyiv has also continued to receive
EU technical assistance under the Tacis program, with
support for institutional, legal, and administrative
reform, private sector development, and for addressing
the social consequences of transition.
Currently, the ENPI is being developed to provide
a framework for assistance within the broader ENP.
It is due to be launched in the EU’s 2007-13 financial
perspective agenda and will replace the Tacis program
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by covering a range of instruments including technical
assistance. Dissatisfied with the incentives offered
by Brussels, in a resolution adopted in January 2005,
the European Parliament called on the EU Council
and EU Commission to provide a “clearer European
perspective” for Ukraine to encourage the reform
program.63 However, the European Parliament’s impact
on the official stance of the EU has proved limited.
President Yushchenko petitioned the EU to more
fully embrace Ukraine and specify its prospects for
eventual integration. He argued that the EU and the
United States should recognize Ukraine as a market
economy and support its bid to join the WTO. He also
called upon Brussels to upgrade Ukraine from its PCA
arrangement to an association agreement similar to
the West Balkan states.64 His position was backed by
the European Parliament. Nonetheless, the EU seemed
unlikely to change its position until 2008 when the
3-year ENP Action Plan and the PCA expire. Although
some voices have proposed an Enhanced Partnership
for Ukraine, its content remains uncertain pending
further negotiations.
At the EU-Ukraine Summit in December 2005,
Ukraine was granted market economy status and
agreements were signed for deeper cooperation in
energy, transportation, and satellite navigation.65
However, Ukraine has yet to become a member of
the WTO because of insufficient progress in enforcing
existing legislation and the absence of proper legislation
in such spheres as agriculture, services, and metallurgy.
Discussions have been underway since the Orange
Revolution for a potential free trade agreement between
the EU and Ukraine as a significant step in the country’s
Western integration.66 The PCA envisions the creation
of a free trade area with Ukraine. Kyiv was given a list
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of detailed prescriptions whose implementation would
create a basis for deeper integration with the EU. The
EU’s current PCA with Ukraine is due to expire in the
spring of 2008. This would be an ideal time to forge
a new model of economic cooperation constructed
around a free trade accord.
At the EU-Ukraine summit in Helsinki, Finland,
in October 2006, the principles of a new accord to
replace the PCA were mapped out. A month earlier, in
September 2006, European Commission President Jose
Manuel Barroso stated that the Commission would
soon launch a discussion on a broader cooperation
agreement with Ukraine that could include a freetrade deal.67 Meanwhile, Prime Minister Yanukovych
reaffirmed that Ukraine will not join a customs union
with Russia within the framework of the Single
Economic Space, especially as this would restrict its
potential engagement with the EU.
Moldova. Moldova signed a PCA with the EU in
1998. Chisinau also petitioned for membership in the
EU’s Stability Pact for South East Europe (SPSEE) and
was eventually admitted into this multilateral initiative
in June 2001.68 However, unlike the other Balkan
states, Moldova was unable to apply for inclusion
in the EU’s Stabilization and Association Process
(SAP), a mechanism seen as a stepping-stone for EU
entry. In addition, the resolution of the Transnistrian
issue has not been addressed within the SPSEE
framework. Chisinau became involved in the various
SPSEE working groups to enhance the independent
media, local democracy, cross-border cooperation,
and parliamentary cooperation, to stimulate trade,
investment, and cooperation in the energy and
infrastructure sectors, to combat organized crime,
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and to better manage migration and disaster response
issues.
In March 2004, Brussels allowed Moldova to export
certain products tax-free to the EU, including textiles
and agricultural goods, while allowing Chisinau to
protect its own market from EU products for up to 7
years. In March 2005, Brussels appointed a special EU
representative for Moldova, indicating that the Union
intended to play a more active role in the country and
in resolving the Transnistrian conflict.69 A European
Commission Delegation was also established in
Chisinau during the fall of 2005. The progress of
Romania toward EU membership also contributed to
mobilizing Brussels to enhance its involvement in the
neighboring state. On the other hand, Romania’s entry
into the EU in January 2007 will create new problems
for Moldova in that a visa regime between the two
countries would need to be established and the bilateral
free trade agreement with Romania would have to be
cancelled in line with EU stipulations.
Moldova was included in the EU’s ENP program
and a bilateral Action Plan was concluded by December
2004 and signed in February 2005. In accordance with
the Action Plan, Chisinau has begun to harmonize
Moldova’s laws with those of the EU. However, the
ENP policy has come under domestic criticism for
lacking the political incentive of eventual accession.
Proponents of an enhanced Action Plan supported
several measures to accelerate Moldova’s path toward
the EU, including the pursuit of a legal approximation
agenda, offering various EU trading preferences, and
gradual integration in the EU’s Internal Market.70
The construction of an effective institutional and
legal framework is seen as a prerequisite for developing
a modern market economy and developing trade and
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access to the EU’s Internal Market. To this effect, the
Moldovan parliament passed legislation obliging
governmental institutions to observe European
standards while developing and adopting all laws.71
The Moldovan administration has committed itself
to EU integration, which the country’s Foreign and
European Integration Minister Andrei Stratan has
called “irreversible,” claiming that the EU-Moldova
Action Plan will be implemented by the end of 2007
after which Chisinau will petition for EU associate
membership.72
The EU has focused attention on combating crossborder organized crime and implementing more
effective border management along the MoldovanUkrainian frontier. It has also applied several punitive
measures against the Transnistrian leadership as a
means of pressure in search of a compromise over
the breakaway territory.73 For example, in February
2003 the EU instituted a visa ban on the Transnistrian
leadership and extended and renewed the ban in
August 2004 and February 2005. The Union deliberated
the possibility of conducting a post-conflict “peace
consolidation” operation in Transnistria and advised
Chisinau to reject the “Kozak memorandum” proposed
by the Russian authorities in 2005 to turn Moldova into
a confederation in which Transnistria would obtain
veto powers over government policy and Russian
troops would be deployed in the secessionist region
indefinitely.
Observers believed that the Moldovan government
was unlikely to accept any arrangement over
Transnistria without explicit EU support, thus giving
the Union significant influence in the regional standoff.
The Moldovan parliament called for an expansion of the
negotiating format over Transnistria to include the EU,
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the United States, and Romania. Such proposals were
vehemently opposed by Moscow, which has resisted
EU and U.S. involvement in resolving the conflict and
reintegrating Moldova as a single state. However,
under the “5 plus 2” arrangement, the EU and the
United States were included during 2006 as observers in
negotiations over Transnistria. Nevertheless, progress
in the talks was effectively blocked by the Transnistrian
leadership, which pushed for the breakaway region’s
independence. Tiraspol organized a referendum on
independence on September 17, 2006, which was
overwhelmingly approved by the region’s residents
and unanimously rejected by EU and NATO states.
The Moldovan government, elected in March 2005,
made a commitment to EU integration and renounced
its previous close ties with Russia. This was in line
with the stance of all major political parties. However,
Chisinau faces a prolonged and difficult mission to
implement all EU stipulations and regulations for
necessary economic, structural, and legal reforms.
In enhancing its involvement in Moldova, in
December 2005 the EU launched a legal border and
trade regime along the Moldovan-Ukraine frontier to
prevent illicit trade and smuggling operations across
the Transnistrian enclave. This EU Border Assistance
Mission (EUBAM) was assailed by separatist leaders
in Transnistria and by the government in Moscow
for allegedly imposing an economic embargo on
Transnistria and for undermining Russia’s strategic
interests in the region. EU leaders viewed this initiative
as an important test of its ENP and its ability to employ
“soft security” instruments close to Union borders.74
Meanwhile, the Transnistrian leadership and their
backers in Moscow viewed the EU initiative as an
economic blockade and Igor Smirnov, president of the
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unrecognized republic, temporarily withdrew from
the multinational negotiating process.
EU spokesmen have asserted that the resolution
of the “frozen conflicts” in Moldova and Georgia will
open up their potential for future EU membership.75
Critics argue that on the contrary, the realistic prospect
for EU entry for Chisinau and Tbilisi may prove a
strong magnet for the separatist regions to reintegrate
with the central state.76 For instance, the more Moldova
is integrated into the EU through trade and investment,
the more attractive it will be for business leaders and
the general population in Transnistria and the more it
could undercut separatist sentiments in the enclave.
Attempts to resolve the Transnistrian conflict should
not take precedence over Moldova’s EU integration,
and the former should not be viewed as a precondition
for structural reforms in the country.
Georgia. After Georgia regained its independence
in 1991, EU-Georgia relations focused primarily
on humanitarian relief following the outbreak of
separatist conflicts inside the new state. Assistance
was also provided in the transformation of political
institutions and economic policies. EU involvement
in the country and the wider South Caucasus region
has been largely focused on economic assistance rather
than intensive political engagement. A PCA between
Tbilisi and the EU was signed in 1996 and came
into force in 1999. It provided for a regular political
dialogue and concrete cooperation in such areas as
trade, investment, and legislative affairs. Some EU
capitals understood better than others that instability in
the south Caucasus constituted a threat to EU security
whether by potentially blocking energy transportation
routes or providing a conduit for organized crime and
international terrorists. To counter such threats, the EU
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has provided support for Georgia’s border guards and
other border management requirements.
In July 2003, the EU Council appointed an EU
Special Representative (EUSR) for the South Caucasus,
to develop a comprehensive policy toward the region.
At the same time, financial allocations to Georgia
substantially increased in order to reinforce institutional,
administrative, and legal reforms. The EU launched a
ESDP mission to Georgia in 2004 with a focus on the
legal process and policing. It has also employed the
EU Commission’s Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM)
to support the democratization process.
The EUSR assisted in mediating talks between Tbilisi
and the breakaway province of Ajaria in May 2004
that contributed to reintegrating that territory under
the central government. The EU has also supported
the Joint Control Commission for South Ossetia, the
main existing conflict settlement mechanism for the
secessionist region, and has provided limited funds.
The EUSR has held talks with the separatist authorities
in South Ossetia but has not participated regularly in
OSCE or United Nations (UN)-facilitated meetings
on South Ossetia or on the secessionist region of
Abkhazia.
Georgia’s Rose Revolution in November 2003,
and the subsequent holding of relatively free and
fair presidential and parliamentary elections, was
welcomed by the EU Commission after persistent
criticisms that the country had made insufficient
progress toward a democratic system of governance.
The launching of a broad reform program, including
combating official corruption, strengthening the rule
of law, and improving the investment climate, were
considered to be positive steps and were rewarded
with financial and technical means, including an EU
rule of law mission and macro financial assistance
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programs.77 Georgia itself was keen on eventual EU
membership and established a commission to enhance
this process.
Despite some progress, Western policies have
been hamstrung as evident in the EU’s 20 July 2006
statement on the separatist problems in Georgia.78 It
welcomed plans to send a UN fact-finding mission
regarding the deployment of an international police
force to Abkhazia and expressed concern about Russia’s
recent closure of the only recognized border crossing
with Georgia. However, to supplicate Moscow, the
EU statement counseled “mutual confidence among
the parties,” and called for dialogue on the basis of
“existing mechanisms.” In other words, it appeared
to equate the legitimate Georgian authorities with the
leaders of separatist entities sponsored by the Kremlin
and continued to support “existing mechanisms” that
have failed to resolve the conflict for over a decade.
In June 2004, the EU’s ENP eventually included
the three South Caucasian states. Initially, they were
not considered as viable candidates for EU integration
and the Union itself was not perceived as a key factor
in promoting regional stability and development.
However, since Georgia’s Rose Revolution, eventual
EU entry has increasingly been seen as a feasible
and important option for the south Caucasian
states. In July 2004, the EU initiated the Rule of Law
Mission (or Themis mission) to Georgia and a Special
Representative of the CFSP High Representative was
appointed for the South Caucasus region in 2003.
Proponents of a 5-year ENP Action Plan for
Georgia, endorsed by the EU in late 2006, contend
that it should include an accelerated development and
implementation of the PCA, support for developing a
market economy, a financial assistance program, the
67

ENPI, and gradual economic integration into the EU’s
Internal Market.79 They also recommended further
support for economic rehabilitation of Georgia’s conflict
zones in Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the context
of conflict settlement, enhanced backing for regional
cooperation, and greater cooperation in visa policy,
energy programs, transportation, communications,
environment, maritime affairs, public health, science,
technology and innovation, education, youth, and
people-to-people contacts. Georgia, Armenia, and
Azerbaijan should also be involved in educational,
training, and exchange programs for national ministries
in order to become better informed about the EU. The
Union remains highly popular in Georgia and in some
recent opinion polls over 80 percent of the public
favored Georgia’s membership.80
Analysts contend that the separatist entities in
Georgia also need to be connected to the ENP, otherwise
the gap between them and the larger state will widen
even further, thereby making integration all the more
problematic in the future. The challenge is to connect
the secessionist territories to the ENP process without
granting them international recognition as separate
states.81 Otherwise, the gap between them and the
countries they have broken away from will widen
significantly. For example, Abkhazia and South Ossetia
could participate in programs related to education,
transportation, and democratization.
Tbilisi has sought the resolution of internal conflicts
as a priority in the ENP Action Plan and wants the
EU to provide direct assistance in demilitarization,
demobilization, and economic development in the
separatist conflict zones and in upgrading border
security. It also wants the EU to include the restoration
of Georgia’s territorial integrity as a major item on the
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EU-Russia cooperation agenda.82 Tbilisi has sought to
shift the regional focus from the South Caucasus to the
Black Sea, thereby involving states in NATO and the
EU that support Georgia’s aspirations and have lobbied
on the country’s behalf.83 The Georgian authorities and
their CEE supporters have criticized the EU premise
that closer engagement will follow the region’s
stabilization, arguing that EU involvement will in itself
promote stabilization and the resolution of the “frozen
conflicts.” They are therefore urging Brussels to help
unblock the negotiations on the secessionist conflicts
and for the EU to deal more resolutely and coherently
with Russia.
The absence of any realistic prospect of EU
membership would have a negative long-term impact
on those states in Eastern Europe that view themselves
as potential candidates. In the domestic arena, it could
further impede structural reform and benefit populists,
nationalists, and pro-Russia interest groups. This could
harm the progress of political and economic reform
and discourage foreign direct investment. Incomplete
judicial and law enforcement reforms would also
reduce governmental accountability, reverse local anticorruption campaigns, and encourage the proliferation
of organized criminality.
At a broader international level, the exclusion of
Eastern Europe’s remaining contenders for the EU
could exacerbate internal Union frictions, especially
between anti-enlargers in Western Europe and the
CEE capitals most supportive of further expansion.
As a consequence, the CEE states may become less
supportive of the foreign policies and integrationist
priorities of older member states. Furthermore,
nonexpansion of the EU could encourage Russia’s
objective of establishing an alternative economic
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union and drawing the excluded capitals into a closer
political and economic relationship with Moscow. This
would significantly reinforce and even expand Russia’s
regional ambitions.
The East’s Western Dimension.
It has proven difficult for the East European states
situated outside the Western institutional framework
to work closely together in pushing for EU and NATO
membership. Unlike the three Baltic states or even the
Visegrád group in Central Europe, the post-Soviet
countries in the region between the Baltic Sea and the
Caspian Sea are more diverse and politically fractured.
They vary greatly in population and ethnic composition,
have wide disparities in economic development,
possess differing foreign and security priorities, lack
the strong sponsorship of EU and NATO countries
from which the Baltic and CEE capitals benefited, and
do not all share the same levels of commitment to
Western institutional integration.84
Several post-Soviet states have sought to protect
themselves from unwanted Russian influence and to
move into Western organizations. With this objective
in mind, a number of countries established region-wide
organizations, including the multinational GUAM
grouping composed of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan,
and Moldova. GUAM was founded in 1997 at the
initiative of Azerbaijan as a counterpart to the Russiandominated CIS. Although it initially achieved little in
terms of regional economic and security cooperation, it
enabled the four countries to pool their efforts within
the OSCE and other formats in pushing for specific
issues such as the resolution of the “frozen conflicts”
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and implementation of the Conventional Forces in
Europe (CFE) Treaty.
A GUAM-U.S. Program was established to promote
trade and help coordinate counterterrorist and anticrime operations and the organization has been
strongly supported by several CEE capitals. However,
for several years it seemed to languish as Uzbekistan,
an early member of the grouping, withdrew its
membership and the remaining countries found it
difficult to implement an effective common agenda.
In order to revive GUAM, on May 23, 2006, leaders
of the four member states met at a summit in Kyiv and
renamed GUAM as the Organization for Democracy
and Economic Development (ODED-GUAM).85
Participating governments stressed the importance of
GUAM in helping accelerate their integration into NATO
and the EU and promoting democratic developments
in the wider region. The participants adopted a GUAM
statute as an international organization open for other
states to join. ODED-GUAM members also signed a
free trade agreement and work was slated to begin on
unifying border and customs services between the four
countries. They also pledged to intensify cooperation
in the energy sector especially by investing in
diversification and in constructing new delivery routes
for Caspian oil and gas. President Viktor Yushchenko
asserted at the summit that one of ODED’s main goals
was to challenge Moscow’s energy-export dominance.
There were also reports that Romania, which
obtained observer status, intended to join ODEDGUAM, which would help link the formation with
NATO and with the EU. Pro-Western activists
in Ukraine and elsewhere contend that regional
organizations and trilateral cooperative arrangements
with CEE EU members are a strong complement and
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incentive for EU integration.86 In addition, Ukraine,
Belarus, and Moldova are members of the Central
European Initiative (CEI), a broad grouping of 17 states
that also includes several West European countries but
excludes Russia. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation
Organization (BSECO) has also become a forum for
political consultation and coordination among the
Black Sea littoral states, in which the United States
obtained observer status in November 2005 and in
which the EU is also likely to participate in the future.
Despite the initial momentum following the May
2006 summit, GUAM began to lose its impact again
following the Ukrainian parliamentary elections
in which the pro-Russian forces gained a majority
of government posts. This was most evident at the
GUAM Parliamentary Assembly session in Chisinau
on October 14-15, 2006, when representatives failed
to issue a statement in support of Georgia in its
escalating conflict with Moscow.87 Furthermore, little
was accomplished in formulating proposals to resolve
the “frozen conflicts” in Georgia and Moldova as
specified during the May summit. The opposition of
the Ukrainian delegation was viewed as one of the main
reasons for GUAM’s evident paralysis in confronting
Russia and adopting a unified position.
One recent significant regional initiative has
been the Community of Democratic Choice (CDC),
launched by Kyiv and Tbilisi to promote democratic
transformations among post-Soviet states. In August
2005, Ukrainian President Yushchenko and Georgian
President Saakashvili signed a joint declaration to
establish a community of democratic states in the BalticBlack-Caspian Sea region. The two leaders were joined
by the Presidents of Poland and Lithuania when the
CDC was formally launched at an inaugural summit
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in December 2005. However, the initiative was subject
to criticism from some quarters because it appeared to
divide the more democratic from the less democratic
states in the region, even though most of Moscow’s
neighbors were equally under threat from a resurgent
Russia.
With regard to other regional initiatives, several
East European states have become involved in the
“Euro-region” projects that span several EU states and
their immediate neighbors. This has involved varying
degrees of “institutionalized collaboration between
contiguous sub-national authorities across national
borders.”88 In most cases, municipal or regional
authorities have fostered a number of joint activities,
whether in environmental protection, cross-border
trade, small business development, or cultural and
social interactions. Such initiatives involving both
public and private partners have helped develop ties
with the EU aspirants, enhanced the development
of some poorer national peripheries, and brought
local and central authorities in closer contact with EU
standards and practices.
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IV. EASTERN DIMENSION: COUNTRY FOCUS
This section will examine in more detail CEE policy
toward four East European states—Ukraine, Belarus,
Moldova, and Georgia. It will describe how the new
EU members have tried to leverage the EU, NATO,
and the United States to adopt a more engaged and
inclusive policy toward these countries and to invest
more resources in building stable and prosperous
democracies along the EU’s and NATO’s eastern
borders. The strategic importance of the Black Sea
region in particular, which is straddled by Ukraine,
Moldova, and Georgia, has grown since the upsurge of
international jihadist terrorism, the growing importance
of energy supplies from the Caspian basin to the
European Union, and increasing military involvement
by the United States in the Eastern Balkans, the South
Caucasus, the Middle East, and Central Asia. Most of
the CEE capitals are focused not only on the grand
strategy of institutional integration but also on concrete
projects that will enable each country in the region to
qualify for NATO and EU accession.
Ukraine.
Ukraine has much work to accomplish to qualify for
either NATO or EU membership. With regard to NATO
standards, civilian control of the military remains
weak, military reform has not been completed, while
official corruption and lack of transparency remains
problematic. NATO’s PfP program has assisted Ukraine
over the years to catch up with its CEE neighbors and
become interoperable with NATO forces. Moreover,
although the first post-Orange Revolution government
supported Ukraine’s desire to join the Alliance, this
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goal came under serious question following the
appointment of Viktor Yanukovych as Prime Minister
in August 2006. Kyiv will need to demonstrate its
aspirations, consistency, and commitment to NATO
entry with comprehensive parliamentary and public
support if it is to be considered for membership.89
Although it aspires to EU accession, Kyiv is many
years behind the countries of the West Balkans in
meeting the necessary criteria while its membership
prospects will also depend on the willingness of the
EU to broaden its membership to include the rest of
Europe. The CEE states have campaigned vigorously
on behalf of Ukraine’s entry and have devised various
projects to assist the largest East European state.
Poland. Warsaw’s underlying strategic rationale
contends that political, economic, and social instability
along its eastern borders impacts negatively on Polish
and European security.90 The long-term goal of all postcommunist Polish administrations has been to free the
entire region from Russia’s neo-imperial influence and
to help establish a democratic cordon of states along its
eastern frontier.91 In Warsaw’s calculations, the most
effective mechanism for achieving such an objective
is to propel its eastern neighbors toward both NATO
and EU membership, as such concrete prospects will
help consolidate domestic democracy, the rule of
law, market economies, and security sector reforms.
Moreover, inclusion in both organizations will enable
Ukraine in particular to defend its interests against
persistent pressure from Russia and attempts to pull
Kyiv back into its orbit.
Poland’s success in becoming both a NATO and
EU member transformed the country into an attractive
partner for its eastern neighbors. And conversely “in
supporting the new nation-states between itself and
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Russia, Poland succeeded in defining itself as part of the
West.”92 The first Polish post-communist government
established a constructive eastern policy, recognizing
the right to independence for Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova,
and Russia. Warsaw was the first capital to recognize
Ukraine’s statehood in December 1991 and promoted
reconciliation with Kyiv that would acknowledge
mutual historical grievances. The Polish government
asserted that it had no territorial claims toward any
eastern neighbor and urged Polish minorities in these
states to support their independence and not become a
source of domestic conflict and international dispute.
Such a policy helped to marginalize any anti-Polish
sentiments in Ukraine and Kyiv began to view Warsaw
as its key ally to the West.
Poland’s National Security Strategy underscores
that NATO remains the key platform of international
security cooperation and the main pillar of political
and military stability on the continent. Hence, Warsaw
has consistently advocated an open door policy for
NATO for all European countries that meet the criteria
for membership. Poland also sees itself as a pioneer of
reform in post-communist Europe and a major player
in the region in advocating its neighbors’ membership
in Western institutions, promoting democratic
governance and civil society, and helping to build
competitive capitalist economies.
Warsaw has understood the potential value of the
EU’s CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy)
as a method for involving the Union in resolving the
“eastern question.”93 Polish authorities have been
pushing the EU Council, the EU Commission, and
the EU Parliament to pursue a more activist policy
toward its eastern neighbors while complaining that
the Union has too often been characterized by inertia,
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accommodation, and exaggerated concern about
Russia’s negative reaction to reform along its western
borders. Polish officials also point out that the EU has
avoided criticizing Moscow for its declining democratic
practices and deteriorating human rights record, thus
encouraging further Russian regression.
In 1998, Poland proposed the creation of an EU
Eastern Dimension through a “European space of
political and economic cooperation within a wider
Europe” at a time when it was initiating its own
membership negotiations with the Union.94 It canvassed
for EU Association Agreements, or Partnerships for
Association with Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova,
together with roadmaps for their eventual EU
inclusion.95 In 2002, the EU launched its Wider Europe–
New Neighborhood initiative, which was subsequently
renamed as the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP).
In November 2003, the European Parliament adopted
a resolution on a Wider Europe that was largely in line
with Polish proposals. However, Warsaw asserted that
the EU needed to differentiate between its policy toward
eastern (European) and southern (non-European)
neighbors, as only the former could be granted the
prospect of EU membership.
Since it entered the EU in May 2004, Warsaw has
sought to play a central role in shaping the Union’s
eastern policy and in developing closer ties with its
eastern neighbors. Indeed, Polish officials view these
countries as a separate and special category for more
intensive EU involvement. Polish officials considered
the ENP, which did not specify future accession for
the participating states, as an insufficient incentive.
Warsaw’s proposals were not fully endorsed by its West
European partners, some of whom seemed primarily
concerned about the repercussions of Poland’s assertive
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approach, especially for EU-Russia relations.
Germany in particular under the leadership of
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder intended to maintain
a “strategic partnership” with Russia and develop
sectoral ties with the Russian economy. Berlin did not
want to undermine these relations by pushing for EU
expansion eastward. France also pursued a Russia first
policy and ignored the standpoint of Poland and other
CEE states, which Paris viewed as too confrontational
toward Moscow. Warsaw will need to be cognizant
of the views of some EU capitals and may seek a
balance between assertiveness and compromise in its
Eastern policy. Although it may be accused by some
EU partners as being too regionally ambitious and
provocative toward the Russian regime, as the largest
newcomer in the Union with a direct stake in Russia’s
development, Poland simply cannot be ignored or
dismissed by the more passive member states.
From Poland’s perspective, Ukraine is the pivotal
country in the region that must be drawn into the
Western fold and prized away from Russian influence.
All major Polish political parties across the political
spectrum have supported Ukraine’s EU and NATO
entry, even including the more populist, nationalist,
and protectionist formations. In practical terms,
Warsaw offered Ukraine close military cooperation
within the framework of NATO’s PfP program and the
two countries created a joint peacekeeping battalion in
1997 that was deployed by NATO in Kosova during
the summer of 2000. Ukrainian troops also served
under Polish command in Iraq between 2003 and 2005.
Poland supported the forging of a distinct UkraineNATO Charter similar to the one that Russia was
negotiating. The Charter was formally signed in July
1997.
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Warsaw played an important role during the
election crisis in Ukraine in November-December
2004 as President Kwaśniewski intervened directly as
a mediator between the two Ukrainian presidential
candidates with U.S. support and EU acquiescence.
Polish officials have unambiguously backed the
further enlargement of the EU eastwards and pushed
for EU Action Plans and Partnership and Cooperation
Agreements with Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova.96
These proposals were amplified following Ukraine’s
Orange Revolution. Poland’s foreign policy goals
for 2005, approved by parliament in February 2005,
specified support for the democratic transformation of
Ukraine. Warsaw viewed itself as a bridge between the
EU and the “wider Europe” in the east.97
In January 2005, President Kwaśniewski formally
backed Ukraine’s application to join the EU after his
Ukrainian counterpart, President Viktor Yushchenko,
announced Kyiv’s ambition to enter the Union.98
Kwasniewski declared that Brussels should put
forward a “more daring plan of action” toward
Ukraine and establish a date for the start of accession
negotiations. Meanwhile, Poland’s parliamentary
speaker Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz warned that some
EU members will certainly object to further Union
expansion as they remain unconvinced that the entry
of 10 CEE countries was ultimately beneficial.99
Poland has been campaigning vigorously in support
of Ukraine’s membership in both NATO and the EU.100
It has tried to inject a singular approach into the EU’s
Eastern policy and has consistently supported Ukraine’s
entry into NATO, for which President George W. Bush
gave official backing during President Yushchenko’s
visit to Washington in April 2005. The authorities
in Warsaw also proposed in January 2005 that
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the EU’s relations with Ukraine should be raised to
the level of a “strategic partnership” thus opening the
door to future integration.101
Poland wants the EU to have a more distinct foreign
and security policy, but one that is backed by strategic
vision, political will, and military muscle. Although
the Polish administration has tried to establish a
more influential role for itself in the EU and within its
neighborhood, it remains doubtful whether Warsaw
will be able to mobilize sufficient support in the Union,
beyond Central Europe, the Baltics, and Scandinavia,
to ensure Ukraine’s future EU membership. Close
relations between Berlin, Paris, Rome, and Moscow
indicate that this will remain an uphill struggle,
especially given EU hesitation to continue with any
further expansion of the Union.
Polish proposals toward Ukraine have included the
creation of a free trade area with the EU, especially after
the country joins the WTO. It has also sought easier visa
facilitation and border crossings for Ukrainian citizens
entering the EU, especially to encourage businessmen,
tourists, and students. In June 2006, the frontier services
of Ukraine, Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary signed
a quadrilateral Action Plan-2006 to improve border
controls, enable joint operations, and train specialists.
Poland has hosted conferences for Polish and
Ukrainian businessmen and local officials in order
to stimulate joint investment projects in agriculture,
construction, tourism, environmental protection, and
other areas. Proposals have also been voiced to more
effectively assist Ukrainian NGOs across the country
as these could enhance contacts between the western
and eastern regions and increase support for Ukraine’s
Western orientation and membership in NATO and
the EU. In this respect, the EU’s ENP could promote
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cooperation between state institutions and civil society
groups, thus involving wider sectors of the public in
devising and implementing the ENP Action Plans.
EU integration will also be enhanced by developing
contacts between NGOs inside and outside the Union.
In 2004, the Warsaw-based EU-Poland Foundation
and the Kyiv-based Democracy and Development
Center established a group of experts from leading
think tanks to develop a program of public awareness
on European integration issues. Both the Polish and
Ukrainian governments approved the initiative.
Warsaw has also launched ideas for a scholarship
program for Ukrainian students in the EU, supported
a training program for Ukrainian officials in Brussels,
and pushed for the opening of a European university
in Lviv in Western Ukraine.
At a broader regional level, in January 2005 Polish
parliamentary speaker Cimoszewicz approved the
idea of establishing a tripartite Interparliamentary
Assembly between Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine
after a meeting with his Lithuanian counterpart
Arturas Paulauskas.102 The assembly would exchange
contacts and information on pan-European issues. The
three countries already shared bilateral parliamentary
assemblies and the tripartite format was approved in
both Vilnius and Kyiv. Its primary purpose was to
advance Ukraine’s aspirations to join NATO and the
EU by imparting Poland’s and Lithuania’s reform
experiences to the Ukrainian parliament. In May 2005,
the three capitals also decided to field a tripartite
peacekeeping battalion (LitPolUkrbat) in order to
develop the existing bilateral Polish-Ukrainian and
Polish-Lithuanian battalions. The unit, consisting of
640 troops, was dispatched to Kosova at the end of
2005 and could in future be deployed for peacekeeping
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missions in Moldova, Georgia, and elsewhere.103
The PiS (Law and Justice) Polish government
has been active in pushing for Ukraine’s western
direction and has lobbied for providing Ukraine with
an EU Association Agreement once the current PCA
expires, as well as a free trade accord with the Union.
However, Warsaw has come under some criticism for
official delays in promoting several initiatives, such
as the regional energy initiative and the presidential
foundation for supporting democracy in the East.
There are also apprehensions about Warsaw neglecting
its relations with Germany and France. The Ukrainian
authorities have been concerned that Poland’s potential
foreign policy missteps and disputes with some West
European partners may backfire on Kyiv as they could
reduce Warsaw’s impact in canvassing for Ukraine’s
future integration.104
In the economic arena, Poland and other CEE states
participate in transborder programs funded under the
Phare Crossborder Cooperation Program (CBC). Since
joining the EU in May 2004, the CEE capitals have
become beneficiaries of larger assistance funds under
the Interreg Regional Assistance Program (IRAP).
For example, between 2004 and 2006, eastern Polish
voivodships received 40 million Euros in subsidies for
programs with Ukraine and Belarus under the Interreg
fund. However, these programs involve a complex
planning and management system that often limits
their timeliness and effectiveness.105 Warsaw has also
pledged to institute a new visa policy for Ukrainian
citizens that will simplify cross-border travel, and it is
intent on opening several new border crossing points.
Poland’s NGO sector has been particularly active
in assisting its counterparts in Ukraine and Belarus.
For instance, in October 2006, 18 Ukrainian and four
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Belarusian NGOs received grants totaling over $420,000
from Poland’s Stefan Batory Foundation. Since 2003, the
foundation has implemented a program of support for
democratic change and the development of civil society
and is planning to establish partner relations between
NGOs and the authorities in Kyiv and Minsk.106
Lithuania. Lithuania has consistently pushed for the
augmentation of the EU’s eastern policy, advocating
democratic change and economic reform in neighboring
states, particularly in Ukraine and Belarus. Vilnius,
together with other CEE capitals, has experienced the
shortcomings of EU policy while contending that a
secure eastern border and the stability of its neighbors
remains a critical foreign policy and security priority.
Vilnius also views the eastern dimension as an area of
cooperation in which the U.S.-Lithuanian partnership
can be further developed.
At the multilateral level, the Vilnius 10 process
launched by the Lithuanian authorities in 1997 to enable
a coordinated CEE approach to NATO membership,
ran out of steam after the Alliance welcomed seven
of the countries involved. Some Lithuanian officials
acknowledge that the interests of each country
diverged after attaining NATO and EU entry, and it has
been difficult to develop a coordinated policy toward
the eastern question. Some attempts are also being
pursued to coordinate the policy of the three Baltic
states with that of the Visegrád group, but progress has
been slow because of differing priorities. As a result,
the Lithuanian government has focused attention on
bilateral initiatives with Ukraine and other eastern
countries.
Ukraine has been a key foreign policy issue
for Vilnius. Lithuania played an instrumental role
under Poland’s initiative for a western diplomatic
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intervention in the November 2004 post-election crisis
in Kyiv. Where Moscow’s interference in support of
its favored presidential candidate was blatant, and the
EU Commission was largely silent in the early stages
of Ukraine’s election turmoil, Warsaw and Vilnius
helped to mediate the standoff between Ukraine’s two
political blocs and bring about a peaceful resolution.
Lithuania has pursued a number of programs with
Kyiv to bring the two countries closer together both
at political and social levels. For example, in July 2006
leading Lithuanian and Ukrainian intellectuals decided
to establish a forum for remembering the common
history of both nations.107 One of their goals was to
develop a virtual archive in Vilnius of the Grand Duchy
of Lithuania to which both nations once belonged. In
May 2006, Lithuania organized a major NGO Forum
on an “Agenda for Democracy in Europe’s East”
within the framework of the “Vilnius Conference 2006:
Common Vision for a Common Neighborhood,” an
initiative co-sponsored by the Lithuanian and Polish
presidents.108
Hungary. One of Budapest’s priorities has been to aid
neighbors in their quest for NATO and EU integration,
as this would directly benefit Hungarian minorities
resident outside Hungary and create a united EuroAtlantic community in which all Hungarians could
participate. Visegrád 3 (V-3) was formed in the early
1990s between Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia
as a cooperative mechanism to help plan for admission
into NATO and the EU. It later changed its name to V-4
after the January 1993 split of Czechoslovakia into two
independent states—the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
In practice, Visegrád cooperation has always been
utilized for specific purposes and future cooperation
will likely be focused on exerting influence within the
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EU when dealing with common issues.
Budapest’s main political parties support the
integration efforts of neighboring countries, including
Ukraine, which contain sizeable Magyar minorities.
Hungary’s political leaders from both major political
streams, the center-left and the center-right, view the
strategic partnership between the EU and NATO as
essential for facilitating the economic and democratic
development of the countries along the EU’s eastern
and southern borders. Budapest’s priority countries
include Croatia, Serbia, and Ukraine. The government
supports an EU-NATO partnership to focus on the
eastern questions, despite the fears among older EU
member states that such a partnership could serve to
undermine the EU’s role and its neighborhood policy.
Similarly to the other CEE states, Hungary sees the
ENP as incapable of offering sufficient incentives for
consolidating the domestic reform process.
In general, Budapest welcomes U.S.-NATO-EU
cooperation with strong CEE involvement for engaging
the remaining East European countries. This could
facilitate a stronger response to crises and would help
enhance democratic developments and ensure lasting
security along the EU’s eastern frontier. The status
of the CEE countries would thereby be raised, and it
would serve to steer the major international institutions
toward joint projects with eastern neighbors. However,
Hungary avoids undertaking any major initiatives
without the support of the larger EU members and will
likely seek to engage Germany in particular in steering
the Union’s eastern policies.
Neither the Socialist Party nor the opposition
Fidesz have plans to manage and restrict Russia’s
increasing economic and energy encroachment in the
country. Fidesz is generally more suspicious of Russian
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neo-imperialist ambitions, whereas the Socialists
have maintained closer ties with Russia’s elites and
former officials. For example, during a February 2005
trip to Moscow, Prime Minister Gyurcsány made a
controversial pronouncement by thanking the Soviet
Union and the Red Army for “freeing Hungary from
fascism 60 years ago.”109 Such statements do not
inspire confidence among Hungary’s neighbors that
it will uphold an assertive Eastern Dimension. It also
remains uncertain whether Budapest’s careful policy
toward Russia would become more emboldened in the
event of a Fidesz victory in future general elections.
Czech Republic. The Czech Republic forms part of
the informal Visegrád coalition, established in 1991
between Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, to
collectively pursue admission into the EU and NATO.
However, Visegrád cooperation has not been a priority
for any of the democratic governments since the collapse
of Communism and the Visegrád format has not been
significantly utilized in the CEE’s Eastern Dimension.
Czech President Vacláv Klaus has been one of the most
consistent critics of Visegrád, at one point viewing it
as a Western reconstruction of Eastern Europe that
would not assist with EU accession. Although some
level of cooperation has been maintained following
the admission of all four Visegrád states to the EU in
May 2004, the initiative has not embraced its eastern
neighbors.
The Czech Republic lacks an activist Eastern policy
toward the former Soviet republics. Instead, it has been
involved in publicizing grave human rights abuses
in a range of repressive states including several CIS
countries such as Belarus. A special unit in the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs promotes transformation efforts
in dictatorial states complemented by NGOs, such as
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People in Need. Former President Vaclav Havel used
his global stature to campaign internationally against
oppressive regimes, but the government itself has been
relatively subdued on the eastern question as compared
to Poland and the Baltic states.
Slovakia. With EU and NATO membership attained
by 2004, Slovakia has sought to play a constructive role
within a regional framework. Visegrád cooperation
has had specific objectives and future initiatives will
likely be focused on exerting influence within the EU
on issues such as the development of a common EU
energy policy. Slovakia has an interest in promoting
reform among the EU’s neighbors to prepare them for
eventual inclusion. Slovak activists, both in government
and in the NGO sector, believe that the country’s
own experience in overcoming authoritarianism
and international isolation in the 1990s can assist
the transition process in Ukraine, Belarus, and the
West Balkan countries. Both Ukraine and Belarus
were designated as foreign policy priorities by the
government of Mikulas Dzurinda between 1998 and
2006, and it allocated significant financial assistance
for democratization and civil society projects in both
countries.
Ukraine is Slovakia’s largest neighbor and bilateral
relations have developed in the fields of economy,
education, science, culture, and tourism. In October
2005, the Slovak government adopted plans to assist
Ukraine in implementing the EU-Ukraine Action Plan
within the framework of the EU’s ENP. The Slovak
Ministry of Defense also provided guidance to Kyiv
with regard to the NATO accession process. Bratislava
has advocated that international institutions provide
Kyiv with clear-cut Euro-Atlantic incentives to help
facilitate reforms. In addition to Slovak government
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support, the well-developed Slovak NGO sector has
promoted democratic processes among neighboring
states. These initiatives have involved networking
between civil society representatives, media figures, and
democratic activists together with independent experts
and representatives of international institutions.
In November 2005, Slovak officials announced that
Ukraine’s NATO membership was a foreign policy
priority for Bratislava and that Slovakia would provide
financial assistance and expertise to help Kyiv achieve
this target.110 The Slovak embassy in Kyiv offered
its readiness to serve as a contact embassy between
NATO and Ukraine.111 However, since the election of
the leftist-populist coalition in June 2006, speculation
has increased that Bratislava may scale back its vocal
and practical support for EU and NATO enlargement
eastward, reduce its backing for reform in Ukraine
and elsewhere, and prove more willing to appease the
Russian administration.
Estonia. Estonia’s political leaders consider regional
cooperation as the cornerstone of the country’s EuroAtlantic integration efforts and regard broader
regional initiatives as essential for international
security. In 1991, the Baltic Assembly, a cooperative
mechanism for the parliaments of Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania, was founded. In 1994, the Baltic Council of
Ministers was established as an important initiative for
intergovernmental cooperation. Joint defense projects
were also launched in the 1990s with Western assistance,
including the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBAT),
the Baltic Air Surveillance Network (BALTNET), and
the Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL), and now
operate with Baltic resources. In June 2004, the three
Baltic defense ministers agreed to seek additional
opportunities for trilateral military cooperation.112
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Cooperation with the Nordic states—Sweden,
Finland, Denmark, and Norway—has also featured as
a strategic priority for Tallinn. High-level government
officials meet regularly in the Nordic-Baltic-Eight
(NB8) format. EU eastern enlargement, the global war
against jihadist terrorists, energy security, and common
policy toward Russia comprise the key issues that are
regularly deliberated.113 Following the October 2005
Nordic Council session, in which Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania participated, the Swedish Prime Minister
emphasized the need for a coherent EU policy toward
Russia, citing that France and Germany have their own
particular policies, but that Brussels does not.114 The
Nordic and Baltic states share similar foreign policy
priorities reflected in these cooperative efforts.
Sweden has been one of Estonia’s strongest allies,
with a foreign aid package established in 1990 that
supported the development of regional security,
a market economy, and environmental projects.
Stockholm backed Estonia’s membership in the EU
and led efforts in all three Baltic states to provide
information on EU issues. Sweden and Estonia have
established several joint projects that have encouraged
training and reform in states neighboring the EU,
including Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine.115 Under
the EU’S ENP program in Ukraine, Tallinn has made
a significant contribution in the information and
communication technology sectors.116
The unsettled countries to the east of the EU
border are a priority for Tallinn. It has signed bilateral
agreements with most other post-Soviet states and
works closely with Ukraine and Georgia in training
police and border guards and promoting civilmilitary reform. Estonia’s primary objective is to
bolster the sovereignty of nations within its immediate
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neighborhood so they will not be politically absorbed
by Russia. The EU’s hesitant performance during the
democratic revolutions in both Ukraine and Georgia,
evidently out of fear of provoking Moscow, reinforced
Tallinn’s belief that Washington can better spearhead
democratic efforts by benefiting from and applying
Baltic and Polish experiences. Cooperative efforts in
this sphere would also serve to strengthen U.S.-CEE
relations.
Latvia. Latvia’s history of Muscovite occupation
has given emphasis to promoting democratic practices
and freedom in other former Soviet states. Riga has
engaged in various efforts to promote democracy in
Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. It has favored
both NATO and EU incentives to stimulate democratic
and economic reforms in these countries and to expand
regional stability. Riga has supported the creation of a
Ukraine-EU free trade area and Ukrainian membership
in the WTO.117 Government policy is congruent with
public opinion, where 62 percent of Latvians reportedly
support further EU enlargement eastward.118
Regional cooperation among the three Baltic states
has been visible, especially in the areas of military
cooperation and the EU’s eastern policy. However,
Tallinn and Vilnius were reportedly surprised by the
decision of Latvian President Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga to
participate in the 60th anniversary of the Soviet “victory
over fascism” in Moscow in May 2005 without reaching
consensus on the issue with her Baltic neighbors.119
Nonetheless, this incident and other disagreements
have not had any adverse effect on inter-Baltic relations
as all three capitals share virtually identical goals in
their Eastern Dimension.
Romania. Romania has endeavored to assert itself
as a significant player in the Black Sea region since the
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demise of the Soviet Union. Membership in NATO
has enhanced such aspirations, as has the strategic
partnership with the United States. The Black Sea region
is viewed by Bucharest as strategically important in
linking the Caspian Basin energy resources with the
West. Approximately 50 percent of European energy
imports pass through the Black Sea, and analysts project
that by 2020 this amount will increase to 70 percent. The
Romanian authorities have highlighted the country’s
location and its democratic progress as a potential
model for the wider region. Romanian President Traian
Basescu has declared that the government’s primary
interest is to consolidate its position in the Black Sea
region.120
Romania’s relations with Ukraine have improved in
recent years, and a border treaty was signed in June 2003.
However, disputes over sea border demarcations have
not yet been fully resolved. Both sides claim rights to
Snake Island in the Black Sea, and both have conflicting
views on the extent of the continental shelf between
the two countries. Bucharest has also criticized the
Ukrainian canal project in the Danube delta. Romania
contends that the Ukrainian construction project
will have a negative ecological effect and drastically
change water flows. It filed a lawsuit against Kyiv at
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague,
while the new Ukrainian administration has tried to be
more accommodating to Romanian concerns.
Both Kyiv and Bucharest also have differing
approaches toward Moldova, as Kyiv is more
circumspect regarding Moldova’s westward direction
and more protective of the Ukrainian minority in the
separatist Transnistrian region. Bucharest and Kyiv
have signed agreements on the protection of Romanian
and Ukrainian minorities in either country. During his
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visit to Bucharest in November 2005, Ukraine Minister
of Foreign Affairs Borys Tarasyuk announced that
minority language departments would be established
in state universities in both countries. In addition, a
Romanian cultural center would be opened in Kyiv
and a Ukrainian cultural center in Bucharest, while the
visa system for Ukrainian citizens would be simplified
by Romanian officials.
Since the Orange Revolution, Bucharest has sought
to assist Ukraine in its efforts to join NATO. For example,
in November 2005 Romanian President Basescu met
with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Tarasyuk and vowed
to share Bucharest’s experience in the NATO and EU
accession processes.121
During 2006, Bucharest lobbied for the creation of
a Black Sea Euro-Region (BSER) under the auspices
of the Council of Europe (CoE). Romanian officials
sought a structured form of cooperation between
local authorities in a region that would soon border
the EU. The aim of BSER was not to replace existing
political institutions such as BSEC or the Stability
Pact for Southeastern Europe, but to provide a forum
where common strategies could be adopted and even
the separatist entities could be included in concrete
projects. The BSER was officially launched in March
2006 during a conference sponsored by the Romanian
authorities in the port city of Constanta.
Bulgaria. For Sofia, the eastern dimension of its
security and foreign policy has slowly evolved beyond
its relations with Russia. Politically close ties between
the Socialist Party and Russia and the country’s
energy dependence have prevented Sofia from openly
advocating EU and NATO integration for Ukraine,
Belarus, Moldova, and Georgia. Following the popular
revolutions in Ukraine and Georgia, Bulgaria remained
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less involved than its CEE neighbors in helping to move
the CIS states away from the Russian orbit. Sofia issued
congratulatory notes for the triumph of democratic
leaders in both Ukraine and Georgia, but seemed wary
of antagonizing Moscow in its statements and actions.
Nonetheless, Sofia has on occasion voiced its
support for Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations, with
the Bulgarian Foreign Minister asserting that Ukraine’s
Western integration is a high priority for the Bulgarian
government.122 Bulgarian officials have participated
in meetings of the regionwide CDC initiated by the
Ukrainian and Georgian Presidents, but they have not
been at the forefront of such projects.
Unlike Romania, Bulgaria has not clearly defined
its position in the evolving geopolitics of the Black Sea
region. Bulgarian policy analysts assert that with the
emergence of a Central Asian-South East European
energy corridor, Sofia needs to better position itself as
a vital link for the transport of Caspian resources to
Western Europe. Bulgaria can help diversify its energy
supplies by curtailing its fuel dependence on an
increasingly assertive Russia, while it attracts stronger
political and economic commitments from Washington,
which has a high stake in European energy security.
Belarus.
All the CEE capitals have condemned persistent
human rights violations in Belarus and have called on
the Lukashenka regime to respect democratic standards
of governance. They have also resisted the imposition
of tough economic sanctions on Minsk, arguing that
this was more likely to hurt ordinary citizens than
Belarusian officials. The most active CEE governments
have also backed various practical initiatives in
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assisting the development of political pluralism, civil
society, and an independent media in Belarus.
Poland. A Polish-Belarusian state declaration
signed in October 1991 eliminated anxieties in both
capitals over potential territorial claims. In June 1992, a
Polish-Belarusian treaty was signed by then Belarusian
President Yurii Shushkevich indicating that Minsk
viewed Poland as its gateway to the West. However,
the election of President Alyaksandr Lukashenka in
June-July 1994 terminated any substantive cooperation
between Minsk and Warsaw. Subsequently, Polish
policy focused on helping the democratic political
opposition and Belarusian civic groups. Warsaw
concluded that Belarusia’s political and security
structures remained closely tied to Moscow and were
opposed to any meaningful reforms or the emergence
of a democratic government. As a result, the Belarusian
national movement became solidly pro-Polish after
harboring initial suspicions over Polish intentions.123
None of Belarus’s neighbors support isolating the
country through the imposition of broad international
economic sanctions. They view such an approach
as counterproductive and even destructive for the
emergence of an effective pro-democracy movement.
For instance, in September 2006 an expert committee
at the European Commission rejected a proposal to
suspend Belarus’s trade benefits under the Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP). Poland, Lithuania, and
Latvia voted against the proposal, while the Czech
Republic and Slovakia abstained. The measure would
have cleared the way for the European Commission
to impose tariffs on Belarusian imports in 2007.
Delegations from Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania
argued that the tariffs would affect ordinary Belarusians,
damage the EU’s image in Belarus, and accelerate
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the country’s isolation from the West.124
Some CEE analysts contend that the potential
movement for democratic change in Belarus may be
wider than the small circle of dissidents that have
managed to attract international attention and it may
even extend into the official apparatus. Warsaw has
tried to establish contacts with lower-level officials
in Minsk and other Belarusian cities and regions. It
argues that these individuals should be encouraged
to work for a democratic alternative to Lukashenka
even while international organizations apply pressure
on the government with regard to its human and civil
rights abuses.
Poland has positioned itself to play a prominent
and constructive role in fostering democratic change
in Belarus and has come under bitter attack by the
Belarusian media and officialdom. All of Belarus’s
Central European neighbors were concerned about the
outcome of the presidential elections in March 2006
and the prolongation of the Lukashenka regime, which
could have a negative impact on their own security.
Poland and the three Baltic states in particular have
been pushing the United States and the EU to become
more directly and comprehensively engaged with
Belarus in order to promote democratization and
eventual European and trans-Atlantic integration
for this self-estranged and self-isolated republic. The
Europeanization of Belarus would help stabilize a
wider Europe and promote U.S. national interests by
reinforcing trans-Atlantic relations.
In practical terms, in January 1998 a PolandBelarus Civic Education Center was established in
Białstok in north eastern Poland close to the Belarusian
border. Polish NGOs have supplied the Belarusian
opposition with technical aid, organized conferences
and seminars, and closely monitored the human rights
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abuses of the Lukashenka administration.125 In January
2006, a Belarusian language radio station called Radio
Racja (Reason), originally established by Belarusian
minority leaders in 1999, was relaunched in Białstok
and funded by the Polish government. Most of the
Polish Belarusian minority leaders reside in the city.
The Polish government subsidizes the Belarusian
language media inside Poland, including a local radio
station, television programs, and several newspapers.
Warsaw planned to begin television broadcasts to
Belarus in 2007, focusing on information programs
transmitted in Belarusian and in Russian.126 The
channel will be sponsored by funds from the Polish
government and the EU. Poland is also preparing radio
broadcasts through the European Radio for Belarus,
expected to cover about three quarters of Belarusian
territory. The European Radio for Belarus is part of
a media consortium headed by Germany’s Media
Consult funded by the EU’s commissioner for External
Relations and European Neighborhood Policy.
According to the independent Belarusian Committee
for Support of Political Victims, 393 students who
have either been expelled from higher educational
institutions in Belarus or face expulsion for political
reasons, have applied to the committee for assistance.
More than 380 Belarusian students started the 2006-07
academic year in neighboring states or in EU countries,
including 233 in Poland, 77 in Ukraine, and 25 in
the Czech Republic. The Committee for Support of
Political Victims, established by Belarusian opposition
leader Alyaksandr Milinkevich in early 2006, aims to
provide assistance to people who suffer from political
persecution.127
Poland has also been active on the economic front by
seeking cross border cooperation at the local level with
97

Belarusian regions and municipalities. For example,
“Euroregion Bug” was created in September 1995, and
in March 1996 Presidents Kwaśniewski and Lukashenka
met to discuss the inauguration of a Polish-Belarusian
“Euroregion Niemen.” However, as the regime in
Minsk hardened its stance, practical cooperation in
these endeavors floundered. “Euroregion Bug” became
a Polish-Ukrainian enterprise, while “Euroregion
Niemen” did not become active.
Warsaw has been accused by officials in Minsk
of spearheading the U.S. campaign against Belarus.
Allegedly, the Polish government and its special
services were given a “special role” by Washington in
ousting the Belarusian government and persistently
engage in espionage, provocations, and in general
preparations for a revolution in Belarus.128 Poland is
deemed by official Minsk to be the center for “antiBelarusian activities” in the region, whether through
official sources or NGOs.
Lithuania. Vilnius has been actively engaged in
promoting democratic reform and offering assistance
to its eastern neighbor in order to prepare the country
for eventual NATO and EU accession. It has opposed
isolating Belarus as it believes this will simply assist
the Lukashenka regime and has encouraged the EU
to intensify trade and other economic interaction with
Minsk. Vilnius has actively supported civil society
development and public information initiatives in
Belarus. Officials and NGOs have been involved in
numerous projects aimed at promoting democracy
and strengthening civil society, including training and
seminars for Belarusian journalists and the democratic
opposition.
At the same time, Vilnius has remained engaged at
the official level by encouraging Minsk to implement
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the recommendations of international organizations
for ensuring human rights in the country.129 Vilnius
welcomed U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s
strong message to Belarusian President Lukashenka
during her visit to Vilnius in April 2005 as it reassured
political leaders of Washington’s commitment to
democracy in Lithuania’s neighborhood.
Under an agreement signed in April 2006,
Lithuanian
and
Belarusian
historians
share
information and conduct exchange programs for
scientists and students.130 Cooperative links have
developed between the Lithuanian Institute and the
European Humanitarian University (EHU), a private
institution that was relocated to Vilnius in 2005 after
it was closed down by the Belarusian authorities
in July 2004. The University has received support
from U.S. and German foundations and from several
Western governments and NGOs. In December 2006,
the European Commission and the Nordic Council of
Ministers allocated 4.5 million euros ($6 million) to the
EHU.131
Belarusian activists regularly meet in Vilnius and
have urged major international institutions to conduct
a public trial of the regime’s top officials and security
service chiefs.132 Lithuanian officials have stressed the
importance of disseminating accurate information to
the citizens of Belarus and especially to the country’s
pro-democracy activists, thus strongly justifying radio
transmissions from neighboring countries.
The foreign ministers of 10 EU countries, including
seven of the new members from CEE, signed a letter
to Austrian Foreign Minister Ursula Plassnik in April
2006, encouraging her to push for an increase in EU
support for Belarusian civil society and democratization
programs.133 Lithuania also hosts a campaign on
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behalf of Belarus organized by NGO activists and
students, called the United Center of Initiatives for
Belarus. The organizers arrange various events on
behalf of the Belarusian democratic opposition and
urge the Lithuanian public to support its neighbor
much like the West once supported Lithuania.134 The
Belarusian Institute operates in Vilnius and organizes
roundtable discussions on the Belarus predicament
and seeks to draw international attention to human
rights violations and the importance of assisting the
families of repressed activists.135 The Belarusian Social
Democratic Party has also called upon Lithuania to be
the main initiator of actions in Brussels aimed at freeing
the major opposition leader Alyaksandr Kozulin who
was sentenced to 5 1/2 years in prison in July 2006.136
Among other practical initiatives in Lithuania, both
governmental and private, are the Radio Baltic Waves
private broadcasts from Vilnius to Belarus, which
transmits uncensored news and relays programs from
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Voice of America,
Voice of Russia, Radio Polonia, and Deutsche Welle.
Several Belarusian newspapers persecuted by Minsk
have been printed in Lithuania and smuggled over
the border. Vilnius has also pursued transborder
cooperation with Belarusian local governments, but
much of this initiative has been thwarted by the central
government in Minsk.
In response to Lithuania’s activist policy,
Minsk has tried to limit the country’s influence
inside the country. For instance, in March 2006, the
Belarusian authorities denied visas to six Lithuanian
parliamentarians on the eve of the presidential
elections. The Lithuanian parliament subsequently
adopted a resolution vehemently condemning the
move and expressing support for political prisoners and
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dissidents persecuted by Minsk.
Latvia. In June 2006, the Latvian government
introduced a free visa system for citizens of Belarus
until Latvia formally joined the EU Schengen zone. The
political objective was to enable closer contacts between
ordinary Belarusians and the EU countries and thus
contribute to democracy promotion and civil society
building in Belarus. In May 2006, the Latvian Foreign
Ministry asked higher educational establishments to
enroll Belarusian students who have been banned from
studying in Belarus due to their political beliefs.
Latvian
officials
voiced
their
profound
disappointment at the response of the EU to the
diplomatic incident engineered by Minsk against
Riga in July 2006 in which a Latvian diplomat was
evidently framed by Belarusian security services
and subsequently left the country. Even though the
Belarusian regime violated the Geneva Convention
on diplomatic relations, the EU reaction amounted
to little more than dispatching a letter of protest to
Minsk.137 Analysts in Riga believe that the Belarusian
regime was seeking to discredit Latvia in the eyes of its
citizens because it has become a positive example for
democrats and civic activists in Belarus.138
Estonia. The Estonian authorities have planned
to provide opportunities to study in Estonia for
Belarusian students expelled from universities in
Belarus for political reasons. Tallinn has also helped
fund the Belarusian University in Vilnius as well as
free media and informational projects.139 Estonia has
been a strong supporter of establishing an EU fund
to promote democratic reform and human rights in
Belarus and other East European countries. Several
Estonian NGOs have also held rallies and pickets in
support of Belarusian democracy and against the
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Lukashenka regime. Minsk threatened to retaliate
against Tallinn after Estonia barred 31 top Belarusian
officials, including President Lukashenka, from
entering its territory in line with the visa ban adopted
by the European Council.140
Czech Republic. Prague has been closely involved in
democratic transformation efforts in Belarus, including
Czech-U.S. cooperation to fund an independent
radio station that will broadcast from Poland into
Belarus. The Czech Foreign Ministry has earmarked
funds for various projects aimed at developing civil
society and protecting human rights. According to
public opinion surveys, two-thirds of Czechs favor
further EU enlargement to include the former Soviet
republics.141
Slovakia. Other CEE countries, including Slovakia,
Hungary, Slovenia, Romania, and Bulgaria, have also
offered various forms of assistance to help build a
publicly accountable democratic system in Belarus.
Slovakia in particular has been singled out by the
Lukashenka regime as alleged purveyors of subversion
and revolution working closely with Washington in
order to overthrow the government in Minsk.142 NGOs
in Bratislava have been especially active in support of
the democratic opposition in Belarus as well as assisting
scholars, students, analysts, and policy groups working
on strategic issues in Minsk.
Moldova.
Since the reelection of President Vladimir
Voronin in April 2005, the government in Chisinau
has committed itself to EU membership, to closer
links within the multinational GUAM format and to
the enhancement of the CEE’s Eastern Dimension.
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Moldova’s European Strategy, an internal document
adopted by the government in late 2005, has been
structured in accordance with the 31 chapters of
the European Union’s Acquis Communitaire. Even
though Union membership remains a distant prospect,
the adoption of European standards and legislation is
considered to be vital for attracting foreign investment
and enhancing trade with EU member states. In the
long run, EU integration is widely perceived by the
majority of Moldova’s political elite as the best avenue
toward modernization and prosperity. Meanwhile,
public support for EU accession has steadily climbed
to over two-thirds of the citizenry.143
Both Moldova and Georgia have become active in
advocating a greater international role in resolving
the “frozen conflicts” in their secessionist enclaves.
They contend that during the past 15 years, Russia
has prevented a resolution of these disputes while
strengthening the position of the separatist regimes,
deterring the legitimate central governments from
reincorporating these territories, weakening the role
of international agencies and mediators, and retarding
Moldova’s and Georgia’s progress toward internal
stability and Western integration.144
Romania. Due to a shared history, culture, language,
and religion, officials in Bucharest consider relations
with Moldova as their foreign policy priority. Much
of Moldova belonged to Romania before the Second
World War. After Chisinau gained independence from
the Soviet Union in 1991, Bucharest was the first to
recognize the new state. Romania has also been the
main supporter of the Moldovan government during
the Transnistrian crisis provoked by pro-Moscow
separatists in that enclave, and has demonstrated its
strong support for an integrated Moldova. Bucharest
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has backed economic and political reform in Moldova,
as well as Chisinau’s eventual membership in both
NATO and the EU.
Bucharest has also registered setbacks in its policy
toward Moldova. For instance, in the early 1990s
Moldovan officials were vehemently opposed to
Romania’s purported objective of reunification and
Bucharest’s promotion of “two Romanian states” that
seemed to nullify Moldovan national and historical
identity. In more recent years, Bucharest’s renouncement
of any territorial ambitions and its imminent inclusion
in the EU helped to strengthen relations between the
two countries and removed any lingering revisionist
apprehensions. Bucharest has realized that it needs
to depoliticize and dehistoricize its approach toward
Chisinau in order to instill greater confidence in the
Moldovan administration.
Relations between Bucharest and Chisinau markedly
improved after the Moldovan authorities declared their
pro-European orientation and distanced themselves
from the Putin regime. Following his inauguration in
December 2004, the newly elected Romanian President,
Traian Basescu, visited Chisinau during his first trip
abroad in January 2005. Moldova’s President Vladimir
Voronin subsequently visited Romania in September
2005. Moldovan officials asserted that Romania’s entry
into the EU in January 2007 will bring the country
closer to joining the Union, which the overwhelming
majority of citizens reportedly support.145 To accelerate
this process, Bucharest has shared the Romanian
translation of the Aquis Communitaire with the
Moldovan authorities. It has also proposed various
joint energy, infrastructure, and transportation projects
with Moldova to help bring the country closer to the
EU.146
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The Romanian authorities have been intensively
and extensively active in pursuing initiatives in the
Black Sea region. They have pushed for an EU Black Sea
Dimension to mirror Finland’s Northern Dimension
that was aimed at drawing the Baltic states into the
Union. On June 4-6, 2006, the presidents of Romania,
Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan
assembled in Bucharest for the inaugural session of
the Black Sea Forum for Partnership and Dialogue.147
Moscow voiced concern that the Forum would become
another mechanism for drawing its former satellites
into the Western fold and away from Russia’s orbit,
even though Romania’s President Traian Basescu
declared that Russia should be involved in the regional
cooperation process. The Forum was designed as an
annual presidential summit and consultative meeting
rotating among the participating countries and with
the involvement of EU representatives.
Bucharest has lobbied to include Moldova in various
South East European projects in order to remove it
from the “post-Soviet space” designation. Indeed, in
1996 Moldova was a founding member of the South
East European Cooperation Initiative (SECI) and has
held observer status within the South East European
Cooperation Process (SEECP) since 1999, becoming a full
member in May 2006. With active Romanian support,
Moldova also became a member of the Stability Pact
for South Eastern Europe, and in April 2006 it joined
the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA).
Bucharest has also pushed for Moldova’s inclusion
in a regional package with the West Balkan countries
for an EU association agreement and eventual Union
membership; however, in this endeavor, success has
not been registered.
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Bucharest has petitioned to be included in the
existing format of international negotiations over the
separatist Transnistrian region of Moldova. The EU
has generally opposed such a move and several Union
representatives argued that Romania’s inclusion
would detract from the EU’s common policy toward
the Transnistrian conflict and would alienate Russia.
However, Romania’s participation in resolving
the standoff has been supported by several CEE
capitals, including President Viktor Yushchenko’s
administration in Kyiv. Bucharest has been critical
that the existing format of negotiations favored the
secessionist authorities in Tiraspol and their political
and military backers in Moscow. Similarly to other
CEE states, Romania has supported the replacement
of the Russian peacekeeping contingent in Transnistria
with a new multinational mission consisting of both
military and civilian observers under an international
mandate.
At the parliamentary level, in September 2006
Romania and Moldova revived an interparliamentary
commission for cooperation.148 Discussions were also
intensified during the course of the year for a new
treaty on friendship and cooperation between the
two countries and for boosting trade and investment.
On the social side, Bucharest proposed special visa
arrangements for Moldovan citizens once Romania
entered the EU in January 2007. This could be based on
the asymmetric visa system that exists between Poland
and Ukraine or between Slovakia and Ukraine, making
it easier for Moldovan citizens to visit Romania.
In October 2006, the two governments signed an
agreement that will come into effect in January 2007,
enabling Romanian citizens to enter Moldova without
visas and Moldovan citizens to enter Romania on
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a preferential visa regime.149 Visa liberalization has
been one of the priority issues for the government in
Chisinau. It is estimated that approximately 200,000
Moldovan citizens also hold Romanian citizenship.
Since 2000, Bucharest has offered Moldovans the
prospect of obtaining Romanian citizenship without
any residency requirements.
Romania has tried to avoid an exclusively
Moldovan approach in its regional policy and has
sought to construct a more expansive Black Sea vision,
particularly in promoting economic development
through closer infrastructure, transportation, and
communications linkages between all littoral states.
Bucharest wants the Black Sea region to become an
economic alliance through free trade and a major
energy corridor from the Caspian basin in which
Romania can be a significant hub. During a meeting
of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization
(BSEC) in Bucharest in April 2006, President Basescu
asserted that Romania sought to augment the impact
of the organization by promoting more effective
regional programs and by developing an EU-BSEC
partnership.150
Poland. Although Warsaw has been less engaged
with Moldova than with the two eastern neighbors that
directly border Poland, it has nevertheless included
Moldova among the states that should be on track for
EU and NATO membership. With regard to the EU,
Polish officials assert that the Moldovan authorities are
committed to membership and, according to opinion
polls, over 70 percent of the population supports
accession.151 Nevertheless, some EU officials continue
to question whether Chisinau’s commitment to EU
entry is reversible and why Moldova, unlike Georgia,
has not stated its intention to leave the CIS.
Ukraine. Ukraine’s Yushchenko presidency has
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also made efforts to contribute to resolving the conflict
between Moldova and Transnistria. Kyiv has been
one of the three mediators, together with Moscow
and the OSCE, in settlement negotiations involving
the separatist entity. The initial “Yushchenko plan”
presented at the GUAM summit in April 2005 was
criticized by Moldovan officials as it would have
given too much legitimacy to the Tiraspol regime and
provided them with a veto over Moldovan foreign
policy without reinforcing Western involvement in
resolving the conflict.152 Kyiv eventually dropped its
support for a plan that was purportedly negotiated
with major inputs from Russian officials.
Ukraine’s Orange parties in particular have openly
supported Moldovan territorial integrity and have
backed the EU’s border monitoring mission along
the Moldovan-Transnistrian and Ukrainian frontiers.
During a visit to Chisinau in June 2006, Ukrainian
Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk endorsed Chisinau’s
goal of transforming the Russian “peacekeeping” unit
in Transnistria into an international military and civilian
mission that would promote state integration.153
Lithuania. Vilnius, together with its two Baltic
neighbors, has backed Moldova’s goal to join both
NATO and the EU.154 It has also spoken out for
the full territorial integration of the divided state
through more intensive EU involvement as well as the
internationalization of the peacekeeping contingent
in Transnistria. At the first meeting of the Forum of
the Community for Democratic Choice (CDC) held in
Kyiv in December 2005, Lithuania’s President Valdas
Adamkus urged the new democracies of Moldova,
Ukraine, and Georgia to learn from the Baltic countries
by working more closely together to resolve common
problems and pursue their shared objectives.155
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Vilnius has been closely involved in mobilizing
financial assistance for Chisinau, working through the
EU and with international donors such as the World
Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the
UN Development Program (UNDP). Lithuania has
also been active in supporting the implementation of
the EU-Moldova Action Plan, especially in enhancing
Moldova’s administrative capacities, improving its
customs activities, and strengthening civic society and
the independent media.156
Latvia. On September 7, 2006, Latvian Prime Minister
Aigars Kalvitis paid a visit to Moldova to discuss
Riga’s assistance to Chisinau in the implementation
of the EU’s Neighborhood Policy.157 In recent years
political and economic cooperation with Moldova has
become one of Riga’s leading foreign policy priorities.
Both capitals continue to expand their bilateral
agreements in furthering political and economic
support for Moldova’s democratic transformation and
international institutional integration. In particular,
Riga has been helpful in reforming Moldovan
legislation and improving the work of the central and
local administrations.158
Estonia. The Estonian authorities have been
outspoken in supporting countries that opted for
democratic rule. For instance, on the eve of President
Bush’s visit to Tallinn in November 2006, Estonian
President Toomas Hendrik Ilves underscored that
support for Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia was an
obligation.159 An Estonian friendship group has been
established in Moldova’s parliament, which focuses
on providing assistance for Chisinau’s EU ambitions.
Estonian NGOs have been particularly active in
Moldova with encouragement from the government in
Tallinn.160 An Estonian diplomat was also appointed to
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work in Moldova’s foreign ministry in order to impart
Estonia’s experiences in international integration to
officials in Chisinau. Tallinn has also been a strong
supporter of bringing the peacekeeping mission in
Transnistria under EU control as a police operation.161
Czech Republic. Similarly to its CEE neighbors,
Prague has been supportive of Moldova’s ambitions
for EU membership and together with its neighbors in
CEE has shared its accession experiences with Chisinau.
The Moldovan authorities have also enlisted Czech
assistance in drafting the required legislation to meet
EU standards. A Czech contingent has participated in
the EU monitoring mission along the TransnistrianUkrainian border, viewing this as an important
contribution to combating transborder organized crime.
The Czech government opened an embassy in Chisinau
in December 2005, even while Prague was reducing the
number of its missions abroad.162 Other CEE countries,
including Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia, have been
supportive of Moldova’s territorial reintegration and
eventual NATO and EU membership.
Bulgaria. Bulgaria has been less intensively involved
in Moldova than Romania or several other CEE states,
although it is positively disposed toward the country’s
reintegration and its accession to NATO and the EU.
In May 2006, Bulgarian Foreign Minister Ivailo Kalfin
became the first foreign minister to visit Chisinau since
diplomatic relations were established between the two
capitals in 1991.163 Sofia has offered to share its EU
integration experiences with Chisinau as it supports
further Union enlargement eastward.
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Georgia.
The democratic changes following Georgia’s
Rose Revolution in November 2003 have provided
opportunities for closer links between Tbilisi and NATO
and the EU and for intensifying CEE assistance to the
pro-Western government. Some U.S. politicians have
been promoting a further expansion of the Alliance
around the Black Sea region. In particular, U.S. Senator
John McCain has consistently proposed Georgia’s
entry in order to help stabilize the South Caucasus, a
region of “vital interest to western security.”164 All the
CEE capitals support Georgia’s Western integration,
and several have signed cooperation agreements
on European and Atlantic integration. A number of
governments have provided practical cooperation in
reforming Georgia’s armed forces and enabling Tbilisi
to implement NATO’s Individual Partnership Plan
(IPP).
Nevertheless, Georgia continues to face major
problems in democratic construction, in developing a
strong and independent civic sector, and in completing
its state-building tasks. Sections of its territory continue
to be controlled by Russian-backed separatists in
Abkhazia and South Ossetia.165 Several CEE capitals
have consistently supported Tbilisi, and in 2004 they
established the New Group of Friends to help Georgia
integrate with the EU and NATO.166 They have also
backed the creation of a free trade agreement between
Georgia and the EU.
Lithuania. Lithuania has established projects to
promote reform in Georgia, Moldova, and Armenia.
For instance, it has provided support in reforming
Georgia’s judicial system and the defense sector, and in
strengthening its border security. Lithuania’s Defense
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Ministry has supplied weapons to Georgia, asserting
that the transfer of arms to new democracies is a
responsible action despite charges from Moscow that
such transfers threaten regional stability and Russia’s
national security.167 Vilnius has also provided direct
assistance to Georgia in training military officers and
civilians at the Lithuanian Military Academy and has
supplied financial assistance for Georgian participation
in the Baltic Defense College in Tartu, Estonia.168 Vilnius
has also been active in working with Washington on
the “Georgia Train and Equip Program” to upgrade
and modernize the country’s military.
Other fields of cooperation have included
administrative reform and interparliamentary visits.
In May 2006, the Lithuanian presidency sponsored
a conference in Vilnius entitled “3 plus 3,” with
representatives from the three Baltic states and the three
Caucasian countries searching for common ground
and future forms of interregional cooperation.169
During the heated dispute between Georgia
and Russia in October 2006, following the arrest by
Georgian security police of four Russian military
intelligence officers accused of spying on Georgia’s
military defenses, Vilnius was very active in expressing
support for Tbilisi and mobilizing its neighbors and
the EU in acts of solidarity with Georgia. President
Valdas Adamkus initiated a joint statement by the
Lithuanian, Polish, and Ukrainian presidents backing
Georgia during celebrations of the 750th anniversary of
the founding of Lviv in western Ukraine.170 The Baltic
capitals, together with the Nordics and several Central
European states, framed a strong EU declaration
condemning Russian sanctions against Georgia.171
Lithuania has been a strong proponent of withdrawing
Russian troops from Abkhazia and South Ossetia as an
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impetus to resolving the two conflicts and reintegrating
Georgia. Vilnius envisages the replacement of Russian
peacekeepers in both entities with a genuinely neutral
and international peace-enforcement contingent.172
Latvia. The Latvian authorities have focused their
attention on helping to reform Georgia’s justice system,
in order to make the judiciary more transparent
and effective.173 They have also worked at the local
administrative level. In early December 2006, local
government representatives from Georgia visited
Latvia for training purposes and to study Latvia’s
system of local government, its administrative territorial
reforms, its organizational and financial arrangements
for providing utility services to municipalities, and the
financial and budget management of local authorities.
The Baltic states in particular have sought to anchor
Georgia in Euro-Atlantic institutions and to weaken the
domineering and negative influences of neighboring
Russia in both the Baltic and trans-Caucasus regions.174
Russian officials and analysts believe that a grand
international conspiracy has been arranged in CEE
whereby Poland and Lithuania are responsible for
Ukraine, while Latvia and Estonia are focused on
prizing Georgia away from Russia’s influences. In
reality, the smaller post-Soviet republics look to the
three Baltic countries as pertinent examples to emulate
in their path toward the EU and NATO.175
Estonia. The Estonian authorities have made a
significant contribution to defense reform in Tbilisi,
participated in the modernization of Georgia’s
Border Guard, and concluded agreements on the
exchange and protection of classified information.176
Other forms of assistance have included the training
of Georgian officials and politicians. Tallinn has
also been a consistent supporter of Georgia’s bid for
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NATO membership, while the funds allocated by the
Estonian parliament for bilateral cooperation with
Tbilisi in the security and economic spheres have
increased each year for the past decade.
Mart Laar, former Estonian prime minister, has
served as a special adviser to Georgian President
Saakashvili. He has made strenuous efforts to draw
the EU and its foreign policy chief Javier Solana, into
becoming a mediator between Georgia and Russia
following the deterioration of relations in October
2006. Moscow imposed severe sanctions on Georgia
following the arrest of several Russian diplomats. Laar
and others saw the confrontation with Moscow as a
valuable opportunity for the EU to take a more active
role in the South Caucasus.
Croatia. Zagreb has been particularly active during
2006 in assisting Tbilisi in its projected path toward
EU and NATO accession. The Georgian authorities
believe they can learn from the Croatian experience
in particular as it involves a country that recently
established its independence after confronting a
Serbian separatist movement directly supported by
a neighboring country. Several high level meetings
have taken place between the country’s presidents
and formal agreements have been signed, including a
protocol on “European integration matters” between
the two foreign ministries.177
Poland. Poland, similarly to other CEE countries, has
offered advice, consultations, and training in sharing its
experiences in political and economic transformation
with Georgia. At the same time, Warsaw has advocated
membership prospects for Tbilisi at various EU and
NATO forums. It has also called for the withdrawal
of Russian troops from all of Georgia’s territory and
strongly condemned Moscow for imposing sanctions
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and threatening the Georgian government in the fall of
2006.
Czech Republic. The Czech authorities offered to
mediate between Georgia and Russia during the crisis
in October 2006 sparked by Moscow’s strong reaction
to the arrest of four alleged spies in Tbilisi. The Russian
authorities imposed a transportation blockade on
Georgia and expelled a number of Georgian citizens.
Instead of replying constructively to the Czech offer,
Russia’s Foreign Ministry accused Prague of supplying
arms and ammunition to Tbilisi that could purportedly
be used in launching attacks against the separatist entity
of Abkhazia and it appealed to NATO countries not to
sell weapons to Georgia.178 Tbilisi has also requested
that Prague and several other CEE governments help
with modernizing Georgia’s anti-aircraft defense
system and other sectors of its security structure.179 In
terms of assisting with internal reforms, Czech officials,
similarly to other CEE governments, have advocated
the emergence of a pro-Western opposition in Georgia
as this would help root the country in European
traditions and avoid potential pendulum swings in
security and foreign policy and domestic reform.
Romania. Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili
has singled out Romania, Estonia, and Ukraine as key
models for democratization and has underscored that
Romania was the first country to recognize Georgia’s
independence in the fall of 1991.180 He has also declared
that Romania’s presence in the EU was the first step for
all countries in the Black Sea region to join the Union.
Bulgaria. Both Romanian and Bulgarian officials
have pushed for the creation of a Stability Pact for the
South Caucasus, modeled on the Balkan example. In
2004, Sofia and Bucharest initiated the adoption of
such an initiative in the Parliamentary Assembly of
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the Council of Europe. The Assembly finally adopted a
Recommendation and a Resolution in November 2006
calling for the establishment of the Stability Pact. 181 The
objective was to promote political, social, economic,
and cultural cooperation among Georgia, Armenia,
and Azerbaijan and to more intensively involve panEuropean institutions in the region’s development.
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V. DEALING WITH RUSSIA
This section focuses on the varied policies pursued
by the EU, NATO, the United States, and the CentralEast European countries toward the Russian Federation.
The lack of coherence and unity in the Euro-Atlantic
approach toward a resurgent and authoritarian Russian
administration has emboldened the Kremlin to push
forward its regional agendas in order to reestablish
zones of influence and dominance in post-communist
Eastern Europe.
Russia’s Neighborhood Policy.
From Moscow’s perspective, the European CIS
(including Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia) is
as an important arena for regaining a broad sphere of
dominance and projecting Russia’s rising international
power toward Central and Western Europe and the
Middle East. The reintegration of the “post-Soviet
space” became a priority under President Vladimir
Putin, as it would evidently elevate Russia’s contention
that it was an important global player and a stabilizing
factor in “Eurasia.” As a result of its ambitions, Moscow
opposes any significant foreign military presence in the
region and seeks to dissuade its immediate neighbors
from inviting U.S. forces, building NATO or American
military bases, or petitioning for NATO entry.
Russia has also sought to establish a free trade
area with its western neighbors, including Belarus,
Ukraine, and Moldova, allegedly based on WTO and
EU principles. However, such proposals generate
problems for the other participating states. First, such
an arrangement will make it more difficult for them to
integrate with the EU if their economies are increasingly
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geared toward Russia. Second, Moscow seeks to use
closer economic integration to underpin its attempts to
recreate closer political linkages dominated by Russia
and estranged from the West. Moscow will seek to be
closely involved in any free trade agreement between
the EU and its eastern neighbors, who need to be
mindful on the impact this will have on their economic
relations with Moscow. Russia remains their largest
trading partner and principle energy supplier, and it
has displayed a propensity to use energy and trade
as tools of pressure and blackmail against targeted
governments.
Belarus has been the most glaring example of
Muscovite restorationism, where the Lukashenka
government in Minsk has supported a union with
Russia to strengthen its own political position and
continue to benefit from energy subsidies that keeps
the Belarusian economy afloat. Russia for its part seeks
to bring Belarus more comprehensively under its
control in a Moscow-dominated union and is pushing
to fully control the country’s energy infrastructure.
This could set a precedent and a model for other states
and territories in the former Soviet Union, especially
if Minsk proves unable to resist a complete economic
takeover.
With regard to the “frozen” or low-intensity
conflicts in Moldova and Georgia, Moscow has tried
to benefit strategically by keeping the incumbent proWestern governments off balance and threatening to
support independence for the secessionist entities in
both countries. For example, in March 2006 the Russian
Prime Minister’s office declared that the government
has “decided in principle” to merge North Ossetia
(in Russia) with South Ossetia (in Georgia) as a unit
of the Russian Federation that could be renamed as
Alania.182 On the other hand, Moscow has not formally
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recognized the independence declarations of the
secessionist entities as it seeks “common states” or
federal arrangements in both Moldova and Georgia
under Russian arbitration and oversight. This would
enable Moscow to directly influence the domestic and
foreign policies of both states and curtail their Western
orientation.183
Russian policy, backed by strong economic
influence and political penetration, has been an
inhibiting factor for the NATO and EU integration
of Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Georgia. Moscow
has sought to reconstruct its zones of dominance and
supported governments or political forces that have
been ostracized or criticized by Western institutions
for their authoritarian and antireformist policies. The
Kremlin remains particularly determined to prevent
the Black Sea zone from becoming a secure region
for the Western alliance and a strategic corridor for
Western interests in Central Asia and the Middle East.
A prominent and preeminent U.S. role in these regions
would mean that Russia’s influence would steadily
dwindle.
Russia will continue to use various international
crises to promote its strategic positions. For example,
Moscow has pushed for an indefinite delay of decisions
on Kosova’s final status in the Balkans. The Kremlin
sought significant U.S. and EU concessions in return
for its neutrality over Kosova. First, it wanted Western
acknowledgement or acquiescence that it will be the
primary security provider in the post-Soviet region.
Second, it is pushing for a NATO “closed-door” policy
to any further eastern expansion. And third, it seeks
to minimize U.S. military involvement among Russia’s
many neighbors.
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Moscow may also want Kosova to serve as a
precedent among Russia’s neighbors, but certainly
not within Russia itself among aspiring countries
such as Chechnya or Tatarstan. The Kosova solution
may embolden Russia to conclude that it has greater
international legitimacy in supporting territorial
separatism in Georgia and Moldova. In Ukraine, proMoscow forces have deliberately heated up disputes
over the status of the Crimean peninsula and encouraged
the Russian ethnic majority in this autonomous region
to ignore the authority of the central government in
Kyiv.184
In November 2006, Russia’s ambassador to
the UN Vitaly Churkin unveiled an appeal to UN
member states adopted the previous month by the
unrecognized republics of Abkhazia, South Ossetia,
and Transnistria.185 The appeal, signed by the foreign
ministers of the three separatist entities, condemned
the GUAM initiative designed to persuade the UN
General Assembly to include on its agenda a debate on
the “frozen conflicts” in Moldova and Georgia.
During 2007, with the Kosova status decision
pending and deep divisions evident in the new
Ukrainian government over Kyiv’s foreign policy
direction, the Russian administration endeavored to
extend its influence by playing on separatism. Such
a policy will also gain Moscow bargaining chips with
the United States in future regional disputes, generate
valuable anxiety among Russia’s other neighbors, and
keep Ukraine tethered to Russia. Whether or not the
Crimean imbroglio will lead to outright conflict and
calls for territorial separation, as in Transnistria,
Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, will depend on
many factors, including the prospect of Ukraine
pursuing a pro-Western course or if the country
becomes polarized and ungovernable.
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In Moldova, Russia has increased its pressures
to steer the pro-Western government away from its
aspirations for NATO accession. On several occasions
Moscow has severed energy supplies and imposed
commercial embargos on Moldovan exports to Russia.
It has also backed the Transnistrian authorities and their
pursuit of a separate state that will one day merge with
Russia. However, Moscow has not openly recognized
Transnistrian independence as it seeks to manipulate
the issue to keep the Moldovan government off balance.
Its priority is to keep Moldova out of NATO and at
a distance from the EU by maintaining the threat of
separatism rather than fully realizing it.
In Georgia, the Kremlin has also imposed trade
sanctions and energy embargos and supported the
staging of public referenda on independence for the
pro-Russian breakaway regions of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. As with Moldova, Moscow is unlikely
to support Georgia’s division outright, as it prefers
to maintain pressure on the current Western-oriented
government until it falls fully into the Russian orbit
and surrenders its NATO aspirations. In response
to Moscow’s incessant pressures, the government in
Tbilisi has canvassed for Western assistance to defend
its sovereignty, accelerated its bid to join the NATO
alliance, and raised the prospect of leaving the CIS
organization.
The United States and Russia.
U.S. policy toward Russia under the George W.
Bush presidency has been ambivalent. On the one hand,
Washington has courted Moscow’s cooperation in
combating international jihadist terrorism, restricting
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation and
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keeping pressure on the Iranian and North Korean
regimes to dissuade them from developing nuclear
capabilities. The overriding assumption has been that
Moscow is a factor of stability in various regional
crisis points. In reality, Moscow has manipulated the
terrorist threat to conduct a brutal anti-independence
war in Chechnya and to support repressive regimes
in Central Asia. Moreover, the Iranian and North
Korean threats suit the Kremlin’s strategic objectives
by challenging and undermining American interests in
the Middle East and East Asia.
On the other hand, Washington has been
increasingly critical of Russia in its internal domestic
regression and the pressure Moscow has applied on
several neighboring states. The CEE countries have
sought a more consistently assertive U.S. policy toward
Russia and the NATO alliance as a whole, including
a more forthright commitment to bringing Russia’s
neighbors into the principal Western institutions.
On May 4, 2006, U.S. Vice-President Richard
Cheney’s comments at a Vilnius summit attended by
representatives from Europe’s newest democracies
refocused the U.S. approach on Russia’s shortcomings
and potentially destabilizing foreign policy.186 In a
keynote address at the forum entitled “Common
Vision for a Common Neighborhood,” Cheney accused
Moscow of restricting human rights and democracy in
Russia and of using its energy supplies to manipulate
and blackmail its neighbors and undermine their
territorial integrity and democratic development.
The Vilnius presidential forum was attended
by heads of state from Bulgaria, Estonia, Georgia,
Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, and Ukraine and
designed as a continuation of the “Vilnius 10” process
inaugurated in 1997. Cheney’s comments elicited
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condemnation by Russian government spokesmen and
parliamentarians, but were welcomed by the Central
Europeans as indicating a more realistic approach by
Washington toward Russia’s development.
Although Washington is unlikely to yield to
Moscow’s objectives to bring Ukraine, Moldova, and
Georgia into a Russian security and economic orbit, it
may decide to acquiesce to some of Russia’s regional
policies. CEE officials are apprehensive that the Bush
administration may, for example, mute or dilute its
criticisms of the Kremlin and temper its support for
further NATO enlargement eastwards. Any perceived
U.S. appeasement of Russia’s neo-imperialist policies
will send negative reverberations throughout Eastern
Europe and unsettle America’s new allies in Central
Europe.
NATO and Russia.
There is no realistic prospect of Alliance membership
for Russia as it does not share U.S. or EU strategic
interests or democratic values. Furthermore, Moscow
does not intend to reform its defense system according
to the Alliance framework or adjust its civil and military
structures to NATO standards. The Kremlin continues
to claim that NATO is a serious rival that is moving
into Russia’s traditional sphere of influence, forging
close ties with its neighbors, and conducting security
operations without an explicit UN Security Council
mandate.
There is a built-in contradiction in Moscow’s
approach toward NATO. On the one hand, Kremlin
officials claim that NATO is losing its strength and
significance as a military organization because of
American unilateralism and growing “soft security”
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threats. On the other hand, they declare that NATO
is a powerful aggressor that seeks to weaken Russia.
Moscow’s propaganda contortions are clearly intended
for different audiences and the overriding objective is
to prevent Russia’s near neighbors from being absorbed
by the West.
Despite its repeated criticism of Alliance actions,
Russia has cooperated with NATO on occasion in
several specific areas. Clearly, Russian specialists
consider there is some potential benefit from such
contacts. The primary benefit is political, in that Moscow
seeks to gain influence within the Alliance, similarly
to its strategy within the EU, in order to undermine
NATO cohesion especially in its Eastern policy.
The NATO-Russia Council (NRC), established
at the Rome Summit in May 2002, superseded the
previous Permanent Joint Council (PJC), a forum for
consultation, consensus building, and cooperation
created by the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act on
Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security.187 The
format of the meetings was altered, in that Russia and
the 26 NATO members now meet as equals instead of
the bilateral NATO plus 1 format under the PJC. NRC
meetings are chaired by NATO’s Secretary General,
with twice yearly sessions at the level of foreign and
defense ministers and chiefs of staff. Practical work has
involved working groups to enhance cooperation with
regard to counterterrorism, weapons proliferation,
theater missile defense, airspace management, crisis
management, civil emergencies, defense reform,
logistics, and scientific cooperation.
However, the NRC has various shortcomings. For
instance, the internal situation of any state cannot be
discussed so that Russia can avoid any constructive
criticism of its policies in Chechnya and its support
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for the secessionist entities in Moldova and Georgia.
Although NATO members have demanded that
Moscow withdraw its forces and weapons from
Georgia and Moldova and honor the commitments
it made at the Istanbul OSCE summit in November
1999, the Russian government claims that these are
bilateral issues outside the purview of NATO. At the
NATO Summit in Latvia in November 2006, Alliance
leaders criticized the Russian government for delaying
ratification of the Conventional Forces in Europe
(CFE) Treaty by failing to close its military bases in
Georgia and not withdrawing the remainder of its
forces from Moldova.188 Alliance members have also
criticized Moscow for its lack of openness in dialogue
on non-proliferation and nuclear safety questions,
for attempting to undermine the cohesion of NATO
member states, and for applying pressure on its
neighbors to limit their cooperation with the Alliance.
Moscow has also canvassed for NATO to
establish official contacts with the Russia-dominated
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), an
organization created in September 2003 through the
institutionalization of the Collective Security Treaty
signed in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, in May 1992 and
including Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. In this fashion,
the Kremlin seeks to control contacts between CSTO
states and NATO and to determine the security of
several neighboring capitals. In effect, the development
of official relations between NATO and CSTO would
contribute to retarding democratic developments
among several NATO partners in Eastern Europe and
Central Asia.
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The European Union and Russia.
Russia wants a bilateral relationship with the EU
and not one of a candidate or member state. Moscow is
unwilling to surrender any elements of its sovereignty
to EU institutions or to adjust any of its legislation
in line with EU standards. The Kremlin also rejected
inclusion in the ENP, while remaining suspicious
about EU attempts to enhance its relations with
Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and other states in Russia’s
“near abroad.” Instead, Moscow seeks a “strategic
partnership” with the EU in order to enhance its
foreign policy interests, restrict international criticisms
of its policies, and promote divisions in the Western
alliance, while it builds up its own regional security
organization through the CSTO framework and a
Eurasian “Economic Space.”
Although the EU laid down its basic approach to
Russia in a “Common Strategy” adopted in 1999, this
strategy was not extended beyond June 2004 because of
internal EU disagreements over policy toward Russia.
Although several concrete areas of cooperation have
been identified, particularly in the economic, security,
and environmental spheres, the PCA is founded on
very generalized and even insipid principles given
the drift toward authoritarianism in Russia over the
past decade. For instance, it declares a commitment to
“shared principles and objectives” including “support
for democratic norms and political and economic
freedoms” but without any mechanisms to monitor
and report on whether such principles are actually
being respected.
There is no single EU policy toward Russia, even
though formal mechanisms exist to regulate relations
between the Union and Russia with the stated objective
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of building a “strategic partnership.” A PCA came into
effect in December 1997 for 10 years.189 It has included
EU-Russia Summits, involving heads of state who meet
twice a year to define the strategic direction of bilateral
relations; the Permanent Partnership Council (PPC),
enabling ministers to meet as often as necessary to
discuss specific issues; the Parliamentary Cooperative
Committee (PCC), involving a representative of the
European Parliament and the deputy chairman of the
Russian Duma; and senior and experts level meetings.
The PCA was intended to support Russia’s efforts
to achieve WTO membership and the establishment
of an EU-Russia free trade area. In 2002, the EU also
announced its readiness to recognize Russia as a market
economy, a step that lifted various import restrictions
on Russian products.
All of these cooperative formats were instituted
before the EU expanded to include new members
from CEE in May 2004. The PCA will need to be
renewed during 2007 with input from states that have
a more distrustful view of Russian policy. Moreover,
disagreements over the EU’s Russia policy predate the
May 2004 enlargement, with a more critical approach
voiced by the UK and the Nordic states toward
Russia’s internal developments. At the EU-Russia
Summit on May 25, 2006, leaders agreed to develop a
new accord to replace the PCA, and negotiations were
intended to produce a formal EU-Russia Agreement.
The Agreement is supposed to provide an updated
and more ambitious framework for the EU-Russia
relationship. The EU Commission proposed an accord
that would cover the whole range of EU-Russia
relations with a particular focus on deepening trade
links and developing energy networks.
In November 2006, a few days before the scheduled
EU-Russia summit, the Polish government vetoed the
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start of talks between Brussels and Moscow designed
to forge a major long-term agreement.190 Warsaw
asserted that Russia needed to lift a ban on Polish
food imports and ratify the EU-Russia Energy Charter
before a common EU position could be reached and a
new “comprehensive cooperation agreement” signed.
Polish Prime Minister Jarosław Kaczynski claimed that
Russia was violating the current EU-Russia cooperation
agreement by banning Polish meat and many other
foods and wanted the EU to demonstrate its solidarity
on matters of principle. However, Poland’s insistence
that Russia should ratify the Energy Charter designed
to open up the Russian energy market to foreign
investment was not backed by all EU countries. Instead,
the European Commission was seeking to enshrine
some of its principles into the new Agreement with
Russia while diluting or discarding other elements of
the Charter.
Officials in Finland, which held the EU presidency
in the second half of 2006, announced that the EURussia summit on November 24, 2006, would not
launch negotiations for a new framework agreement.191
Such an accord required a unanimous decision by all
25 EU countries. The Helsinki summit was supposed to
mark a new stage in EU-Russia relations, culminating
in a strategic agreement covering energy, migration,
trade, and human rights. In frustration at the failure to
sign a beneficial accord, Russian officials threatened to
impose a new ban on all EU meat and animal products
from January 2007 when Romania and Bulgaria joined
the Union.
EU enlargement commissioner Olli Rehn dismissed
alleged Russian concerns over animal health in both
countries and called Moscow’s threat a political game
in which the objective was to create pressure. However,
some commentators argued that Warsaw may have
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inadvertently played into Moscow’s hands by raising
the prospect that Russia will now aim to sign bilateral
agreements with individual EU states and thus further
fracture the Union and debilitate its Russia policy.192
The EU Parliament has tended to be more outspoken
on relations with Russia than other EU institutions or
the larger member states that have tried to divorce
“pragmatic” economic interests from “moral” issues.
For instance, following the EU-Russia Summit in
October 2006 at which President Putin rejected
international principles such as the Energy Charter, EU
parliamentarians passed a nonbinding resolution in
Strasbourg, calling for member states to give “serious
thought” to their relations with Russia. They argued
that such contacts should not be based on economic
criteria alone but on a number of political and security
issues.193 The parliament called for democracy, human
rights, and freedom of expression to be placed at the
core of any future agreement between the EU and
Russia. In particular, the parliamentarians voiced their
concerns over the increasing intimidation, harassment,
and killing of journalists, and other people critical of
the Russian government.
In the economic sphere, Moscow has feared the
adverse consequences of the EU’s eastern enlargement
on its own economy. The new CEE members
introduced the restrictive “Schengen” visa regime for
Russian citizens shortly after accession, even though
their formal entry into the “Schengen” zone is unlikely
to take place before 2008. To prevent its immediate
neighbors from moving into the EU zone, Russia
has sought to develop a Common Economic Space
(CES) with Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. The
agreement on the formation of the CES was signed
in September 2003, with plans to develop this into a
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free trade area. Ukraine in particular has been hesitant
to back closer economic integration with Russia as
this could undermine its prospects for eventual EU
accession. Even the Yanukovych government installed
in October 2006 has resisted Ukraine’s amalgamation
into the Russian-directed economic union.
The Russian regime also opposes any significant
EU involvement in resolving the “frozen conflicts”
in either Moldova or Georgia, as it fears that this
would challenge Russia’s influence and its policy of
reimperialization.194 It also resists any moves by the EU
or its member states to forge institutional links with
any regional organizations that exclude Russia, such
as GUAM or the CDC.
Central-East Europe and Russia.
Russian officials and media outlets pursue
campaigns against the activism of the CEE states in
Moscow’s “near abroad.” They occasionally benefit
from the pro-Russian statements of some U.S.
commentators who criticize the CEE for defending
their national interests against Russia’s pressures and
who seek a close U.S.-Russia relationship regardless
of Moscow’s policies toward America’s most reliable
European allies.195 Russian officials, including Nikolai
Patrushev, head of the Federal Security Service (FSB),
Russia’s primary intelligence agency, claim that
Washington is using its new allies in CEE to promote
antigovernmental revolutions in neighboring countries.
For example, the overthrow of President Lukashenka
in Belarus has allegedly been plotted in Bratislava,
Slovakia.196 However, Poland was considered the
prime culprit by Kremlin policymakers in “exporting
revolution” eastwards and conducting a new imperial
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policy toward Ukraine and Belarus under the guise of
a “Baltic to Black Sea Security Zone.”197
Muscovite elites view their western neighbors,
especially Belarus and Ukraine, as part of the historic
Greater Russian territories that were formally reunited
during the Tsarist and Soviet periods.198 They do
not acknowledge the permanent independence
or sovereignty of these countries or accept their
membership in Western institutions. As a result, the
states that emerged from the Soviet Union remain a
source of strategic competition between Russia and
Central-Eastern Europe. This contest has sharpened
significantly since 10 CEE states became members
of NATO between 1999 and 2004, and eight of
these joined the EU in May 2004. Most CEE capitals
support bringing their immediate neighbors into the
Euro-Atlantic institutions, while Russia has sought
to construct a countervailing political, economic,
and security structure where it can assert regional
leadership.
The Kremlin has vigorously opposed Poland’s
eastern policy, convinced that Warsaw was a prime
culprit in the breakup of the Soviet empire. By
denigrating the popular revolutions against corrupt
governments in Ukraine and Georgia as Western
engineered coups, Russian leaders are determined
to preclude any similar occurrences in other “postSoviet” states and potentially within the Russian
Federation itself. Facing a presidential succession in
2008, Russia is more likely to undergo a struggle for
power and resources among sectoral magnates and
security chiefs once President Putin leaves office, as
effective political opposition has been neutralized and
most civic organizations have been muted.
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Russian officials are intent on deflating NATO
and EU capabilities in their western and southern
neighborhoods while widening and deepening their
dominance over the “near abroad,” an area the Kremlin
views as a strategic extension of Russian territory.
Putin’s administration is focused on controlling the
foreign policies and security orientations of nearby
states and preventing their merger into the West.
For example, despite the Orange Revolution,
Moscow did not surrender Ukraine as a strategic asset,
calculating that its influences could be restored as the
incoming coalition led by Prime Minister Yanukovych
would remain fractured, and the domestic reform
program will stutter while neither NATO nor the EU
will offer Kyiv realistic prospects for membership. The
reintegration of the “post-Soviet space” has become
a priority under Putin, as it would elevate Russia’s
contention that it was an important global power.
Moscow opposes any significant foreign military
presence in this region and is consistently dissuading
its CIS neighbors from petitioning for NATO entry.
Hence, it has supported anti-NATO political forces in
Ukraine and elsewhere to steer these countries away
from the North Atlantic Alliance.
The Putin administration views many of the Central
European and Baltic states as ambitious spoilers of the
“post-Soviet space” and is therefore intent on turning
them into neutralized buffers against further Western
encroachment eastward. The Kremlin has employed
various diplomatic, political, and economic tools in
order to transform these countries into weak, isolated,
and subservient neighbors or marginal players along
the EU’s and NATO’s eastern borders. For example,
the Baltic republics have been regularly condemned
by Russian officials for posing as models for former
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Soviet republics that sought membership in Western
institutions and for acting as “Russia experts” inside
the EU.
Moscow claims that CEE governments are injecting
“Russophobic” positions into the EU, and it seeks
ways to counteract such trends through closer bilateral
links with West European capitals. It calculates that
this will help marginalize the CEE newcomers in the
EU’s decisionmaking process. The Russian authorities
are also pursuing inroads through institutional
linkages with both the EU and NATO, with the intent
of muting the foreign and security policies of both
organizations that run counter to Russian interests and
goals. Furthermore, the Kremlin has fostered divisions
between the CEE capitals by, for example, cultivating
closer ties with Budapest and Prague through lucrative
economic investments while seeking to politically
isolate Poland and the Baltic states within the CEE
region and inside the EU.
Russian officials were encouraged by failures to
pass the EU’s Constitutional Treaty in France and
Holland in mid-2005. They claimed that the Union’s
enlargement strategy was the primary cause of such
failure because Brussels overestimated its “absorption
capacity” with the accession of eight CEE countries.
Moscow felt uneasy about the EU’s eastward expansion
for several reasons: it was excluded from the process of
a “United Europe,” it brought into the Union allegedly
“Russophobic” states, and it encouraged Russia’s “near
abroad” to canvass for EU membership and abandon
the Muscovite sphere.
The Kremlin has also charged several CEE capitals
with supplying weapons to the post-Soviet states. For
instance, in September 2006 Russian Defense Minister
Sergei Ivanov alleged that some new NATO members
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have supplied Georgia with weapons earlier provided
to CEE by the Soviet Union evidently without the right
to reexport them.199 Ivanov was attending an informal
meeting of the Russia-NATO Council in Slovenia.
The Kremlin has claimed that the EU’s policy toward
its eastern neighbors, under the influence of CEE
“novices,” has been primarily directed against Russian
interests with the purported goal of surrounding the
country with a string of hostile states. Hence, officials
have exploited the constitutional failure and other
difficulties with EU integration to encourage a halt
to further enlargement. Simultaneously, they are
canvassing for an EU acknowledgement of Russia’s
primary security and political responsibility in non-EU
Eastern Europe and Russia’s intimate involvement in
all EU-CIS relations.
The standoff between Russia and Brussels over the
EU border monitoring mission along the Transnistrian
section of the Moldovan-Ukrainian frontier in the
spring of 2006 became a notable test for the EU’s
eastern policy in a potential confrontation with Russia’s
own neighborhood policy. The EU, with significant
impetus from its new members, appointed its own
Special Representative for Moldova and embarked
on applying a legitimate customs regime working
with both Kyiv and Chisinau. In contrast, Moscow
appeared determined to undermine EU influence in
what it considered to be its primary sphere of interest
revolving around Moldova’s Transnistrian enclave and
it accused the EU of imposing an economic blockade
on the territory. EU policy in this simmering crisis will
help indicate to what degree the Union was committed
to the region’s transformation in line with European
standards and to what extent it would succumb to
Russian pressures.
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One major area where the CEE capitals have tried
to limit Russian influence and dominance has been in
energy policy, especially following Moscow’s severing
of supplies to Ukraine in January 2006. Warsaw in
particular has backed alternative supplies and routes
for gas and oil from the Caspian basin as a way of
steadily reducing dependence on Russian sources.
These alternative routes include the Nabucco pipeline
across Turkey to Eastern Europe and the EU.200
Russian authorities have sought to preempt such
moves by forging deals to purchase energy resources
from the Caspian states, gaining financial control over
energy infrastructure handling Russian oil and gas in
neighboring countries, and planning new energy routes
that would give Moscow controlling shares in most of
the energy distribution networks across Europe.
Poland. Warsaw makes a clear distinction between
Russia on the one hand and Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova,
and Georgia on the other. It underscores that Russia
has no realistic prospect of joining the EU and does
not itself seek membership. Hence, the EU and Russia
should remain as two sovereign partners but should
not be entitled to block the other party’s legitimate
interests.201
A struggle has developed within the EU regarding
the appropriate approach toward Russia, and Poland
is at the forefront of those states that seek a more
assertive policy toward Moscow. Polish spokesmen
believe that the Union should show greater concern
over antidemocratic tendencies in Russian politics
and demonstrate that the West does not approve of
the authoritarian system imposed by President Putin.
Polish officials criticize the inconsistencies of their West
European partners who condemn extrajudicial killings
in Israel and elsewhere but fail to criticize Russia for a
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much more brutal policy toward civilians in Chechnya
over a number of years.
Warsaw has been particularly concerned that
Russia is seeking to create fractures in the EU by
pursuing differing approaches toward the WE and
the CEE countries and using its ties with the former
to undermine the position of the latter. According to
President Kwasniewski, Russian policy toward the EU
has created the danger of manipulation and abuse and
Poland wants the EU’s relations with Moscow to be
decided and implemented by consensual agreement in
Brussels.
There have been several examples of how Moscow
has dealt with Paris and Berlin over the heads of the
CEE capitals. During the late 1990s, as Poland prepared
itself for EU membership, it reintroduced visas for
Russian citizens. Moscow strongly objected to such
visa requirements for its citizens crossing Lithuanian
and Polish territory to enter the Russian exclave of
Kaliningrad on the Baltic coast. France initially lobbied
on Russia’s behalf, to the dismay of Polish officials who
strongly criticized French President Francois Mitterand
for seriously undermining European unity.202
In April 2005, Germany and Russia agreed to
construct a new gas pipeline under the Baltic Sea
that would bypass Poland. This North European Gas
Pipeline was subsequently renamed as the RussoGerman “Nord Stream” pipeline. Such an arrangement
with Russian energy sources directly concerns the entire
EU, particularly those states that are almost completely
dependent on Russian supplies. The proposed pipeline
has the potential of undermining Polish and CEE
security as Russia could disrupt its supplies through
Ukraine and CEE in order to apply political pressures
on these countries without affecting its relations with
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the West European capitals.203 Warsaw asserted that the
Baltic pipeline project needed to be discussed within
the Union and not simply on a bilateral basis.
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder’s comments that
German-Russian relations were better than they have
been for 100 years were poorly received in Warsaw.204
While Poland views Russia as a power to be contained,
Germany evidently sees Russia as its principal political
and economic partner in the east. Such a position could
exacerbate existing rifts in Polish-German relations.
However, the new German Chancellor Angela Merkel,
in contrast to her predecessor, has reached out to her
CEE neighbors and involved them in dialogue about
Germany’s policy toward Russia.
As a result of the evident unreliability of several
WE states, Warsaw has sought to convince Washington
to have a more realistic policy toward Russia and
its eastern neighbors. Officials were heartened by
unflinching U.S. support for the pro-democracy
upsurge during Ukraine’s Orange Revolution in
November-December 2004, by President Bush’s visits
to Riga and Tbilisi during his trip to Europe in May
2005, and for U.S. support for holding the November
2006 NATO summit in Latvia. President Bush’s backing
for the popular revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine
indicated that Washington wanted to maintain its
active support for democratic forces throughout the
former Soviet Union, even while upholding its relations
with Russia.205 Poland believes that the development
of a joint and effective U.S.-EU policy toward Russia
and the East European states outside the EU would
strengthen democratic developments throughout the
region and enhance Poland’s security as well as that of
its allies.
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Since the collapse of the Soviet bloc, Russian leaders
envisaged post-communist Central Europe as consisting
of a string of neutral and weak states regardless of
their internal political and economic makeup. A
primary Kremlin objective was to deter or prevent
these countries from moving into NATO and further
diminishing Moscow’s strategic maneuverability.
The Kremlin sought the region’s demilitarization and
neutralization so that it would form a buffer between
NATO and the CIS. This would enable Moscow to
once again act unilaterally throughout the region
as it depicted its own security as paramount and its
national interests as more salient than those of its many
neighbors.
Once NATO invitations had been issued to the
Central Europeans, the Russian authorities seemed
resigned to the loss of Poland as a buffer state and a
neutral neighbor. Nonetheless, Russian strategists
still perceived the country’s full integration into the
Western system and especially Poland’s accession
to NATO as an obstacle and a challenge to Kremlin
influences over the three Baltic republics, Ukraine, and
Belarus. Hence, all the democratic Polish governments
have been treated with suspicion if not hostility by
Moscow since the early 1990s.
Following the collapse of the Soviet empire, a
historic struggle reemerged between Poland and
Russia. This has centered on their competition over
a region that formed part of the Polish-Lithuanian
Commonwealth from the 15th to the 18th centuries and
then fell under Muscovite domination until the demise
of Soviet communism. Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova
form the modern battleground between an Atlanticist
and European Poland and a Eurasian and authoritarian
Russia. The Russian elite is deeply suspicious of
Warsaw’s motives and believes Poland was a major
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culprit in the breakup of the Soviet imperium that now
seeks to fracture Russia itself and tear it away from its
“Eurasian” allies.
The neutralization of Polish influences eastward is
deemed essential by the Russian regime, and President
Vladimir Putin has implemented and intensified such
an approach. Moscow remains keenly watchful of
close cooperation between Warsaw and its eastern
neighbors, fearful of Polish and Western inroads that
could permanently tear Ukraine and Belarus away from
the Russian orbit. Hence, Polish political, cultural, and
economic influences have been criticized and opposed
by Moscow and its various interest groups throughout
the region.
At the outset of Putin’s tenure in 2000, Moscow
appeared to inject more pragmatism into its relations
with the four Visegrád states. Political relations with
Russia seemed to improve as the Kremlin evidently
calculated that it needed to adapt to an enlarging
and developing EU in which Poland would soon be
a member. However, as Putin endeavored to raise
Russia’s stature through economic and political
instruments, relations soured precipitously. From 2003
onwards, a mini “cold war” unfolded between Moscow
and Warsaw over a number of disputed issues. The
tug-of-war over Ukraine in late 2004 convinced the
Kremlin that Poland was its chief regional adversary,
while Putin’s regional ambitions were confirmed for
the Polish elites.
Moscow remains deeply troubled that the CEE
states serve as attractive models for the neighboring CIS
countries, as this undermines the latter’s dependence
on Russia and could even pull some of Russia’s federal
regions away from Moscow’s control. Poland is at
the center of this unwelcome “Eastern policy” which
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among Russian elites is perceived as a revival of “Polish
imperialism.” Hence, Poland’s eastern neighborhood
is precisely where “Euramerica” (or the concept of a
broad Euro-American alliance) clashes most directly
with the Russian-dominated “Eurasia” (or the concept
of a non-Atlantic continental alliance), and the outcome
along this strategic tectonic plate remains uncertain.
Warsaw has attempted to pursue a common EU
policy and a complementary EU-U.S. approach toward
Russia, but both policies could prove challenging
over the coming decade. Some critics contend that
an effective “grand strategy” will not be possible to
implement and attempts to do so could create new
fractures within both the EU and NATO. Poland will
try to leverage its close ties with Washington and its
growing influence within the EU to have a constructive
impact on its eastern neighbors and even on Russia
itself—constructive in the sense that Polish officials
seek to expand European institutions eastward and to
curtail Moscow’s ability to block this process.
Some American and European policymakers once
argued that the Kremlin had rejected the doctrine
of “multipolarity” in his dealings with the United
States. Such premature conclusions were dashed as
President Putin has openly elevated “multipolarity” as
a strategic objective. In practice, this means the pursuit
of multiple power centers in various regions in order
to diminish America’s global dominance. Moscow’s
position has been vehemently opposed by Poland, as
Russian policy is designed not so much to strengthen
Europe as to weaken America and its role on the old
continent.
Although Moscow adopted a relatively mild
approach toward NATO’s second substantial
enlargement in 2003, Putin declared that his objective
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was to create structures that facilitated the “unification
of Europe” together with Russia. This would
evidently constitute one strong “pole” to balance the
United States. At a time when Washington has been
preoccupied with Iraq and global terrorist networks,
the Kremlin calculated that it could take the steam out
of NATO expansion, enlist European support for its
security proposals, diminish the position of CEE states,
and exacerbate any latent trans-Atlantic divisions.
Putin has repeatedly stressed his yearnings for
NATO to become a “political organization” and not
a security alliance. This has serious implications for
Alliance members such as Poland, which logically
views Russian cooperation with the Alliance as another
means for undercutting NATO’s rationale as an effective
military structure that can operate outside the zone of
member states. It is also a blatant attempt to weaken
the American-European security relationship and to
expose former Soviet satellites, including Poland, to
renewed and unwelcome Russian influences.
The Russian leadership seeks two strategic
long-term objectives: access to NATO and EU
decisionmaking and major political influence from the
Balkans to Central Asia. Putin understands that Russia
is too weak to prevent further NATO enlargement.
Instead, the Kremlin has aimed to minimize the impact
of NATO’s growth by obtaining a role in Alliance
decisionmaking. Putin also realizes that NATO has
weakened as a coherent institution because the United
States primarily acts with willing partners during
international crises. Hence, the Russian president
fortifies his ties with Washington when it benefits
Moscow and forges alternative coalitions in order to
exploit America’s strategic weaknesses and benefit
from its overstretched capabilities. Any trans-Atlantic
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rifts are a strong temptation for the Kremlin to revive
its “divide and dominate” strategies.
Poland was apprehensive when French and German
leaders, in opposition to U.S. policy in Iraq during 2003,
courted Moscow in a counterweight axis to Washington’s
coalition. Such a strategy indicated a unilateralist or
“minilateralist” approach by several large EU members
that ignored the views of EU newcomers such as
Poland. Moscow has also pushed in the EU capitals
for a freer hand in its regional policies. For example,
the Kremlin continues to canvass for an international
seal of approval as the primary peacekeeper or conflict
manager in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and other
former Soviet territories. This would entail significant
leeway for Moscow in dealing with independence
movements within the Russian Federation, enhance
political and economic influence among its neighbors,
and even enable military operations in nearby regions
on the pretext of protecting Russia’s strategic interests
and assets regardless of the opposition of indigenous
governments.
During the past decade, Moscow has expanded its
peacekeeping operations in the CIS with little regard
for a UN or OSCE mandate. The Kremlin claims that
“Muslim radicalism” constitutes a direct threat to Russia
and its neighbors and seeks to camouflage its own
expansionism as a struggle against “fundamentalism
and terrorism.” President Putin calculated that the
West would accede to Russia’s increasing pressures
and economic and security influences in its “near
abroad” while the United States remains preoccupied
on other fronts. This would effectively neutralize
all the former Central and East European satellites,
including Poland, with Moscow pushing itself
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forward as an indispensable center of power alongside
Washington and Brussels.
In this challenging strategic environment, Warsaw
seeks to enhance its own position and prestige while
upholding American engagement throughout CEE
and beyond. To successfully navigate such a strategy,
the Polish authorities need to achieve three overriding
objectives: to consolidate Poland’s position as a
reliable NATO ally; to gain an important role in EU
decisionmaking especially with regard to the Union’s
foreign and security policy; and to maintain its close
relationship with the United States.
Lithuania. Diplomatic relations between Lithuania
and the Russian Federation were established in July
1991 leading to signatures on several major agreements
and high-level official bilateral meetings have taken
place regularly. Russia’s relations with Lithuania
have been less strained over minority issues than with
Estonia or Latvia. Lithuania hosts a small Russian
minority population and its citizenship law passed
in 1989 included most current residents. Lithuania’s
border treaty with Russia was ratified by the Russian
parliament in 2003, 6 years after it was signed by the
presidents of both countries.
Nevertheless, relations between the two capitals
have not been trouble-free. Moscow’s persistent
interference in Lithuanian politics through its business
contacts and intelligence networks, designed to
purchase or coerce enduring political influence, led to
notable strains in bilateral relations.206 Furthermore,
since Lithuania’s admission to NATO, Russian aircraft
have repeatedly violated Lithuanian airspace leading
to official protests and suppositions that Moscow was
intent on intimidating its smaller neighbors. Despite
initial controversies, disputes have subsided over
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transit between Russia and its Kaliningrad region via
Lithuania since the EU became more closely involved
in resolving the issue.
Latvia. Latvia’s relations with Russia have been
characterized by friction throughout the postcommunist period. Latvia hosts the region’s largest
Russian population of about 30 percent due to the influx
of laborers, administrators, and military personnel and
their families during the period of Soviet occupation.207
Aside from Moscow’s attempts to thwart Riga’s EuroAtlantic aspirations, difficulties have been evident in
the status and rights permitted to Latvia’s Russian and
Sovietized population. Although legislation was strict
in the early to mid 1990s with regard to citizenship
requirements, over time these policies have been
moderated. Nonetheless, the Kremlin continues to
accuse Riga of discrimination against Russians in order
to make Latvia and its Balkan neighbors less attractive
as a model for Russia’s western regions and its “near
abroad.”
Other contested issues between Riga and Moscow
have included the unsigned border treaty. Latvia
added an explanatory declaration to the treaty in April
2005 that was interpreted by Moscow as allowing
for opening future territorial claims against Russia.
Riga dismissed such charges as groundless. Latvia’s
parliament also passed an official demarché in May
2005 that denounced communism and urged Russia
to condemn the repressions under Soviet rule. The
government established a special commission in
August 2005 to assess the damages incurred by the
country and its population under the Soviet regime.208
Estonia. Relations between Estonia and Russia
have been strained and marked by incessant disputes
during the post-Cold War era. After a decade of
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negotiations, a treaty demarcating common land and
sea borders was signed in May 2005. However, just
prior to the Estonian parliament’s ratification of the
document in June 2005, parliamentarians added an
amendment noting the illegal occupation of Estonia by
Soviet forces. Moscow opposed the amendment and
contended that it allowed for future Estonian claims
to Russian territory that had been forcibly annexed by
the Russian Federation after World War II. Although
the EU essentially backed Tallinn’s position, Moscow
insisted on new negotiations in order to maintain its
pressure on the Estonian authorities.209
In addition to the border dispute, Russian aircraft
have violated Estonian airspace numerous times
between 2004 and 2007, both before and after Tallinn
joined NATO, and are a continual source of tension
between the two states. Furthermore, several Estonian
government officials have been denied visas to travel to
Russia. For example, Estonian foreign minister Urmas
Paet was refused a visa by Moscow in November 2005,
with Russian authorities claiming that the refusal was
a “technical error.”210 Similarly to its policies toward
Latvia, Moscow has manipulated the Russian minority
issue in Estonia by claiming that the understandable
requirement for a level of language proficiency to
gain Estonian citizenship is a form of discrimination.
The primary purpose of the Kremlin is to depict the
government as “Russophobic.”
Romania. Romania has been one of the most
active CEE states in campaigning for NATO and EU
enlargement, particularly in the Black Sea region, and
has expressed its concerns about Russia’s expansionist
ambitions in the region. Such an approach is partly
due to historical experiences with Russia and
partly a response to Moscow’s intent to divide
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Moldova and keep the republic out of contention for
NATO and EU entry.
Slovakia. The policy of the new government coalition
in Slovakia toward Russia and its other eastern
neighbors has come under question since the general
elections in June 2006. Some pro-democracy activists
fear that the three-party populist-nationalist coalition
may display weaker support for a democracy-oriented
Eastern Dimension, become lukewarm toward further
NATO and EU enlargement eastward, and adopt a
softer and ineffective approach toward Russia. The
Smer led administration has given indications of both
Euroskepticism and Atlantoskepticism, and it could
also downgrade Slovakia’s regional cooperation in
Visegrád and other formats.
Czech Republic. In the first few years of Czech
statehood after the breakup of Czechoslovakia, Prague’s
policy approach toward Russia was underpinned
by the moral authority of President Vaclav Havel.
Havel was a strong proponent of NATO enlargement
and the inclusion of all post-communist states in the
Alliance. He was also suspicious about the successful
development of Russian democracy and the persistence
of Moscow’s imperialist ambitions. Nonetheless, the
Czech government has been less active in the Eastern
Dimension of CEE policy than Poland or the Baltic
republics. This can be partly explained by Prague’s
overriding focus on Western integration, its lack of
borders with Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, and its
lessened exposure to negative Russian influences.
Hungary. Hungary’s policies toward Russia have
in many ways mirrored that of the Czech Republic,
especially under the Socialist administrations, which
have avoided antagonizing Moscow. Budapest’s
foreign policy has focused most of its attention on
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protecting and expanding the position of Magyar
minorities in neighboring states rather than vehemently
and consistently supporting its Eastern neighbors in
gaining NATO and EU accession. This has generally
suited Russia’s strategic interests in the region.
Bulgaria. For much of the 1990s, Bulgaria’s Socialist
Party (BSP) remained closely linked to Moscow, and
when the BSP returned to power in December 1994,
Russia’s influence in Bulgaria increased. The centerright Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) was perceived
as a dangerous formation by the Kremlin that would
move the country closer to NATO. The UDF’s election
victory in April 1997 was seen by Moscow as a major
setback, as the new Bulgarian administration embraced
the prospect of NATO entry. The Russian authorities
endeavored to divide the UDF by seeking to corrupt
officials and parliamentarians with lucrative business
propositions. It invested large amounts of money to
undermine the government and to discredit the UDF.
Pro-Russian lobbying groups canvassed on behalf of
Moscow’s economic interests and against Bulgaria’s
NATO membership.
Bulgaria’s center-right government elected in
April 2001 did not oppose maintaining good relations
with Russia but expressed anxiety that Moscow was
intent on influencing Bulgarian foreign policy to
the detriment of its relations with the United States.
During President Putin’s visit to Bulgaria in March
2003, analysts contended that Putin attempted to
influence Sofia’s position on Iraq and worsen its
relations with Washington. To counterbalance the
center-right government, Putin cultivated ties with
Socialist President Georgii Parvanov.
Under the new government coalition elected in
June 2005, which included the Socialists, Sofia sought
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more equal and pragmatic ties with Russia. However,
achieving such a balance has proved difficult as Bulgaria
depends on Russian energy resources for almost 90
percent of its needs and any open confrontation with
Moscow could have adverse effects on the country’s
economy. In January 2006, Bulgaria and Russia had
an open dispute over energy as Moscow threatened to
cut gas deliveries unless Sofia renegotiated an existing
contract and agreed to increased prices. The Bulgarian
government initially maintained its strong position,
but eventually succumbed to pressures to review some
aspects of the deal. The Kremlin will continue to apply
both pressures and incentives toward Bulgaria, which
it views as a realistic target of influence in the BalkanBlack Sea region regardless of Sofia’s membership in
NATO and the EU.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS
A fuller understanding of Europe’s ongoing
evolution is essential for devising a long-term
American strategy toward each country, toward the
EU and NATO, and toward the wider region. Europe’s
institutional development and the EU’s emerging
foreign and security policies have direct implications
for American security and the future role of U.S. armed
forces in Europe and in nearby regions. By analyzing
specific questions about EU and NATO policy and
the limits to further enlargement and multinational
integration, U.S. policymakers can enhance their
understanding of broader trends in trans-Atlantic
relations and devise more effective U.S. policy toward
the older and newer European allies.
The Eastern Dimension.
At a time of uncertainty over the future size, shape,
and effectiveness of both NATO and the EU, it is
important for U.S. policymakers and analysts to gain
fresh perspectives on the policies and impact of both
organizations. In particular, America’s close allies in
CEE have been at the forefront of constructing a wider
and more coherent European entity and a broader and
more effective trans-Atlantic Alliance by seeking to
expand both the EU and NATO eastward to encompass
the former Soviet republics.
This Eastern Dimension pursued by most of the
CEE capitals has been resisted among several of the
older member states, thus generating new points of
friction within the European Union and inside the
North Atlantic Alliance. American officials need to be
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closely attuned to intra-EU and intra-NATO disputes;
to the impact of noninclusion on countries such as
Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and Georgia; and to the
strategies and objectives of Russia in this uncertain
political environment.
In a broad strategic context, Washington has become
embroiled in a struggle between three competing
interests over the future of Eastern Europe. First, the
United States is persistently lobbied by an activist
core of new allies in CEE who seek American support
for their foreign policy priorities and a more resolute
and coherent Eastern Dimension by the trans-Atlantic
alliance to incorporate the remaining East European
states, including those in the South Caucasus.
Second, the United States is seeking to restore close
and beneficial partnerships with a more conservative
and reticent axis of older EU members who are
apprehensive about provoking disruptive conflicts
with Moscow and are seeking to temper the more
assertive policies of the EU newcomers from CEE.
Several West European states pursue direct bilateral
relations with Russia that preclude the emergence
of a common EU policy and undermine the foreign
policy of new Union members seeking NATO and EU
expansion eastwards.
Third, Washington confronts an emboldened and
neo-imperialist Russian government consolidated by
President Putin since he assumed office in 2000. Moscow
is generally supportive of U.S. antiterrorist policies but
resents America’s preeminent role in regions bordering
the Russian Federation. President Putin’s Kremlin has
established an authoritarian system of government and
is pursuing expansionist policies of dominance toward
its former satellites and challenging the national and
security interests of America’s new CEE allies and
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ultimately of the United States itself in pivotal regions
such as the Black Sea-Caspian Sea corridor.
In sum, the Bush administration is balancing three
distinct and increasingly adversarial interests over the
future of the European and Atlantic projects. Although
American policy has defined the promotion of freedom
and democracy as a distinct national priority, it has also
sought to rebuild relations with its traditional NATO
allies and has endeavored to maintain cooperative links
with Russia. A more vigorous policy of expanding the
Western alliance across the European continent could
place the White House in more direct confrontation
with the Kremlin and damage its improving relations
with several strategically hesitant EU partners.
The U.S. administration needs to respond to the
escalating strategic challenges in a widening Europe.
The East European and Caucasian regions, which Russia
claims as an integral part of “Eurasia,” have emerged as
major battlegrounds between two contrasting political
systems and two potentially conflictive security
structures. Contradictory or ineffectual American
policies toward the EU, its new allies, and Russia will
simply contribute to intensifying the struggle for power
and influence in the “wider Europe” as aspirations rise
and threats multiply.
Several pressing regional questions of direct
concern to America’s new allies in Central-Eastern
Europe will necessitate greater American engagement
and U.S.-EU complementarity, as well as closer policy
coordination between the CEE capitals. In particular,
CEE governments seek greater clarity in U.S. policy
toward Russia and the broader region, more resolute
support for the region’s democratization, and a firm
commitment to NATO and EU enlargement eastward.
It is in America’s national interests to intensify its
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engagement with the remaining East European states
that currently lie outside the Atlantic orbit. Concrete
steps toward their inclusion in NATO and the EU would
help expand prospects for democratic governance and
free markets, stabilize Washington’s newest allies in
CEE, and increase the number of America’s potential
future partners.
Policy Recommendations.
For Central-East European States:
• The CEE states need to forge a political consensus
with regard to their policies toward their East
European neighbors. This needs to involve a
common strategy working within the EU and
NATO and developing multilateral links with
all the East European countries. CEE capitals
need to support each other in all EU institutions
in devising and pursuing policies of engagement
with the East Europeans and policies of realism
toward Russia. Close coordination in eastern
policy would need to be conducted at the
ministerial level.
• Local governments in CEE regions bordering the
eastern states should enhance their cross-border
programs, based on the principles of assistance
for democracy, civil society, and market
economies, including support for business
development, market access, and authentic
civic cooperation. These programs should be
closer in line with the foreign policies of CEE
governments rather than being subordinate to
formal European Commission procedures and
guidelines.211
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• Ukraine can be included as an active observer
in the Central European Visegrád group that
includes the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
and Slovakia, and be offered the prospect of
involvement in the Weimar Triangle initiative
that includes Poland, Germany, and France.
• Having entered the EU in 2007, Romania
can enhance its assistance for Moldova’s EU
ambitions by sharing broadcast media and
publications, opening cultural and information
centers, and promulgating debate about the
requirements and benefits of Union entry.
• The countries canvassing for NATO and EU
entry—particularly Ukraine, Moldova, and
Georgia—will need to formally leave the
CIS and disentangle themselves from other
organizations and initiatives dominated
by Russia. These organizations retard each
country’s progress toward Western institutions
and ultimately threaten their state sovereignty
and national independence.
For NATO Allies:
• The NATO Allies must be prepared for a long
and arduous struggle if they want to ensure that
Moscow’s neighbors can become America’s and
Europe’s partners with closer political, economic,
and security ties, as well as generators of regional
security. In particular, a sustained package of
incentives and assistance must be provided
for Ukraine to consolidate the advantages
of democratic reform. Targeted assistance is
necessary for the Belarusian opposition and
elements of the establishment that may seek an
alternative to President Lukashenka. A more
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activist policy can be pursued to reintegrate
the divided Moldovan and Georgian states,
promote democratization, combat criminal
networks, and give both countries the prospect
of an alliance with the United States.
• NATO needs to develop more structured and
durable engagement with other Caucasian and
Central Asian states by offering each the prospect
of close security and political cooperation. This
will also help prevent the Moscow dominated
CSO from becoming a rival to NATO and the
United States and a new source of regional
threat.
• NATO should devise a more coherent,
consensual, and long-range approach toward
the aspirant states in Eastern Europe in terms of
future membership of the Alliance. As NATO
takes on a global role in such areas as peace
enforcement, humanitarian support, and state
stabilization, countries that fulfill the general
criteria for inclusion, including democratic rule
and security sector reform, need to obtain a
specific track for membership.212
• NATO can assist Poland in developing the
existing Polish-Ukrainian Battalion into a more
substantial brigade that can be employed for
peacekeeping duties on Alliance missions.
Other CEE and East European militaries can
also be involved in such arrangements.
• NATO must be prepared to provide peacekeeping forces and other units in the “frozen conflicts”
in Moldova (Transnistria) and Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia). Chisinau and Tbilisi
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need to formulate concrete proposals for Alliance participation in peacekeeping operations.
They can also engage in democratization
programs, civil society building, security sector
reform, demilitarization, demobilization, and
antiproliferation in former conflict zones.
• NATO should encourage the creation of a joint
peacekeeping contingent under the auspices of
the GUAM organization that would help raise
its visibility and practical value. The contingent
could serve alongside NATO and U.S. units in
various conflict or reconstruction zones.
• NATO must directly address the anti-Alliance
propaganda generated primarily by Moscow,
especially among Russia’s neighbors and better
inform partners and aspirants as to what to
expect from cooperation with the Alliance.
Allied governments and NGOs need to more
effectively explain NATO’s mission to the
publics of Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and
Georgia. NATO has evolved into an organization
that projects stability and is actively engaged in
resolving conflicts and crises. It is not simply a
military alliance but a political organization and
a security promoter for members, aspirants, and
neighbors.213
For EU institutions:
• The EU can be instrumental in establishing
a fund to support democratic movements in
the authoritarian states of the post-communist
world. Before he was elected Estonia’s President
in October 2006, Vice Chairman of the European
Parliament Toomas Hendrik Ilves made such a
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recommendation together with British, Polish,
Hungarian, and Czech Europarliamentarians.214
The idea would be to bypass current EU
regulations that only allow funds to be donated
to movements approved by each country’s
government.
• Because the fund cannot be created within the
framework of the EU due to the opposition of
the older members, the new EU entrants need
to take the initiative. The European Liberty
Fund has been proposed as the name of the
new initiative, which would work through
alternative mechanisms to support the
democratic opposition.
• Brussels could open a full EU delegation office
in Belarus, thus developing its decision from
2005 to establish a regionalized EU delegation
in Minsk.215 It can also nominate an EU Special
Representative for Belarus. By easing visa
regulations for members of civil society,
scholars, and students, the EU would help open
up the country to EU influences and democratic
alternatives. The European Initiative for
Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) should
be fully utilized and contacts developed with all
sections of Belarusian society, including regional
elites, unions, business leaders, and educational
institutions.216
• EIDHR should be fully utilized and contacts
developed with all sections of Belarusian society,
including regional elites, unions, business
leaders, and educational institutions.217
• A greater role should be given to NGOs in
candidate states such as Ukraine, especially in
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raising public awareness and debate about the
EU and NATO and providing the authorities
with important analytical inputs in their
decisionmaking process.218
• The EU, together with the United States, should
become a member of the Black Sea Economic
Council (BSEC) and take an active role in its
initiatives. This would enhance the prestige and
effectiveness of the organization and enable it
to take a broader role in security and reform
questions.
• The EU needs to strengthen the conflict
resolution instruments of its policies in Moldova
and Georgia and provide more powers and
resources to the EU Special Representatives
(EUSR) in the South Caucasus and in Moldova.
The mandate of the EUSR in Georgia should be
strengthened from that of conflict prevention
to conflict resolution, thereby enabling the
representative to facilitate direct talks between
Georgia and the two separatist entities.
• The EU should adopt a more prominent role in
resolving the separatist standoffs in Moldova and
Georgia and not simply trail the OSCE mission.
This would include the application of sanctions
and incentives where necessary to advance
solutions. Suggestions have also been made to
increase engagement with the unrecognized
administrations in Transnistria, Abkhazia, and
South Ossetia to promote democratization,
civil society development, and the rule of law
without legitimizing the status of these entities.
This would help counter their isolation, promote
pro-EU currents, and avoid exclusion from the
EU integration process. Eventually, the EU may
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need to employ multinational peacekeeping
missions in both Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
• The EU can enhance its ENP Action Plan with
Moldova and Georgia to include the issue
of state reintegration.219 The South Caucasus
and Moldovan conflicts need to be raised in
senior discussions by EU representatives with
neighboring powers, particularly during EURussia Summits and other high-level meetings.
• A new Border Monitoring Operation (BMO)
along the Georgian-Russian border needs to be
emplaced under an EU mandate to reinforce
Georgia’s sense of security and help implement
a more effective border guard and customs
management system along Georgia’s entire
frontier with Russia. If some EU member states
remain fearful of antagonizing Russia through
such a mission, a coalition of willing EU states
could launch such an initiative.220
• A more coherent EU policy needs to be devised
toward Russia, working together with the United
States and the NATO alliance. Specifically, this
would need to include:
		

—

Applying diplomatic pressure on Moscow
to cease supporting the Lukashenka
dictatorship in Belarus.221

		

—

The EU must require Russia to withdraw
its military contingents and weaponry
from the Transnistrian region of Moldova
in line with Moscow’s commitments at the
OSCE Istanbul Summit in November 1999.
If this is not accomplished within a set
timeframe, the Russian military presence in
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Transnistria should be declared as illegal.
Moldova’s constitution underscores the
country’s neutrality and prohibits the
presence of foreign troops on any part of
Moldovan territory.
		

—

The EU and United States, working
with Ukraine, should ban military and
commercial flights between Russia and
Moldova’s breakaway region of Transnistria
without the authorization of the Moldovan
authorities. A similar arrangement should
be pursued with Tbilisi to ban unauthorized
Russian flights to the secessionist Abkhaz
and South Ossetian regions of Georgia.

		

—

The Kaliningrad region on the Baltic coast,
which borders the EU states of Poland and
Lithuania and was annexed by Russia at
the end of World War II, needs to be placed
on the EU’s neighborhood agenda. Greater
engagement with the local authorities,
politicians, and businessmen would
discourage the region’s isolation, promote
economic development, and prevent it
from becoming a source of instability,
cross-border crime, and environmental
hazards for the wider Baltic zone.

• It is important for the United States and EU to
coordinate their energy policy as a common
strategic security interest. Russian control over
energy routes from the trans-Caspian region will
undermine American interests throughout the
Middle East, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe
by giving Moscow strong political leverage over
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these states. A trans-Atlantic energy security
strategy can direct more substantial investment
toward alternative routes from the Caspian
basin and can oblige members of NATO and
the EU to pool their resources during a crisis.
This will lessen dependence, instability, and
potential future conflicts with Russia. The EU
and the United States do have some leverage in
that Moscow needs Western capital to increase
energy extraction and modernize its energyexporting infrastructure. This leverage should
be used strategically to ensure fair competition
and transparency in energy policy and avoid the
monopolization of supplies and infrastructure.
• More resources need to be earmarked for
conducting an effective public awareness
campaign about the EU throughout Eastern
Europe, including its structure, institutions,
principles, values, programs, capabilities, and
membership benefits. The CEE countries can be
very helpful in this process as they have recently
joined the Union and have first-hand experience
regarding the impact of accession.
For the U.S. administration:
• The U.S. administration needs to clearly make
the argument that progress toward stable states
and secure democracies in a widening Europe
and an expanding trans-Atlantic community
that encompasses the Black Sea zone and
the Caspian Basin is in America’s national
interests and serves its strategic goals. The
eventual inclusion of East European states that
are currently situated outside NATO and the
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creation of a wider Alliance would help expand
and consolidate democratic systems, open
up new markets, stabilize Washington’s new
allies, and increase the number of potential U.S.
partners.
• Regional questions of direct concern to the
CEE countries will necessitate greater U.S.
engagement and more visible and effective U.S.EU complementarity. America’s new CEE allies
seek greater clarity in U.S. policy toward Russia
and the wider region and more resolute support
for Russian democratization and the curtailment
of Moscow’s regional neo-imperialist ambitions.
A long-term commitment to democracy and
security throughout the Wider Europe would
add substance to President George W. Bush’s
global initiative on behalf of spreading freedom
and democracy.
• The Bush administration has called for greater
involvement by Poland, Lithuania, and other
nearby CEE countries in the democratic
transformation of Belarus. Washington will
need to provide more substantive political and
financial support for opposition activists as they
become engaged in the prolonged struggle for
democratic change in Minsk.
• The United States can provide the Ukrainian
government headed by President Yushchenko
and Prime Minister Yanukovych with attractive
counteroptions to dependence on Moscow,
including closer engagement with NATO and
better defense cooperation, if Kyiv undertakes
a sustained effort at structural reform. NATO’s
Intensified Dialogue with Ukraine must reinforce
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the perception that Ukraine is a genuine partner
of both NATO and the EU.
• Washington can pursue a more active
policy in reintegrating the Moldovan state,
discouraging Russian interference, promoting
democratization, combating the criminal
networks in Transnistria, and extending to
Moldovans the prospect of a closer partnership
with the United States.
• To underscore its more activist and transformational approach, Washington should remove
the “Eurasia” label from all U.S. Government
institutions. Just as the three Baltic states were
never officially recognized by the United States
as part of the Soviet Union, the East European,
Caucasian, and Central Asian states bordering
Russia today should not be defined as part
of some grand “Eurasian” or “post-Soviet”
space in which Russia predominates. Labeling
effects perception and perception impacts on
policy. “Eurasian” labeling is inaccurate and
insulting to the citizens of diverse countries
with divergent aspirations. Such labels also
create a strong impression that Washington and
Brussels will keep these states at a distance and
accept the premise that some East European
states should remain subservient to Russia’s
expansive national interests.
• Russia is not a reliable U.S. partner, and
Washington needs to draw up contingencies
for a potentially unstable post-Putin era. We
cannot assume that Putinism has created a
stable authoritarian system. Russia confronts
several looming crises: demographic (with a
declining population of productive age), ethnic,
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and potentially religious (especially in the
North Caucasus), economic (with over reliance
on primary resources), social (as the stifling of
democracy restricts flexibility, adaptability,
and modernization), and political (as power
struggles may become manifest between the
new Kremlin oligarchs and security chiefs who
have gained control over large sectors of the
economy). Although Washington has few tools
to influence Russia’s internal development,
it can deploy its economic, diplomatic, and
military capabilities to forestall and contain any
instabilities emanating from Russian territory
that could challenge the security of various
neighboring countries.
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